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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines debates about the precautionary principle in a tribunal and judicial review 
proceeding where environmental groups and individuals challenged a proposal to burn tires and 
other non-traditional fuel sources at a cement plant in Ontario, Canada. Chapter 1 explores 
scholarship on the precautionary principle and outlines the unique analytical contributions 
offered by administrative constitutionalism theory. Chapter 2 sets out the case study   
methodology employed by the author. Chapter 3 explains the legislative context. In chapters 4 
through 9, each participant’s arguments are analyzed in relation to the two paradigms of 
administrative constitutionalism: Rational-Instrumentalist and Deliberative-Constitutive. This 
thesis establishes that administrative constitutionalism discourse dominates the construction and 
contestation of environmental risk; the author further argues that administrative 
constitutionalism’s discursive dominance has an exclusionary impact on the people, ideas and 
interests represented in environmental risk regulation. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
The precautionary principle has been the subject of debate and controversy since it first 
emerged in Europe in the 1970s. More recently, several scholars have argued that debates 
surrounding the precautionary principle are linked with debates about the proper role of the 
public administrators who are charged with implementing the principle.1 Questions about the 
source of legitimacy in regulatory decisions, the role of courts on judicial review, and the value 
of generalist, community and expert knowledge are at the core of disputes about both the 
precautionary principle and public administration. Elizabeth Fisher has used the term 
“administrative constitutionalism” – which refers to the constituting, limiting, and holding to 
account of public administration – in describing these debates about public administration.2  
In Ontario, the close ties that connect debates about the precautionary principle and 
administrative constitutionalism were crystallized in the Lafarge decisions3 that are the subject of 
this case study. Lafarge originated in an attempt by the international cement company Lafarge 
Inc. to burn tires and other non-traditional fuel sources at a cement plant in Ontario. 
Precautionary ideas played a central role in the ensuing legal debates at both the administrative 
proceedings before the Environmental Review Tribunal and a subsequent judicial review at the 
Divisional Court. My research will address the following research question: What role did 
competing understandings of administrative constitutionalism play in disputes about the 
                                                
1 E.g. Elizabeth Fisher, Risk Regulation and Administrative Constitutionalism (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2007). Fisher suggests administrative constitutionalism is an essentially contested 
concept whose meaning is context-specific; John Paterson, “The Precautionary Principle: 
Practical Reasoning, Regulatory Decision-Making and Review in the Context of Functional 
Differentiation” in Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (eds) Law and Ecology: New 
Environmental Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2011) at 83-104. 
2 Fisher supra note 1 at 24-5. 
3 Dawber v Ontario (Ministry of the Environment), [2007] OERTD No 25 [Dawber], judicial 
review denied in Lafarge Canada Inc v Ontario (Environmental Review Tribunal), [2008] OJ No 
2460 (Div Ct) [Lafarge]. 
2 
precautionary principle in Lafarge? In answering that question this paper draws on the work of 
Elizabeth Fisher, and specifically her identification of two dominant paradigms of administrative 
constitutionalism – Rational-Instrumentalism (RI) and Deliberative-Constitutive (DC) – that are 
each associated with different understandings of the precautionary principle. The DC paradigm 
recognizes a “semi-independent” role for public administrators oriented around the exercise of 
discretion.4 The RI paradigm, in contrast, views public administration as an instrument of 
legislators that carries out specific responsibilities established through a democratic lawmaking 
process.5  
This case study also introduces a new dimension to the existing scholarship on 
administrative constitutionalism and precaution: It recognizes administrative constitutionalism as 
a type of discourse that constructs, channels, and limits understandings of environmental risk 
regulation. Therefore instead of exclusively focusing on the two rival constituent discourses 
inside the umbrella discourse of administrative constitutionalism, this paper also takes a broader 
look at how administrative constitutionalism’s discursive dominance serves to exclude certain 
possibilities and participants. Maarten Hajer’s work on environmental discourses is a guiding 
influence on this aspect of the case study.6  
Although this study is grounded in Elizabeth Fisher’s work on administrative 
constitutionalism, which is most fully developed in her book Risk Regulation and Administrative 
Constitutionalism, the literature review engages with several other theoretical lenses that 
observers have used to make sense of the controversies surrounding precaution. In particular, 
many scholars embrace a science/democracy dichotomy that frames debates about environmental 
                                                
4 Ibid, 30-2. 
5 Ibid, 28-30. 
6 Maarten Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the 
Policy Process (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
3 
risk as centred on whether choices are best made on the basis of scientific analysis or democratic 
processes. Cass Sunstein, John Paterson, and David Resnik all adopt this framing to varying 
extents, and with their own particular nuances.7 Others cast the regulatory challenges posed by 
environmental risk in moral terms. The precautionary scholarship of Kerry Whiteside, John 
Applegate, and L.M. Collins is infused with sensitivity to the moral implications of regulatory 
choices, even if they sometimes reach diametrically opposed conclusions.8 The epistemology of 
environmental risk is another focal point for scholars who distinguish among different types and 
degrees of knowledge about environmental harm. Andy Stirling, Bruno Latour, David Dana, 
Dayna Nadine Scott, and Brian Wynne engage with these questions.9 
 This list is incomplete and the categorization is inexact. Many scholars approach 
precautionary issues from multiple angles, moving from the nature of risk to the contributions of 
scientists and to choosing the appropriate precautionary response, and this summary is merely 
intended to illustrate some of the diverse paths followed by observers of precautionary debates. 
Yet this case study is not agnostic about which approaches are most illuminating and effective: it 
                                                
7 Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005); Paterson, supra note 1; David B. Resnik, “Is the precautionary principle 
unscientific?” (2003) 34 Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences 329.  
8 Kerry Whiteside, Precautionary Politics: Principle and Practice in Confronting Environmental 
Risk (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006); John S. Applegate, “The Taming of the Precautionary 
Principle”, (2002) 27 William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 13; Lynda M. 
Collins, “Security of the Person, Peace of Mind: A Precautionary Approach to Environmental 
Uncertainty” (2013) 4(1) Journal Human Rights and the Environment 79. 
9 Andy Stirling, “Science, Precaution, and the Politics of Technological Risk: Converging 
Implications in Evolutionary and Social Scientific Perspectives” (2008) 1128 Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences 95; Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into 
Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); David Dana, “The Contextual 
Rationality of the Precautionary Principle” in (2009) 35 Queen’s Law Journal 67; Dayna Nadine 
Scott, “Confronting Chronic Pollution: A Socio-Legal Analysis of Risk and Precaution” (2008) 
46 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 293; Brian Wynne, “Uncertainty and Environmental Learning: 
Reconceiving Science and Policy in the Preventive Paradigm” (1992) 2(2) Global Environmental 
Change 111. 
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adopts the analytical lens of administrative constitutionalism, and incorporates Hajer’s work on 
environmental discourses to sharpen and enrich that lens. Like Fisher, this paper argues that the 
science/democracy framing – arguably the most pervasive analytical approach – is 
fundamentally at odds with empirical accounts of precautionary debates and therefore incapable 
of explaining how precautionary decisions are made. These views are further detailed in the 
literature review and a concluding chapter, but this paper chiefly relies on the work of Fisher, 
Tollefson and Thornback, Paterson and others to support the premise that public administration 
is the proper analytical focal point from which to understand precautionary debates. The bulk of 
this paper is therefore concerned with the insights gained through analyzing the discourse of 
administrative constitutionalism in the Lafarge debates.  
Although the precautionary principle has appeared in many different textual forms, 
certain core elements are consistent. The principle is applicable where there is scientific 
uncertainty about the nature and/or extent of a risk to environmental or human health, and it 
provides for regulatory action to be taken to address the risk. When precaution is invoked in real-
world regulatory contexts, it can have radically different meanings. Some believe that the 
precautionary principle is little more than a common sense affirmation that governments are free 
to regulate dangerous practices before science has cleared all confusion about the danger. Others 
see precaution as a radical departure from the idea that regulation of environmental risk should 
be based on science. This “radical” label is embraced by both proponents and critics of the 
principle – the former claim that precaution can transform environmentally destructive patterns 
5 
of economic development, while the latter see precaution as a gateway to irrational decision-
making that will prevent much-needed technological innovations.10  
Although scholarly attention to the precautionary principle has often focused on its 
international operation, particularly in environmental treaties and trade disputes, much of this 
scholarship is of limited relevance to domestic case studies like this one. Implementing the 
precautionary principle involves fundamentally different challenges in international and 
domestic contexts, perhaps most notably in regard to citizen participation.11 However, this 
international context often informs the precautionary principle’s domestic application. In the 
leading Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) case on the precautionary principle – Spraytech12 – the 
Court grounded its attempts to define the principle in a survey of international legal statements 
on precaution.  
There is no clear demarcation between international and domestic considerations of 
precaution. Accordingly, this review of pertinent scholarly literature focuses on works that 
engage with the challenges implicated in the principle’s domestic application, particularly in 
Canada and other common law jurisdictions, while also consulting more internationally-oriented 
sources that nonetheless speak to these domestic challenges.  
The distinction between international and domestic expressions of the precautionary 
principle also has profound consequences for their underlying concepts of administrative 
                                                
10 E.g. Whiteside, supra note 8; Sunstein, supra note 7; John Dryzek, Robert S. Goodin, Aviezer 
Tucker & Bernard Ruber, “Promethean Elites Encounter Precautionary Publics” in (2009) 34(3) 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 263. 
11 E.g. Jacqueline Peel, The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision- 
Making and Scientific Uncertainty (Annandale: Federation Press, 2005) at 137-59; Fisher supra 
note 1 at 165-7;  
12 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 SCR 241, 
2001 SCC 40 at paras 31-2. See also Castonguay Blasting Ltd. v Ontario (Environment), 2013 
SCC 52 at para 20. 
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constitutionalism. The DC paradigm’s emphasis on public participation and administrative 
discretion may prove more difficult to operationalize globally than in national or sub-national 
contexts. This perception, regardless of its validity, could also lead to the precautionary principle 
being understood in comparatively more RI terms internationally than domestically. The 
principle’s evolution in domestic and international contexts may lead to different destinations. 
The following literature review explores a range of alternative ways to understand 
precautionary debates in addition to Fisher’s focus on paradigms of administrative 
constitutionalism, and concludes with a discussion of the unique contributions offered by linking 
Fisher’s theory of administrative constitutionalism with Hajer’s ideas about environmental 
discourses.  
Precautionary scholars have also employed a broad range of methods, from textual 
analysis of how understandings of precaution have evolved in international law to philosophical 
treatises on risk and legitimacy to case studies of the principle’s implementation.13 This paper 
follows the case study approach.  
The Lafarge case began when Lafarge Canada Inc. sought approval from the Ministry of 
the Environment (MOE) to burn “alternative fuels” – including tires – at a cement manufacturing 
plant in Bath, Ontario, prompting hundreds of individuals and environmental organizations, 
including Lake Ontario Waterkeeper (LOW), to express their opposition to the proposal in 
written comments and public meetings. The MOE approved the proposal despite this opposition, 
but it added a number of conditions requiring Lafarge to monitor and mitigate the facility’s 
                                                
13 Arie Trouwborst, “The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem Approach in International 
Law: Differences, Similarities and Linkages” in (2009) 18(1) Review of European Community 
and International Environmental Law 26; Jacqueline Peel, “Precaution – A Matter of Principle, 
Approach or Process?” (2004) 5(2) Melbourne Journal of International Law 483; Christian 
Munthe, The Price of Precaution and the Ethics of Risk (New York: Springer, 2011).  
7 
environmental impact. On the same day that the Ministry approved Lafarge’s proposals with 
these additional conditions, it announced a proposed regulation that would ban tire burning for 
two years because of a lack of knowledge regarding its environmental and health impacts. The 
proposed regulation would not apply to previously approved tire burning facilities, and since the 
Bath facility was the only one authorized in the province this would have the effect of 
prohibiting elsewhere in the province what was permitted in Bath.  
Subsequently, a number of individuals and environmental organizations applied for leave 
to appeal the decision under Section 38 of the Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR).14 Section 38 
allows third-party appeals of environmental decisions in certain circumstances, bypassing normal 
standing requirements for such appeals. Such appeals, and applications for leave to appeal, are 
heard by the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT). Section 41 establishes the criteria for 
granting leave to appeal.15  
The ERT granted leave to appeal, and the Divisional Court of Ontario upheld the ERT’s 
decision. After the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected Lafarge’s request for leave to appeal the 
Divisional Court’s ruling, Lafarge abandoned the project.16 The MOE’s failure to apply the 
precautionary principle was at issue throughout the proceedings, although the content of the 
debate on this point changed significantly from the ERT leave hearing to the judicial review. The 
allegations concerning the precautionary and ecosystem approaches were based on their 
inclusion in the MOE’s Statement of Environmental Values (SEV), a document it was obliged to 
consider when making environmentally significant decisions pursuant to Section 11 of the EBR. 
At the ERT, all the parties agreed that the SEV – and by extension the precautionary approach 
                                                
14 Section 38, Environmental Bill of Rights, SO 1993, Ch 28. 
15 Section 41, Environmental Bill of Rights, supra. 
16 Baker v Directors, Ministry of the Environment, Case Nos 07-009-07-016 (June 16, 2009) [ON 
ERT] at 8-9. 
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outlined in the SEV – was applicable. This changed when Lafarge and the MOE modified their 
position on judicial review and disputed the SEV’s applicability.  
Under the first branch of the S 41 test, the leave Applicants made several distinct 
allegations about the MOE Directors’ unreasonableness: they failed to consider the SEV, and the  
principles it contains concerning the precautionary approach, the ecosystem approach, resource 
conservation, and public participation; they failed to obtain requisite information on baseline 
environmental conditions; they disregarded the common law rights of local landowners; and they 
discriminated against Bath residents by permitting tire burning there while proposing its 
prohibition elsewhere in the province. On judicial review at the Divisional Court only four 
grounds were considered: the proper interpretation of the S 41 test for granting leave to appeal; 
the relevance of the SEV, and whether the Directors properly considered the ecosystem and 
precautionary approaches; the relevance of common law property rights; and the alleged 
discrimination against residents of Bath.  
My analysis of the legal issues raised in Lafarge is comparatively limited, and this case 
study will not address all of the grounds listed above. Instead I will focus on the debates 
surrounding the precautionary approach and the proposed moratorium on tire burning. The 
proposed moratorium is relevant because it was closely linked to questions about the distribution 
of environmental risk. Other issues will only be addressed to the extent that they illuminate the 
concepts of administrative constitutionalism underpinning the precautionary debates in Lafarge: 
for example, Chapter 4 features a brief discussion of how the leave Applicants linked their 
precautionary arguments with their criticisms of the public consultation process. In addition, the 
parties in Lafarge frequently made use of the same supporting materials and evidence under 
9 
multiple grounds. Consequently, where a fact or opinion that is related to precaution is 
considered under another ground, I will cite and examine it.  
The case study will show that all the S 38 Applicants represented by lawyers, with the 
exception of Clean Air Bath, consistently relied on DC concepts throughout their submissions to 
the ERT and on judicial review. Lafarge mirrored this consistency by adhering to RI principles. 
The MOE, however, switched from largely DC arguments at the ERT to RI arguments at the 
Divisional Court. RI and DC principles were blended in the ERT’s decision, while the DC 
paradigm dominated the Divisional Court’s judgment. Lafarge left DC concepts of the 
precautionary principle, and administrative constitutionalism more generally, on firmer ground. 
RI ideas were not vanquished, but their place in Ontario environmental risk regulation was 
secondary to DC ideas.  
The case study’s findings, and the analysis those findings generate, go beyond 
summarizing the state of administrative constitutionalism in the Lafarge precautionary debates. 
Following a detailed review of the case study’s results, I will make three interrelated arguments 
in a chapter discussing the results. The arguments centre on the limited relevance of a 
science/democracy framing, the lack of any evidence that one paradigm of administrative 
constitutionalism is more or less precautionary than the other, and the nature of the exclusion 
engendered by administrative constitutionalism’s discursive dominance.  
The first Part of this paper is the literature review, the parameters of which were 
discussed above, and following that will be a brief history of the Environmental Bill of Rights. 
These are found in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively. Chapter 3 summarizes the methods and 
materials used in the case study. The Lafarge case study is found in Parts II and III. Part II 
details the proceedings before the ERT, while Part III shifts to focus on the judicial review at the 
10 
Divisional Court. Chapter 4 analyzes the debates regarding the interpretation of S 41, the leave to 
appeal test. Chapter 5 shows how the parties in three separate grounds confronted questions of 
environmental risk and precaution: the second branch of the S 41 test, the precautionary 
approach, and the alleged discrimination against Bath residents. Chapter 6 looks at the parties’ 
interweaving of expertise, science and proof to construct their precautionary arguments. Each 
Chapter in both Parts II and III also features a discussion of how the ERT and the Court, 
respectively, ruled on the legal issues raised by the parties. Chapter 7, the first of Part III, 
examines the debates regarding Dunsmuir and the choice to understand the ERT’s role in 
external or internal review terms, which has significant implications for the degree of deference 
commanded by a Tribunal decision on judicial review. Chapter 8 focuses on the extent and form 
of accountability faced by MOE decision-makers, which emerged as a key issue on judicial 
review. Chapter 9 concludes the case study with an examination of deference’s role in the 
conflict about upholding the ERT’s findings on the risk of harm. Part IV consists of a Chapter 
discussing the findings.  
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PART I: Overview and Literature Review 
Chapter 1  
Literature Review 
Understanding the problem 
The precautionary principle is a legal response to the environmental problems posed by 
technological and industrial innovation. Yet the precise nature of the problem eludes consensus, 
even among supporters of the principle. The challenge, variously described as “risk” and 
“uncertainty”, for regulators is that the environmental consequences of allowing this innovation 
to progress unchecked are often unknown and potentially dangerous. How people chose to label 
this problem of unknown dangers often proves revealing. Usage of the word “risk” can indicate a 
presumption that the unknown consequences of technological developments are capable of 
eventually being defined and measured, after more scientific research.17 According to this 
characterization, the lack of knowledge that makes precaution necessary is temporary, and often 
the precautionary principle only requires delaying the implementation of a new technological 
practice: Certainty will be achieved in the future, but in the meantime the precautionary principle 
can provide guidance.18  
When the same regulatory problem is called “uncertainty,” a different set of assumptions 
is usually found: Knowledge amounting to certainty or near-certainty may never be attainable, at 
least in regard to particular technological practices and ecological processes that are 
exceptionally complex. Precaution may therefore be needed indefinitely. These alternative 
epistemologies can each exist with strong and tame versions of the principle, but critics of the 
                                                
17 Paterson supra note 1 at 85-7; Peel (2005) supra note 11 at 20-1. 
18 Dayna Nadine Scott, “Testing Toxicity: Proof and Precaution in Canada’s Chemicals 
Management Plan” (2009) 18(1) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 59 at 70.  
12 
precautionary principle almost invariably embrace the language of “risk” and reject the idea of 
indefinite uncertainty.  
Cost-benefit risk assessment is the precautionary principle’s main rival in regulating 
technological practices with potentially adverse environmental consequences. It is based on the 
notion that the consequences are quantifiable and proper subjects for mathematical analysis.19 
While epistemologies of both “risk” and “uncertainty” can support diverse interpretations of the 
precautionary principle, the language of “uncertainty” is usually only employed by proponents of 
the principle.  
Elizabeth Fisher identifies three features of technological risk that make it resistant to 
agreement: first, scientific uncertainty about the nature and extent of technological risk; second, 
behavioral uncertainty, or human error, which may also increase the risks associated with 
technology (e.g. human error was instrumental in the Three Miles Island nuclear reactor 
accident); and third, cultural context which influences the acceptability of a risk, including how 
the benefits of a risk are distributed within society.20 These features of technological risk 
combine and reinforce each other to make it difficult for people to reach agreement about how to 
manage or even define it, given that no precise mathematical formula or clear legal rule is 
capable of identifying the nature, extent and appropriate response for a given technological risk. 
All three of these features were present in Lafarge. As discussed in the case study, the dangers 
posed by the tire burning emissions, the trustworthiness of the Lafarge personnel managing and 
monitoring the plant, and the fairness of allowing tire burning in Bath while contemplating its 
prohibition elsewhere in the province were at the heart of Lafarge’s precautionary debates. 
                                                
19 Sunstein supra note 7 at 129-38; Dana supra note 9 at paras 29-32.  
20 Fisher supra note 1 at 7-11. 
13 
The terminology of knowledge, and its absence, is interwoven with the 
science/democracy dichotomy that often frames precautionary debates. Arguments about 
science’s inadequacy often rest on the presumption that uncertainty and ignorance characterize 
our understanding of many technological practices, rather than precise probability ratios 
expressed in mathematical terms. Because environmental decisions must sometimes be made in a 
state of very limited knowledge, the choices are inherently political and thus must be made 
democratically: The legitimacy of these political choices depends on their democratic 
credentials. In contrast, the idea that environmental regulation is properly entrusted to scientific 
experts reflects the assumption that science can provide answers about environmental 
consequences.21  
Paterson complicates this science/democracy dichotomy - and the related distinction 
between risk and uncertainty - by drawing on David Resnik’s work to distinguish decision-
making under conditions of risk and ignorance. Where there is risk, probabilities can be assigned 
to various environmental outcomes, but this is impossible in cases of ignorance. Paterson argues 
that because decision-making under conditions of ignorance is inherently controversial, a 
political and legal response is called for.22 Quantitative analysis, such as traditional risk 
assessment, is simply inadequate, which in turn points to the precautionary principle’s legitimacy 
and justiciability. Paterson acknowledges that the label “risk” can explain some regulatory 
challenges, but in other cases ignorance is the problem.23 Consequently Paterson’s use of 
“ignorance” resembles other scholars’ use of “uncertainty.” However, the different vocabulary 
                                                
21 Fisher supra note 1 at 11-3. 
22 Paterson supra note 1 at 86-8. 
23 Ibid. 
14 
highlights the radical epistemological implications of abandoning the idea that, although risks 
may be temporarily unknown, they are ultimately knowable.  
Whiteside, in contrast to Paterson’s careful delineation among decision-making 
conditions, seeks to transform how risk itself is understood. Instead of resorting to words like 
“uncertainty” or “ignorance” to describe the regulatory challenge posed by technology’s 
unknown environmental consequences, Whiteside broadens the conceptual scope of risk and 
argues that its definition is unduly narrow.24 Risk’s meaning is expanded to encompass 
uncertainty. Yet the radical epistemological implications of Whiteside’s reasoning are softened 
by his acceptance that the precautionary principle is only properly applicable where the nature of 
a risk is uncertain. (This raises the question of how such uncertainty is identified, which is 
explored later in the discussion of expertise.) Thus Whiteside acknowledges the relevance of 
uncertainty by recognizing that it marks a category of risk: Uncertainty and risk co-exist, 
precluding a clear dichotomy between the concepts. 
Stirling, in his 2008 article “Science, Precaution, and Technological Risk,” offers another 
variation by distinguishing between uncertainty and ignorance. Uncertainty, according to 
Stirling, exists where the range of environmental outcomes is known but the probability of each 
outcome is unknown. Ignorance represents the intersection of lack of knowledge about both 
probabilities and the range of possible outcomes.25 It is apparent that Paterson and Stirling attach 
a different meaning to the term “ignorance,” while Whiteside’s taxonomy is less clear. 
This is only a snapshot of the many different ways in which lack of knowledge about a 
technology’s environmental consequences is classified and labeled by scholars.26 These 
                                                
24 Whiteside supra note 8 at 51-60. 
25 Stirling supra note 9 at 98-9. 
26 Andreas Klinke and Ortwin Renn, “A New Approach to Risk Evaluation and Management:  
15 
differences may appear semantic or irrelevant to efforts to understand how the principle operates 
in practice, but it is essential to recognize that terms like “risk,” “uncertainty,” and “ignorance” 
can take on a variety of meanings. Making a precautionary argument, or rebutting one, requires 
engaging with these concepts. Accordingly, understanding precautionary debates involves 
clarifying how participants use these terms. Because that usage is inconsistent and often 
imprecise, it is analytically important to avoid attaching a fixed meaning to these terms. The 
results portion of this paper, found in Parts II and III, therefore examines how these terms were 
used, and contested, in the Lafarge precautionary debates. However, in the other portions of this 
thesis the “uncertainty” terminology is preferred because it acknowledges that ignorance is 
sometimes permanent and unavoidable.  
Scholars who rely on the popular science/democracy framing identify understandings of 
risk as a key faultline between the two camps. Stirling’s idea of ignorance or Whiteside’s notion 
of uncertain risks are linked with the democratic side of the binary, while Sunstein’s 
preoccupation with quantifiable risks is associated with the science side. If risk is quantifiable 
and knowable, as Sunstein posits, then science can provide answers. But science’s value 
diminishes when certainty itself diminishes, as Stirling’s and Whiteside’s ideas reflect. Beyond 
these divergent understandings of risk and uncertainty, this science/democracy framing also 
recognizes disagreement about how decisions about the acceptability of risks should be made: 
democratically, or by experts relying on scientific evidence. 
Whiteside and Sunstein are representative of dichotomy’s academic popularity, and its 
resulting influence on analysis of precautionary debates. Consistent with Whiteside’s deep 
                                                                                                                                                       
Risk-Based, Precaution-Based, and Discourse-Based Strategies” (2002) 22 Risk Analysis 1071; 
Latour supra note 9; Cherie Metcalfe,  “Introduction: Emerging Paradigms of Rationality - 
Theory and Applications” in (2009) 35 Queen’s Law Journal 1. 
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skepticism about the ability of science to erase uncertainty about risk, he both embraces the 
science/democracy framing and affirms that legitimate regulatory responses to environmental 
risk must be rooted in democratic processes. Whiteside bases his claim that implementing the 
precautionary principle in a more democratic fashion enhances its effectiveness on three 
grounds: first, public skepticism about novel technologies and practices may counter the 
“excessively action-oriented worldviews associated with particular professions and forms of 
expertise”; second, greater transparency in decision-making will prevent regulatory capture and 
encourage officials to fulfill their precautionary obligations; and third, non-expert knowledge 
may usefully supplement expert scientific knowledge, for example by detecting unforeseen harm 
occurring in local communities at an early stage when it can still be mitigated.27 
Yet Whiteside’s views are better understood as a rejection of science’s primacy in risk 
regulation than as an affirmation of democracy’s value. He accepts the science/democracy 
dichotomy, dismisses the science side, and is thus forced to join the democracy side. This 
reluctance is expressed in his consideration of Bruno Latour’s and Hans Jonas’s work. Latour 
has written extensively on questions of science and democracy, while Jonas is sometimes 
credited with first recognizing and defining the precautionary principle in his 1979 book Das 
Prinzip Verantwortung (roughly translated as “The Principle of Responsibility”).28  
According to Jonas, there is a moral duty to prevent catastrophic risks associated with 
new technologies. The underlying concern or imperative is that no one has the moral authority to 
risk humanity’s future existence. Whiteside is critical of Jonas’s exclusive focus on catastrophic 
risk, as well as his conclusion that only a “tyranny” can meet this moral exigency to stop new 
                                                
27 Whiteside supra note 8 at 125, 129-30, and 131-2. 
28 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological 
Age (trans) Hans Jonas in collaboration with David Herr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985). 
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technologies from threatening humanity’s survival. Jonas’s anti-democratic conclusion, as 
Whiteside explains, is based on his belief that “people in democratic societies are addicted to the 
pleasures of mass consumption”, and thus incapable of putting “the breaks on the compulsive 
dynamic of technological progress.”29 Although Whiteside attacks many of Jonas’s ideas, he also 
urges scholars to go beyond reflexive dismissals of Jonas’s work and instead engage with his 
arguments: “[i]dentifying and criticizing [Jonas’s] presuppositions helps open paths to alternative 
ways of framing precautionary ideas.”30  
Whiteside’s next step on this path towards alternative framings is the work of Latour. 
Latour’s ideas about the precautionary principle are built on Latour’s rejection of the dichotomy 
between human society and nature. Latour instead characterizes many phenomena that are 
conventionally seen as belonging to one side of that dichotomy as “hybrids”. These phenomena, 
which include climate change and genetically modified organisms, are simultaneously a product 
of human action and beyond humanity’s capacity to control. Hybrids are the proper subject of 
democratic decision-making because choices about risk are essentially political.31 Whiteside 
favours Latour’s democratic interpretation of the precautionary principle, but expresses 
reservations about the lack of moral significance Latour attaches to the principle.32 After this 
comparative examination of Latour’s and Jonas’s work, Whiteside concludes that Jonas had the 
better grasp of the unique technological, societal, and political challenges that the precautionary 
principle must meet. Yet Whiteside is adamant that authoritarianism is not the solution to the 
problems identified by Jonas: Democracy is not a panacea, but it is the only viable platform for 
adequately regulating environmental risk.  
                                                
29 Whiteside supra note 8 at 97. 
30 Ibid at 99. 
31 Ibid at 104-6. 
32 Ibid at 107-11. 
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Sunstein exemplifies the opposing viewpoint which holds that the risks presented by 
technological development are best regulated by scientists. Where Whiteside criticizes scientists 
for systematically underestimating risk because of an irrational faith in technology’s safety, 
Sunstein rebukes supporters of the precautionary principle for irrationally distrusting 
technological innovation. He cites a survey of scientists asked to name present-day technologies 
whose invention and development would have been prevented if the precautionary principle had 
existed when they were created. The list included airplanes, antibiotics, X-rays and the smallpox 
vaccine.33  
Moreover, Sunstein criticizes the precautionary principle for being logically incoherent. 
He notes that prohibiting innovation carries its own risks, as in the example of the smallpox 
vaccine, and thus precautionary actions produce uncertain but potentially vast risks – the very 
types of risks that the principle is aimed at eliminating.34 Instead of calling for the abandonment 
of the precautionary principle, Sunstein outlines a proposal for the principle’s reconstruction that 
centres on restricting its application to catastrophic risks. Sunstein’s arguments have sparked 
many rebuttals from supporters of precaution and others who cite flaws in his analysis,35 and the 
scholarly debates that followed are complex and generally beyond the scope of this literature 
review. Yet Sunstein’s views are both influential and representative of one strain of opposition to 
the precautionary principle. His ideas about environmental risk are echoed at points in the 
Lafarge submissions.  
                                                
33 Sunstein supra note 7 at 25, citing Sandy Starr, “Science, Risk, and the Price of Precaution,” 
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34 Sunstein supra note 7 at 26-32. 
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Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass R. Sunstein's Law of Fear" (2006) 2006(5) University of 
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Many other scholars have rejected the science/democracy dichotomy as simplistic and 
misleading. This paper similarly rejects the dichotomy. These critics note that in practice 
precautionary debates focus on competing scientific opinions about the nature of a risk, as well 
as on disagreements about the nature and distribution of a risk.36 Rarely, if ever, do precautionary 
objectors agree that science has established a practice’s safety, but oppose it nonetheless.  
Despite these flaws, the science/democracy dichotomy remains significant for two 
reasons: first, the framing is frequently invoked by participants in precautionary debates, 
including in Lafarge; and second, it informs a large portion of theoretical scholarship on the 
precautionary principle. These concerns about the science/democracy dichotomy’s validity 
should also not be mistaken for a rejection of either concept’s relevance in interpreting the 
principle, and the scholarly and regulatory debates they inspire. In particular, the role of 
democratic processes in legitimately regulating environmental risks is controversial both in 
regard to whether it is important, and how democratic decision-making process can be crafted. 
Consequently there is a rich scholarship on public consultation and the precautionary principle.37 
Scholars writing in this area generally share a similar desire to render environmental decision-
making processes more permeable to public participation and influence, but some scholars 
temper this attitude with a distrust for the bias, irrationality, and inconsistency that is sometimes 
attributed to more inclusive deliberative processes. Research here centres on how meaningful 
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public participation is both defined and effected. Only the first part of that scholarship, which 
concerns the definition and criteria for meaningful public participation, is relevant to this paper. 
 
Administrative Constitutionalism 
One leading critic of the science/democracy framing is Elizabeth Fisher, who has written 
both independently and with Ronnie Harding about the precautionary principle and its 
implementation in regulatory contexts. Fisher cites two additional problems with the 
science/democracy dichotomy beyond the problems listed above: first, both science and 
democracy are difficult to define, and neither concept encompasses public administration – the 
primary context in which risk regulation occurs;38 and second, the dichotomy fails to account for 
law’s role in technological risk regulation.39 Both criticisms build on the same underlying 
premise that public administration, and law’s role in constituting and expressing its limits, cannot 
be understood as extensions of democracy. Fisher maintains that administrative regulation of 
technological risk “can never be democratic”, although it is inevitably political.40 If this premise 
is accepted, the inadequacy of the science/democracy dichotomy is apparent. Moreover, 
precautionary controversies arise precisely when scientific consensus is most elusive. Because 
neither science nor democracy can provide clear answers to the regulatory challenges posed by 
environmental uncertainty, the science/democracy dichotomy is an unhelpful starting point for 
analyzing how the debates unfold. 
                                                
38 Fisher supra note 1 at 16-7. 
39 Ibid at 17. 
40 Ibid at 257. 
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Fisher therefore calls for empirical study of how technological risk sparks controversy in 
practice.41 She argues that technological risk regulation necessarily involves public 
administration, and cites four reasons in support of this claim: first, determining acceptable 
standards of risk requires looking at the context surrounding a particular activity, including its 
political and economic impact; second, information about a technological risk must be gathered 
and assessed, and legislators lack the time and resources for this process; third, expertise is 
required to make sense of this information; and fourth, regulating technological risk involves 
communication, which may range from requiring certain forms of scientific information to large-
scale public participation, and legislators do not have the necessary time, resources, and 
institutional capacity to manage these communications.42 After outlining the importance of 
public administration, Fisher goes on to make her central claim: that debates about the 
precautionary principle, and technological risk regulation more generally, are fundamentally 
about administrative constitutionalism. 
The significance of Fisher’s argument rests on her claim that the precautionary 
principle’s meaning is shaped by the prevailing model of administrative constitutionalism and as 
a consequence its definition and implementation must be understood through the lens of public 
administration. Fisher identifies two dominant paradigms of administrative constitutionalism – 
Rational-Instrumental and Deliberative-Constitutive. Each paradigm constructs technological 
risk differently. Under an RI paradigm, the precautionary principle is defined as a formal legal 
rule that shifts the burden of proof to proponents who seek to establish a project’s safety and 
operates in specified circumstances. Under the DC paradigm, the precautionary principle guides 
                                                
41 Fisher defines technological risk as “environmental and public health risks arising from human 
industrial activities,” supra note 1 at 6-7. 
42 Ibid at 19-21. 
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the exercise of administrative discretion without imposing formal legal obligations on 
proponents and objectors.43 The prevailing model of administrative constitutionalism will also 
impact how precautionary decisions are scrutinized on judicial review.44 Crucially for the 
purposes of this case study, the two paradigms diverge in how they define and apply the 
precautionary principle. 
Because debates about who should determine where and how the precautionary principle 
is applicable were central in Lafarge, Fisher’s (and Harding’s) work in this area is especially 
relevant. The DC and RI paradigms of administrative constitutionalism represent useful 
theoretical frameworks for analyzing legal disputes about the roles of the MOE, the ERT and the 
Divisional Court in shaping the precautionary principle’s reach and meaning. 
The DC paradigm sees public administration as “semi-independent”.45 Public 
administrators have considerable discretion, and their responsibilities are in large part 
deliberative. The DC paradigm understands technological risk as an epistemological problem 
with complex socio-political features. Accountability under the DC paradigm is fostered through 
the provision of clear and substantive reasons for administrative decisions: transparency is aimed 
at easing concerns about the broad discretion entrusted to unelected public administrators. In 
addition, reviews of administrative decisions must closely scrutinize the original deliberative 
process to ensure it was proper. 46 Under the DC paradigm, public administrators have an active 
role as “deliberative problem-solver[s]” with a duty to apply the precautionary principle. 
Importantly, this duty exists regardless of whether an objector raises precautionary concerns.47  
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Rational-Instrumentalism, the second of the two dominant paradigms of administrative 
constitutionalism identified by Fisher, sees public administration as an extension of the 
legislature: its task is “to obey the pre-ordained democratic will as it is expressed in 
legislation.”48 It strives for effectiveness and efficiency. The RI paradigm understands 
technological risk as essentially quantifiable, and capable of management and containment.49 
Accountability is achieved through straightforward assessments of whether rules were followed 
and legislative mandates obeyed. Under the RI paradigm, public administrators implementing the 
precautionary principle are passive “umpire[s]” who weigh evidence of harm and safety using 
burdens and standards of proof, rather than exercising discretion.50  
Fisher’s work on administrative constitutionalism also includes a close study of merits 
review, a process in Australian administrative law where specialized Tribunals review 
administrative decisions. Merits review can be understood as a form of external or internal 
review: the two perspectives differ in whether they define the reviewing tribunal’s institutional 
place as internal or external in relation to the public administrator. 
The DC and RI paradigms also offer contrasting perspectives on public consultation. The 
two paradigms not only diverge on the significance of public consultation, they also diverge on 
what constitutes effective public consultation. Public consultation generates legitimacy, 
according to DC principles, and may even be a precondition for legitimacy. The precautionary 
principle is thus properly applied through participatory decision-making processes.51 The RI 
paradigm, in contrast, attaches minimal significance to public consultation: Expertise is narrowly 
held, the general public has little understanding of the complex questions that arise in 
                                                
48 Ibid at 28. 
49 Ibid at 28-31. 
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environmental risk regulation, and therefore legitimacy may be directly at odds with relying on 
public consultation because it may result in irrational decisions.52 Thus analyzing the legal 
arguments surrounding public participation helps identify the theories of administrative 
constitutionalism that drive each party’s arguments. In turn, this understanding is essential to 
gaining a complete picture of how precaution was understood and constructed in Lafarge. More 
concretely for the purposes of this analysis, the extent of public participation was at issue in 
Lafarge, and the strong public opposition to the project was rhetorically prominent in the leave 
Applicants’ submissions. 
Fisher also complicates this idea of a simple antagonistic relationship between both 
paradigms of administrative constitutionalism by citing court decisions that have attempted to 
reconcile DC and RI models. In particular, she analyzes how the New South Wales Land and 
Environment Court’s decision in Telstra53 assigned DC and RI concepts to different elements of 
the decision making process.  
Telstra was a merits review case heard by the New South Wales Land and Environment 
Court. It concerned a proposal to build a phone tower outside Sydney, Australia. Both directly 
affected parties and third-party observers may apply for merits review. Fisher’s claim is that 
when merits review is understood in DC terms, so is the precautionary principle, and vice versa. 
The Court’s judgment in Telstra characterizes the broader public administrative framework in 
DC terms, while requiring decision makers to follow an RI approach in imposing formalistic 
burdens of proof. But according to the approach outlined in Telstra, the precautionary principle 
does not dictate outcomes – i.e. the decision maker retains the discretion to understand threats 
more broadly and consider other factors beyond cost-benefit analyses. Telstra further extends 
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DC concepts by permitting decision makers to approve a project even when applying the 
precautionary principle indicates that it should be rejected or modified.54  
Because Canadian administrative law exhibits elements of both the DC and RI 
paradigms, Fisher’s ideas about administrative constitutionalism are jurisdictionally appropriate.  
In particular, Canadian administrative law is similarly preoccupied with resolving the tensions 
inherent in balancing discretion, fairness, deference to elected lawmakers and the officials they 
appoint, and preserving the courts’ authority to review the substantive reasonableness of 
administrative decisions.55 These are the same considerations that feature in Fisher’s work on 
administrative constitutionalism.  
In practice, an internal review model of merits review involves a reliance on adjudicative 
procedures and rules of evidence, and, in the case of precautionary decisions, a formalistic 
shifting of burdens of proof between the parties. This is because under the internal review model 
the tribunal’s responsibility is to remake, and, if necessary, reverse the original decision, and 
adjudicative procedures are considered the “gold standard” for resolving such disputes. An 
external review model, in contrast, understands merits review as “a more activist form of judicial 
review.”56 Under an external review model the reviewing tribunal is still responsible for 
remaking the original decision, but because its institutional place is different it must also perform 
this task in a fundamentally different way. Instead of relying on adjudicative procedures, 
tribunals follow the approach of courts on judicial review and look to general principles of 
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legitimate public administration. External review understandings of merits review reflect DC 
concepts, while internal review models reflect RI concepts.57  
Fisher’s consideration of the external and internal review models does not extend to leave 
to appeal proceedings like the one in Lafarge. Her ideas about merits review, and the two models 
of merits review that she identifies, are therefore pertinent without being directly applicable. But 
the central distinction she draws between the two models – between a de novo determination and 
a discretionary examination of the original decision aimed at fashioning the best outcome – can 
be translated to a leave to appeal proceeding. 
Fisher’s arguments about the inextricable links between precaution, public administration 
and law are not normative. Her position is that law is unavoidably implicated in the regulation of 
environmental risk, not that this is a desirable state of affairs. Thus Fisher’s views are not as 
opposed to those of Michael M’Gonigle, Paula Ramsay, and other environmental law skeptics as 
they may first appear.58 Law, according to Fisher, is not a panacea for problems of environmental 
risk, but it inevitably features in any response to such problems. 
Debates about paradigms of administrative constitutionalism and the precautionary 
principle are embedded in legal culture. The forms and arenas in which these debates occur are 
also specific to each legal culture. Jurisdiction is consequently important in determining how the 
RI and DC paradigms are manifested, and how the precautionary principle is understood. 
Fisher’s claim here – about the importance of legal culture and context in shaping where and how 
debates about the precautionary principle and administrative constitutionalism take place - is best 
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expressed by examples. Fisher notes that when attending a European conference on risk and 
public law, she found that “German lawyers were concerned with issues of delegation, French 
public lawyers with issues of responsibility, and English public lawyers with neither of these 
things.”59 The role of legal culture is also demonstrated by the varying focuses of Fisher’s case 
studies in Risk, from merits review to public inquiries to international dispute resolution. As 
Fisher states, “[T]he principle is not a free-floating ‘duty to be cautious’ but rather a principle 
whose interpretation will be dependent on context.”60  
Legal culture’s importance is one motivation for this case study – this paper aims to 
deepen our understanding of how the precautionary principle operates in Ontario, which cannot 
be explained solely through studies of the principle in other jurisdictions with other legal cultures 
– but it also limits the applicability of this study’s findings. In Ontario, the precautionary 
approach is located within a complex legislative framework that features a collection of other 
legal concepts, and this surrounding framework informs the precautionary principle’s 
interpretation and application. This influence is perhaps most visible in the principle’s 
relationship with the second branch of the EBR’s leave to appeal test, which introduces a 
“significant harm to the environment” requirement. The leave Applicants’ obligation is to show 
that such harm could occur, although the requisite standard of proof is contested. Parallels 
between the precautionary principle’s concern with risk and S 41’s demand for evidence of 
potential harm recur throughout the parties’ submissions in Lafarge. This web of reflexive legal 
interpretations and applications confirms Fisher’s arguments about the significance of legal 
culture, and indicates the need for caution when transplanting international and foreign 
understandings of the principle into a Canadian case study like this one.  
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Approach/Principle 
The confusion and controversy surrounding the idea of precaution extends to the question 
of whether the terms “precautionary principle” and “precautionary approach” signify materially 
different concepts. Some observers label the differences semantic, while others see a vast gulf in 
the practical impact of a precautionary approach or principle.61 In international law, the 
precautionary principle dominates. But the precautionary approach is also found in many legal 
documents, including the Ministerial policy document – the Statement of Environmental Values 
– that was considered in Lafarge. In Lafarge, it was the precautionary approach, not the 
principle, whose relevance, meaning and application was at issue. Yet all the parties used the 
terms interchangeably, as did the ERT and the Divisional Court. Consequently this paper 
explores scholarship on both the precautionary principle and the precautionary approach. 
Jacqueline Peel tackles the relationship – correlative or competitive – between the 
precautionary principle and approach both textually and empirically. Each analytical focal point 
reveals an opposite conclusion. Textually, Peel sees little difference. But her empirical inquiry 
into how WTO Courts and other adjudicative bodies have considered precautionary ideas 
revealed significant differences in the political meanings attached to the two terms. Where the 
precautionary principle is linked with a regulatory obligation to take precautionary measures that 
exists independently from economic considerations, the precautionary approach is invoked as a 
more flexible alternative that is incorporated into a multi-faceted decision-making process that 
also includes economic costs.62 Yet this characterization cannot be reduced to a simplistic 
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“economy v. environment” clash, since the idea of proportionality in selecting precautionary 
measures is a central element of the precautionary principle, and the precautionary approach in 
turn allows precautionary concerns to trump economic fears. The differences are nuanced. Peel 
however persuasively argues that these differences are meaningful, as reflected in the 
contentious courtroom and international summit debates over whether precaution should be 
formulated as an approach or principle. Business interests, together with certain countries, 
including the United States, are aligned with the precautionary approach, while environmental 
groups and several other countries advocate for the adoption and implementation of the 
precautionary principle.63  
In the second part of her analysis, on the textual meanings of the precautionary approach 
and principle, Peel’s methodological approach to understanding precaution’s written 
formulations resembles Applegate’s history of the concept’s evolution in environmental law: she 
breaks down written legal expressions of both the precautionary principle and the precautionary 
approach into their constituent parts, searching for discrepancies and finding few.64 Peel, like 
Applegate, looks at the threshold for triggering precaution’s application provided in the written 
definitions, and the nature – and flexibility – of precautionary measures. Following this 
meticulous review, Peel found that textually the differences between the precautionary principle 
and approach are essentially semantic.65 (Applegate is silent on how, or if, the precautionary 
approach and principle differ.) 
Whiteside sees a clearer divide between the terms “precautionary principle” and 
“precautionary approach,” and argues that they signify fundamentally different concepts: A 
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principle is applicable generally, while the precautionary approach is merely an option decision-
makers can choose to follow or not. Unlike the precautionary approach, the precautionary 
principle creates an obligation. Whiteside also makes a second, and related, distinction: The 
precautionary approach assigns the decision to take precautionary measures, or not to take them, 
to a decision-maker’s discretion.66 However, Whiteside does not claim there is a single “true” 
precautionary principle: instead, he argues that the principle is formulated by society as a 
pragmatic response to concrete problems.67 Thus the nature of the obligation arising from the 
precautionary principle changes according to how the principle is formulated.  
Whiteside’s arguments about the importance of the precautionary principle also rest on its 
capacity to make preventive action a moral imperative, not merely one of many justifiable 
courses of action: his conclusion that the precautionary principle is novel and unique rests on it 
being a principle.68  It responds to contemporary concerns about the intersection between 
scientific uncertainty and environmental harm by providing a reasoned framework for 
determining whether preventive action must be taken, and, if so, which measures should be 
chosen.  According to Whiteside, the precautionary principle generates obligations and answers, 
not mere options. 
As Peel notes, the prospective nature of risk regulation decisions means that only 
hindsight is capable of conclusively showing the wisdom of regulatory choices.69 Stirling argues 
that sometimes even hindsight is inadequate. He proposes that technological developments, and 
the environmental risks they entail, be viewed in evolutionary terms.70 Paths are followed, 
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decisions are made without foresight, and unexpected consequences result. Sitrling cites the 
example of keyboard development to evoke this evolutionary character of technological 
development: the “QWERTY” keyboard was a response to technical exigencies faced by the 
typewriter’s inventors, and it has endured in modern computing devices despite the 
contemporary irrelevance of those historic needs.71 The linearity of traditional conceptions of 
scientific progress – conceptions that are also embraced by supporters of precaution, who cite the 
threat of humanity’s inexorable technological march forward – is subverted by Stirling’s theory. 
In addition to the keyboard example, Stirling cites an iteration of this phenomenon with graver 
consequences for the generation of environmental risk: the design of nuclear reactors. First 
developed for use on submarines, there is widespread agreement among nuclear scientists that 
the outgrowth of current designs from the initial ones constructed in those exceptional 
circumstances has detrimentally affected safety.72 
 Stirling’s ideas suggest that it may be impossible to evaluate if the precautionary 
principle is implemented “correctly” or “wrongly.” This insight has far-reaching implications for 
efforts to prove the principle’s legitimacy, as well as the legitimacy of individual precautionary 
decisions. Beyond the uncertainty surrounding environmental risks, there is even deeper 
uncertainty about the consequences of possible regulatory responses. Sunstein’s list of 
technologies that may have never been invented if the principle existed when they were created 
is mirrored by another list of unknown technologies that might have been invented if 
precautionary actions were taken.73 Because there is no single ideal regulatory response, debates 
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about the precautionary principle’s proper interpretation do not lend themselves to conclusive 
answers.  
Fisher’s theories easily fit with Stirling’s perspective on risk and scientific development, 
and in fact Stirling cites Fisher’s Risk.74 Legitimacy serves as the fulcrum of precautionary 
debates in the absence of conclusive answers, and Fisher argues that public administration is the 
focal point in the ensuing discussions about legitimacy: “Debates over the precautionary 
principle are thus, in essence, debates over the legitimacy of the administrative state.”75 The 
following section explores two concepts that often support claims to legitimacy: expertise and 
evidence.  
 
 
Expertise, Evidence and (Ir)rationality 
Precautionary scholars agree on the importance of expert knowledge and experience in 
evaluating environmental risks, but that consensus ends when the conversation shifts to defining 
and recognizing expertise. RI theorists view expertise narrowly, in a similar way to critics of the 
precautionary principle who believe that scientists should drive risk regulation choices. DC 
theorists question traditional understandings of expertise, and believe that expertise is found in a 
variety of forms and places.76 Shelia Jasanoff, although not associated with the study of 
administrative constitutionalism, exhibits a DC-inflected perspective on expertise (Anne 
Meuwese ascribes Jasanoff’s widely cited work on expertise to the DC paradigm77):78  
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[E]xpertise is not merely something that is in the heads and hands of skilled persons, 
constituted through their deep familiarity with the problems in question, but rather that it 
is something acquired, and deployed, within particular historical, political and cultural 
contexts. 
 
 Collins and Evans call for a systematic taxonomy of expertise into varieties and areas of 
knowledge. The impetus for Collins and Evans’ work is the movement away from deference to 
distrust of formal specialized knowledge, a characterization that others reject for lacking 
nuance.79 The solution, according to Collins and Evans, is not a return to traditional deference 
but instead a theory to indicate when and what forms of expertise should be relied on. They 
accept the essence of the science/democracy framing – the existence of distinct scientific and 
political spheres, which Latour, Jasanoff and other reject – but recognize wisdom on each side of 
the binary.80 The question Collins and Evans pose is not “is expertise paramount?” They instead 
ask, “when should expertise be paramount?” 
Differentiating between scientific and political questions is central to Collins and Evans’ 
arguments, and on this point they adopt the popular distinction between scientific judgements 
about the nature and extent of a technology’s risk, and political decisions about the acceptability 
of a risk. In practice this clear distinction often becomes ambiguous. Contentious debates about 
whether a matter is political or scientific are the common result. Collins and Evans admit this, 
and direct their proposed systematic classification, in part, at making this distinction clearer.81 
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Although Collins and Evans’ ideas have attracted criticism from Jasanoff and others, the 
problem they seek to address – how formal and informal82 expertise should be integrated into 
political decision-making processes – is a real one. Fisher favourably notes their challenge to 
traditional understandings of the science/democracy dichotomy, and remarks on their attempt to 
create an alternative theory of expertise.83 Yet she also critiques their work for failing to place 
enough importance on the contextual factors surrounding technological risk problems. She 
argues that their attempt to theorize about technological risk problems without considering the 
diverse contexts in which such problems arise is flawed.84 
Dryzek et al offer another perspective on expertise, collapsing the distinction between 
informal public and formal scientific expertise and instead positing a dichotomy between elite 
opinion and non-elite expertise. Expertise, as understood by Dryzek et al, is a potential threat to 
elite regulators who are reluctant to acknowledge the full extent of uncertain risk surrounding the 
technological developments they depend on to fuel economic growth.85 This construction of 
expertise is consistent with DC ideals, but it contrasts sharply with Jasanoff’s more radical 
conception of expertise. Diversity regarding the construction of expertise therefore exists both 
within and between DC and RI theories. 
Dryzek’s work on the precautionary principle reflects the DC paradigm’s distrust of 
insular and epistemologically simplistic decision-making processes, and consequently I have 
linked his work with other DC theorists. But more importantly, Dryzek is a leading scholar on 
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deliberative democratic theory, and a firm advocate for the normative and consequentialist value 
of inclusive deliberative processes.86 
David Dana bases his consequentialist argument for the precautionary principle’s 
rationality on evidence of human cognitive bias and irrationality. He explains the human 
tendency to overestimate certain types of risk and underestimate others, and building on this 
discussion outlines a case for the principle’s purpose and legitimacy. If humans respond poorly 
to risk, frameworks like precaution are needed to encourage better reasoning.87 Dana’s 
arguments here recall the work of Jones and Bronitt, Whiteside, Peel and others on the 
relationship between the precautionary principle and burdens of proof. The reversal of burdens of 
proof, and modification of standards of proof, can be understood as an effort to correct for these 
cognitive weaknesses. To the extent that the DC paradigm rejects formalistic rules of proof, and 
instead prioritizes discretion exercised through participatory deliberative processes, a tension is 
apparent between DC theories and Dana’s idea of the precautionary principle as a means to 
improve human cognition in the area of environmental risk. Unambiguous and strict burdens of 
proof would appear critically important to advance this objective.  
Although some observers have reduced the precautionary principle’s meaning to a 
reversal of the normal burden of proof that is placed on objectors to show that a practice 
generates environmental risk, Jones and Bronitt explain why this view is fundamentally flawed. 
They understand burdens of proof as being “separate and multiple”, where the discharging of one 
burden creates a new burden to prove something else.88 In addition, fact-finding obligations in 
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precautionary decision-making often take the shape of requiring certain types of scientific 
information to be submitted, rather than imposing formal burdens of proof that must be 
discharged to a certain standard.89 
Jones and Bronitt blend empirical and normative claims in their discussion of proof and 
the precautionary principle. Following a review of various proposed standards of proof, Jones 
and Bronitt argue that where the potential degree of environmental harm is more serious, the 
standard of proof for proponents seeking to establish a project’s safety should be higher. 
Standards of proof based on statistical formulas are rejected for being “complex and 
controversial”, while fixed standards may be either too high or too low depending on the 
circumstances of a case. Thus Jones and Bronitt conclude that the seriousness of environmental 
harm and standard of proof should be proportional or “context-dependent”.90 Reciprocally, the 
standard of proof for objectors who are seeking to establish the applicability of the precautionary 
principle, and thereby shift the burden of proving a project’s safety to its proponents, must be 
lower. Under this approach, the standard of proof for showing that there is a risk of serious or 
irreversible environmental harm – the objector’s task – is less onerous than the standard of proof 
imposed on proponents trying to establish a project’s safety. This initial standard of proof that 
must be met by objectors is named the “threshold standard of proof.”91 
Jones and Bronitt identify a tension between the reliance on evidential concepts to apply 
the precautionary principle and the lack of any factual or evidentiary obligations in democratic 
law-making: If precautionary decision-making is governed by a legislative framework divorced 
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Fisher, Judith Jones, & René von Schomberg (eds) Implementing the Precautionary Principle: 
Perspectives and Prospects (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2006) at 140. 
89 Ibid at 147. 
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from evidentiary obligations, how can the precautionary principle be meaningfully implemented? 
Jones and Bronitt pose the question but they do not suggest any answers.92 This concern about 
systemic failures in democratic law-making unites Jones and Bronitt with Whiteside: Jones and 
Bronitt discuss the lack of evidentiary obligations in democratic law-making, while Whiteside 
points to the bias for short-term gain. These authors all share a distrust of the various possible 
authorities who could have responsibility for implementing the principle, whether they are 
judges or legislators selected in democratic elections or participating citizens.  
Given this skepticism about democratic law-making processes, it is perhaps surprising 
that Jones and Bronitt call for clear statutory language to govern the fact-finding obligations of 
administrative decision-makers applying the precautionary principle. They suggest that ad hoc 
development by courts and tribunals will result in inconsistency and gaps.93 Jones and Bronitt’s 
reasoning here is evocative of the RI paradigm and its emphasis on legislative mandates as the 
primary source of legitimacy. Moreover, they urge legislators to stipulate both general principles 
for precautionary decision-making and rules that are specific to the concerns of each regulatory 
context. This would be a major endeavour given the sheer number and variety of regulatory 
contexts, making the recommendation’s practicality unclear.94  
Whiteside, in contrast, maintains that the precautionary principle offers an alternative to 
the opaque and hierarchical decision-making seen in traditional risk assessment. This greater 
democratization can be accomplished by promoting openness to minority views and a more 
inclusive deliberative process that recognizes the value of different forms of expertise, including 
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local knowledge.95 These means and objectives indicate a closer connection to DC concepts, 
unlike Jones and Bronitt’s work. Dissatisfaction with democratic law-making can thus coexist 
with both the DC and RI paradigms. 
 Opponents of formalized evidentiary and persuasive obligations generally identify a 
narrow and exclusionary perspective as the primary cognitive threat to avoid. This fear inspires 
their advocacy for an open and informal deliberative process that is highly accessible to citizen 
participants.96 Technical rules concerning proof are undesirable because they would discourage 
participation, dialogue, and compromise. As this comparison shows, disagreements about proof 
often reflect deeper divisions about how humans tend to err – by risking too much or too little, 
following popular opinion or reflexively clinging to an oppositional populist attitude, blindly 
believing self-proclaimed experts or imagining conspiracies. 
 
 Strong/weak interpretation of precaution 
Interpretations of the precautionary principle vary greatly in their potency. Some are only 
triggered by the risk of irreversible harm; some impose an exacting standard of proof on 
proponents seeking to establish a project’s safety; some impose an obligation to take extensive 
precautionary measures on regulators; some essentially offer suggestions; and others are 
deliberately intended to disrupt conventional patterns of capitalist economic development. 
Observers have accordingly tended to classify precautionary formulations on a spectrum ranging 
from more to less robust. Applegate invokes the analogy of a tame house cat and a wild lion: 
both are feline, but one is strong and the other is tame.97 
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Tollefson and Thornback prefer “tamer” definitions of the precautionary principle 
because they can successfully respond to critics of the principle, such as Cass Sunstein.98 In 
addition, the authors’ analysis of how national courts have considered the principle suggests that 
a tamer definition will appeal more to judges.99 Tollefson and Thornback’s calls for a “tamer” 
precautionary principle are diametrically opposed to Whiteside’s arguments for an expansive 
understanding of the principle that includes binding moral obligations. In particular, Tollefson 
and Thornback’s apparent acceptance of the choice in Telstra to not interrogate the expert and 
scientific evidence used to support the project’s safety simply because no counter-evidence was 
presented – an RI approach – opposes Whiteside’s arguments about the principle’s moral 
status.100 If there were a moral responsibility to apply the precautionary principle, it would not be 
conditional on evidence being presented by an objector. This would effectively leave unchanged 
the presumption of safety that the precautionary principle was intended to reverse. Tollefson and 
Thornback’s emphasis on the role of judges in shaping the precautionary principle’s 
implementation also distances them from Jones and Bronitt, who criticize this practice.101  
Tollefson and Thornback, among other observers, identify an inverse relationship 
between the strength and the clarity of the precautionary principle: definitions that are more 
precise also tend to be weaker, and vice versa. Mårten Sundin’s analysis of the precautionary 
principle’s four constituent elements - threat, uncertainty, action, and command – is widely cited 
by scholars working in this area, including Tollefson and Thornback. His central claim is that the 
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strength or robustness of any definition of the precautionary principle is determined by the 
strength of its weakest element.102  
Tollefson and Thornback draw on both Fisher’s and Sundin’s work by linking RI 
concepts to weaker and clearer definitions of the principle, and similarly linking DC concepts 
with stronger and vaguer definitions of the principle.103 The authors conflate efforts to weaken 
and clarify the precautionary principle, and argue that such efforts help “tame” the principle. The 
logic behind Tollefson and Thornback’s claims here is suspect. As this paper will argue, both DC 
and RI concepts can be deployed to make and counter precautionary claims. But Tollefson and 
Thornback’s reasoning is also undercut by the tension between their call for judicial leadership 
on the principle’s implementation and their stated support for the RI paradigm, which prioritizes 
legislative direction over judicial discretion. Expanding adjudication’s role in shaping the 
precautionary principle is consistent with the DC paradigm, but directly opposed to RI 
understandings of legitimacy.   
Dryzek et al’s work further complicates how notions of clarity, strength and deliberative 
process are understood in regard to the precautionary principle. Dryzek et al identify a 
relationship between public involvement in environmental decision-making and precautionary 
outcomes, positing a divide between “precautionary publics” and “promethean elites.” Greater 
public consultation promotes a more extensive and robust application of the principle. This 
contrast that Dryzek et al note is attributed to several factors, including: that publics are more 
vulnerable to environmental risks because they lack the protections afforded by wealth and 
power; that elites have closer ties with the businesses that profit from technology; that elites are 
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more mindful of the significance of global economic competitiveness; and that publics can feel 
that it is their obligation to balance promethean outlooks with precautionary skepticism.104 
Understanding these claims requires clarifying how the term “elite” is used by Dryzek et al: 
“When we use the term elites, we mean core policy-making elites and so exclude, for example, 
experts, social movement leaders, and lobbyists.”105 (emphasis added) The exclusion of 
“experts” from the definition makes this approach incompatible with a simplistic 
science/democracy framing. 
Although the precautionary principle is often viewed as a competitor to cost-benefit risk 
assessment, Dryzek et al instead suggest that cost-benefit approaches contribute to a 
“precautionary discourse.” This suggestion appears in a case study of French public consultation 
on GMO agriculture. A citizen group reporting on the technology urged that cost-benefit 
conditions be satisfied before more GMO crops were introduced, and it was these calls that 
Dryzek et al deemed conducive to precautionary discourse.106 This background suggests that 
context may determine whether a particular regulatory decision is precautionary, even it is not 
expressive of the precautionary principle per se. 
Raymond Leigh and Andrea Olive persuasively argue that the rhetorical and practical 
influence of precautionary ideas must be carefully distinguished.107 They drew this conclusion 
from a case study of regulatory efforts to phase out the use of flame-retardant chemicals that 
pose health risks of unclear magnitude and probability. Interviews with legislators and other 
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participants in the regulatory process revealed that while the precautionary principle’s 
constituent elements – including a sensitivity to limits of scientific knowledge and a readiness to 
demand proof of safety, rather than risk – exerted influence, the label of “precaution” was 
politically unpopular.108  
Leigh and Olive’s findings about the details of this dynamic relationship between 
precautionary ideas and rhetoric may be confined to the United States – many commentators 
have noted that the precautionary principle enjoys less support in America than in other 
industrialized countries109 – but their efforts to unravel the distinct discursive and practical 
contributions of precaution are instructive. In cases where precaution carries formal legal weight 
– as in Lafarge – observers must be alive to the possibility that the reverse dynamic exists, with 
precautionary rhetoric being invoked to advance substantively anti-precautionary arguments. 
When Leigh and Olive’s ideas are considered together with Dryzetk et al’s French case 
study, and the latter’s efforts to blur the bright line dividing the precautionary principle from 
cost-benefit analysis, the gap between scholarly and lay ideas about risk regulation becomes 
more apparent. Where scholars see profound differences and tensions, public participants in 
decision-making may see the precautionary principle and cost-benefit analysis as essentially 
harmonious ways of responding to environmental risk. Concepts such as burden of proof, 
mathematical algorithms, and epistemological theories of environmental risk are highly 
technical, and thus unlikely to be fully adopted by lay public participants. What this shows is that 
in practice, a precise and fixed definition of precaution – one that can be confidently labeled DC 
or RI, strong or tame - may be incompatible with extensive public involvement in risk regulation.  
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Chapter 2 
Method and Sources 
Lafarge provides rich material for an empirical study of how understandings of 
environmental risk and administrative constitutionalism are co-produced. The choice of a case 
study, like any research approach, presents both limitations and opportunities. Empirical claims 
about the precautionary principle’s definition, application and influence on a systemic scale 
throughout Ontario cannot be supported by a single case study. Equally, the case study method 
provides a figurative microscope for seeing how disputes about environmental risk are contested 
within the discourse of administrative constitutionalism.  One particular advantage of the case 
study method is that it facilitates close examination of what Hajer and others term the 
“argumentative interaction”, an idea that Hajer incorporates in his The Politics of Environmental 
Discourse.110  
Among the possible candidates for a case study, Lafarge is notable for the breadth of 
issues raised. It featured an extensive debate about the core assumptions, values and possibilities 
that inform the discursive struggle over environmental risk. This range and breadth means that 
both high-level theories of administrative constitutionalism and the specific steps involved in 
making risk regulation decisions were illuminated.   
The analytical focus of this case study is the discourse of administrative 
constitutionalism. Importantly, it is not a homogenous discourse – it contains the two dominant 
and competing paradigms of Rational-Instrumentalism and Deliberative-Constitutive. But this 
paper disputes Fisher’s characterization of the paradigms as “two polar and incommensurable 
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opposite understandings of administrative constitutionalism.”111 (emphasis added) Although 
these two paradigms present different risk storylines, they share the same starting point: that 
problems of environmental risk and uncertainty are problems of public administration. Despite 
their differences, both paradigms are discourses of administrative constitutionalism and both 
construct environmental uncertainty as a regulatory problem. And both make skill and fluency in 
using the terminology of public administration a precondition for successfully advancing 
precautionary arguments.  
To the extent that Fisher goes beyond her empirical claim about the interlocking 
relationship between risk regulation and public administration to argue this state of affairs is 
inevitable, this paper rejects that view.  Following from that rejection, this case study also seeks 
to identify where RI and DC concepts converge and work in tandem to exclude alternative 
framings of environmental risk. Yet this paper fully adopts the empirical component of Fisher’s 
theory, namely that understandings of public administration and environmental risk are in 
practice mutually constructed and contested through the RI and DC paradigms.  
The foundation of this case study is a close reading of relevant documents, including the 
written submissions made by the parties and interveners before the ERT and Divisional Court. 
Specifically, I have viewed the Tribunal and Court records for Lafarge, which include the 
parties’ written submissions. These written submissions include affidavit evidence and attached 
scientific reports. I reviewed each participant’s submissions to identify whether the RI, DC or 
neither paradigm was dominant with respect to their arguments on several topics. These nine 
topics were:  
 the proper approach to understanding the S 41 leave to appeal test; 
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 the interpretation of the “significant harm” requirement under the second branch of 
the S 41 test;  
 the definition of the precautionary principle;  
 how environmental risk or uncertainty should be understood, including what types 
and sources of knowledge are valued; 
 the environmental discrimination claim;  
 the relevance and significance of the proposed moratorium on tire-burning;  
 the adequacy of the public consultation process;  
 the appropriate standard of review and degree of deference on judicial review;  
 and the legal status of the precautionary approach in the project approval process.  
 
These nine points were chosen after reviewing the Tribunal and Court records and 
determining which issues were most linked to understandings of environmental uncertainty and 
the precautionary principle. As I conducted the case study, I periodically returned to the records 
to determine if an issue should be added to or dropped from the list of topics examined. Part way 
through the case study I concluded that it was necessary to include the environmental 
discrimination claim because it was grounded in concerns about environmental uncertainty and 
equity, two concerns that are intertwined with debates about the precautionary principle. No 
other adjustments were made to the scope of the analysis.  
For each of the nine listed topics, I reviewed and identified the corresponding 
submissions made by the participants (unless a participant’s submissions were silent on a topic) 
and classified them as RI or DC as appropriate. Fisher’s table summarizing the defining 
characteristics of both paradigms of administrative constitutionalism guided this classification 
process.112 Following this analysis and classification of arguments as RI or DC, each 
participant’s submissions were looked at holistically to determine if overall they reflected RI or 
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DC concepts. This exercise of analysis and classification was conducted twice, once for the 
arguments before the ERT and once for the judicial review at the Divisional Court. This 
bifurcated approach was adopted in order to capture shifts in participant arguments between the 
ERT and judicial review proceedings. This case study’s findings are similarly reported by 
separating the ERT stage (detailed in Part II) and the judicial review at the Divisional Court 
(detailed in Part III). In most instances, a party’s submissions were noticeably more RI or DC, 
but exceptions are highlighted and scrutinized. Points of tension or inconsistency within and 
between the submissions are noted. 
Because Fisher’s ideas spring from empirical observation, they are well-suited to a case 
study methodology. This grounding in real-life precautionary debates – where legal rules, 
economic considerations, popular opinion, and political exigencies collide – means that 
arguments adopted by participants seldom fit neatly within a single paradigm of administrative 
constitutionalism. Inconsistency and internal contradiction are rampant. Fisher’s case studies 
have also revealed that DC and RI principles often co-exist in one party’s arguments or a single 
Court judgment.113 Yet, as this case study demonstrates, this complexity does not degenerate into 
an incoherence that would cast doubt on the validity of Fisher’s notion that precautionary debates 
are rooted in debates about administrative constitutionalism. DC and RI concepts are 
predominant in individual arguments and decisions, but they are rarely found in an unadulterated 
form. This pattern is confirmed in the Lafarge case study that follows. 
In addition to Fisher’s theory, the analysis employed in this case study also draws on 
Hajer’s work on environmental discourses.114 In particular, Hajer’s work is vitally important 
because it protects against concentrating on the differences between the RI and DC paradigms at 
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the expense of missing what the larger discourse of administrative constitutionalism 
accomplishes and excludes in regard to framing environmental risk. (Hajer’s work, in turn, 
builds on the scholarship of Michel Foucault and Michael Billig.115) Hajer characterizes 
environmental conflicts as discursive “struggles” over the construction of environmental 
problems, available solutions, and realities.116 His use of the word “struggle” is significant: 
environmental realities are constructed through argumentative interactions.  
Crucially, the documents produced in the course of the Lafarge litigation – written 
arguments, commissioned technical reports, and adjudicative decisions – were written to 
persuade and explicate. Given their roots in conflict, the argumentative interaction offers a useful 
conceptual tool for detailing how these documents, and the arguments they contain, fit together. 
The S 38 applicants and respondents submitted well over ten volumes of material, the vast 
majority of which was explicitly directed at opposing other arguments: the written materials are 
the product of multi-partied arguments, not standalone expressions of a particular viewpoint. The 
idea of the argumentative interaction therefore provides insight into the relationship between 
Lafarge’s parties, a relationship that was both reflexive and competitive. 
Because the discursive contest in Lafarge occurred within an adjudicative institutional 
framework, there was an umpire with the authority to reject or validate the various conceptions 
of administrative constitutionalism and environmental uncertainty: the ERT at the initial S 38 
application, and the Divisional Court on judicial review. Consequently the case study includes a 
close examination of the ERT and Court judgments to determine how much weight they attached 
to the arguments advanced during the litigation process.  
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Fisher (and Harding’s) use of administrative constitutionalism paradigms – specifically 
the RI and DC paradigms – to explain how courts have considered the precautionary principle 
was also adopted by Tollefson and Thornback in their article. In addition, they rely on Fisher’s 
2001 article “Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?” to argue that courts and judges must 
play a leading role in shaping and implementing the principle.117 Yet where Thornback and 
Tollefson’s analysis favours the RI paradigm, Fisher is undecided about which paradigm is 
superior.118 This paper follows Fisher’s approach in avoiding normative claims about which 
model is better. More fundamentally, this paper does not even accept that environmental risk is 
inevitably constructed through administrative constitutionalism.  
One methodological challenge involves classifying the scholarly writings of Bruce Pardy, 
the ERT member who heard Lafarge. Pardy teaches environmental law at Queen’s University, 
and has written about the precautionary principle.119 The starting point in examining Pardy’s 
work is that his scholarly work and adjudicative responsibilities are distinct and must not be 
confused with each other. Judges and other adjudicators often combine critical scholarship with 
application of laws they oppose. Some parallels can be seen in these two distinct aspects of 
Pardy’s work, but this paper does not claim any simplistic cause and effect relationships between 
Pardy’s academic views and the ERT’s legal reasoning in Lafarge. Equally, it would diminish 
the completeness of the case study if Pardy’s scholarly writing were ignored.  
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In his scholarly work, Pardy juxtaposes his ideal of environmental law with a 
“particularized management” approach that determines the acceptability of an anthropogenic 
impact on the environment through a discretionary review of various social, environmental, 
economic, and social factors.120 Some parallels between Pardy’s idea of “particularized 
management” and the Deliberative-Constitutive paradigm are apparent, most notably in their 
shared emphasis on judging environmental harms in reference to their social and economic 
benefits. Such an approach almost inevitably leads to considerable uncertainty about what 
environmentally invasive conduct will be deemed acceptable, a consequence decried by Pardy. 
He approvingly quotes Friedrich Hayek’s famous definition of a society governed by the rule of 
law:121  
[the rule of law] means that government in all its [activities] is bound by rules fixed and 
announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. 
 
However, Pardy’s conception of the rule of law and his ideas about systems theories 
cannot be mapped on to Fisher’s theories about administrative constitutionalism. The two even 
diverge on Fisher’s core premise: the inevitability of public administration’s role in regulating 
environmental risk because risk regulation is contextual in nature and demands expertise. No 
such admission appears in Pardy’s work, which often focuses on private law remedies and 
deterrents to environmental harm.122 Moreover, administrative constitutionalism – and the 
                                                
120 Bruce Pardy, “The Hand is Invisible, Nature Knows Best, and Justice is Blind: Markets, 
Ecosystems, Legal Instrumentalism, and the Natural Law of Systems” (2008) 44 Tulsa Law 
Review 67 at 84-7. 
121 Ibid at footnote 11, quoting Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1944) at 72. 
122 Bruce Pardy, “Environmental Rights: Mitigating Flaws of the Management Model – The 
Ontario Environmental Bill of Rights and the Resource Management Act 1991” (1996) New 
Zealand Law Review 239 at 242-3; Pardy (2002) supra note 119.   
50 
acceptance of the regulatory state that embedded within it – is arguably anathema to the classical 
liberal ideas evoked in Pardy’s scholarly work. Pardy’s views are nonetheless much more 
consistent with the RI paradigm than DC concepts. The term “discretion” is used pejoratively by 
Pardy, public consultation is disparaged as irrelevant to the determination of legal rights, and the 
potential benefits of environmentally harmful practices are considered poor justification for 
injecting more flexibility (and uncertainty) into environmental laws.  
Although Pardy may envision a markedly smaller role for public administration in 
regulating environmental risk, it is apparent that where there is public administration Pardy 
would likely prefer an RI paradigm. Scholarly opinions must not be confused with adjudicative 
opinions though, and this case study will show that both DC and RI concepts are found in the 
ERT decision he wrote.  
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Chapter 3 
Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights and Third-Party Appeal Rights 
Section 41 is a gateway to legal accountability. The nature of the S 41 test – and the 
degree of difficulty leave Applicants face – was therefore critical in determining the outcome of 
the Lafarge precautionary debates. In particular, S 41’s interpretation controls the stringency of 
the leave to appeal test, and consequently shapes the degree of legal accountability faced by 
government decision-makers applying the principle. Understanding S 41 and its ambiguities, in 
turn, depends on unraveling its home statute: the Environmental Bill of Rights. 
The Environmental Bill of Rights (EBR) was introduced in 1993 after several years of 
rising public concern about the environment, in regard to both the quality of Ontario’s 
environment and the processes that governed environmental decision-making.123 The need for 
statutory legal innovations– rather than piecemeal reform by common law courts – was widely 
recognized.124 And the EBR’s most significant innovation was in the area of participatory rights: 
Part II of the EBR provides for public participation in the Ontario government’s environmental 
decision-making, including through a requirement that proposals to issue emissions permits, 
amend environmental regulations, and take other measures with significant environmental 
consequences be posted to the Environmental Registry website for public notice and comment. 
Any comments made through this process must be considered when making the final decision. 
The proposal at issue in Lafarge was subject to these same public consultation requirements. 
Section 38, the third-party leave to appeal provision, is an exception to the choice to rely 
on political accountability instead of legal accountability in the EBR. This choice represented a 
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departure from the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) that helped inspire 
environmental rights legislation in other jurisdictions and was cited by the EBR’s drafters as an 
influence.125 Michigan’s legislation was enforceable through courts under the American public 
trust doctrine, which makes governments legally accountable for their management of public 
lands and other community resources. Canada does not have an equivalent legal doctrine, but 
judicial review and appeal rights can achieve similar ends.126  
Litigation and an expensive bureaucracy were the twin threats cited by the EBR’s critics 
and avoided by its drafters. A political accountability model that relied on the Legislature, and 
ultimately voters, to hold the government accountable for its commitments under the EBR was 
adopted by the majority New Democrat government. This model was not only an affirmative 
choice in favour of political accountability, but also a rejection of litigation-based accountability 
processes. In addition to distrust of politicians, which led to calls for more robust accountability 
mechanisms, there was distrust of  the courts and judiciary. Neither branch of government 
enjoyed much popularity or trust.127 Many groups who otherwise disagreed about the EBR’s 
content came together in opposing a legal model of accountability where courts were the forum 
and judges the instrument for holding the government to its environmental obligations. Expected 
critics of legal accountability such as industry groups and MLA’s were joined by many 
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environmentalists who feared the law’s distorting effect on environmental reforms.128 These 
environmentalists opposed the “law” in “environmental law”, arguing that legal approaches to 
environmental problems ignored the interconnectedness of the environment and society.  
 Two sources of political accountability were included in the EBR: Ministerial Statements 
of Environmental Values (SEV’s) and the Environmental Commissioner’s Office. The EBR 
mandates that prescribed Ministries create an SEV and consider it when making 
“environmentally significant”129 decisions. Some environmental advocates, particularly in the 
legal community, feared that without the threat of legal consequences for neglecting its 
responsibilities under the EBR, the government would abandon its environmental 
commitments.130 On the other hand, members of the business community and other groups 
traditionally opposed to environmental movements feared that the EBR would give rise to 
numerous lawsuits and applications for judicial review of government decisions. This skeptical 
attitude towards legal or adjudicative forms of accountability led to a near-exclusive, but not 
complete, reliance on political accountability.131 
Third-party appeal rights are the strongest source of legal accountability in the EBR. 
Section 41 permits Ontario residents to challenge environmental decisions taken by prescribed 
Ministries on the basis that they are unreasonable and would cause significant environmental 
harm.132 Yet the ECO is not authorized to use this provision or otherwise legally challenge the 
government’s environmental decisions. Legal and political accountability mechanisms are 
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separated in the EBR, limiting any potential reinforcing relationship between the two forms of 
accountability. The ECO has intervened in several legal cases involving the EBR’s interpretation, 
and it follows and reports on relevant litigation, but its role in this regard is reactive.133 In 
Lafarge, the MOE and ECO were at odds on the scope of the second form of political 
accountability provided by the EBR: the Ministerial SEVs. At the judicial review stage, the ECO 
gained leave to intervene with written submissions to the Divisional Court. The ECO disputed 
the MOE’s argument on the SEV’s relevance, although it took no position in the larger dispute 
about the soundness of the MOE’s original decision.134 
The emphasis on political accountability, and a related prioritization of administrative 
discretion, are evocative of DC concepts. The term “discretion” runs through Ministerial 
statements on the EBR, both in Lafarge and elsewhere. DC principles are evident in the EBR’s 
combination of participatory opportunities and regulatory discretion. Despite the appearance of 
DC concepts, there is room for critiques of the EBR based on the DC paradigm. Many 
commentators have suggested that the EBR’s procedural rights are more symbolic than real.135  
Ruth McKay goes even further in her 2001 case study of two EBR processes involving 
public notice and comments, in which she argued that the EBR shifted more responsibility onto 
environmental groups and private citizens, added to their bureaucratic burdens, and made it more 
difficult to pursue environmental advocacy in other fora.136 Citizen and NGO concern about the 
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environment was channeled towards EBR processes – including the public comment provisions, 
and the more rarely used leave to appeal provisions at issue in Lafarge – but these processes 
often prove time-consuming, costly, and ineffective in promoting environmental interests. Sharp 
budget cuts to environmental agencies and ministries added to the impression that the public, and 
not the government, was responsible for protecting Ontario’s environment.137 These criticisms 
echo the RI paradigm’s emphasis on the government having ultimate responsibility for regulating 
environmental risk, rather than the more diffused and polycentric responsibility relationships 
envisioned under the DC paradigm.  
The MOE’s attempt in Lafarge to rely on the ECO’s presence to avoid legal 
accountability recalls McKay’s warnings about the EBR’s potential to subvert environmental 
reforms, and illustrates the complex, and sometimes competitive, relationship between different 
forms of accountability. The MOE sought to rely on a weak form of political accountability – the 
ECO’s responsibility to report to the Legislature on the MOE’s compliance with its SEV – at the 
expense of a stronger form of legal accountability. A paradigm that recognizes multiple and 
intersecting forms of accountability, as reflected in the ECO’s arguments before the Court, 
avoids this “zero sum” competition between different sources and forms of accountability. 
Political and legal accountability are not inherently contradictory ideas, but the concerns of 
McKay and other observers that each can be used to undermine the other were arguably 
validated by the MOE’s arguments in Lafarge. 
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PART II: The Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal 
Part II details the precautionary debates at the Environmental Review Tribunal in 
Lafarge.  Section 38 Applications were made by Lake Ontario Waterkeeper (LOW), Clean Air 
Bath (CAB), the Loyalist Environmental Coalition (LEC), and six individual applicants: Diane 
Dawber and Chris Dawber; Hugh Jenney and Claire Jenney; Mark Stratford and Jamie Stratford; 
J.C. Sulzenko; Janelle Tulloch; and Sandra Willard.138 LEC and LOW filed their applications 
jointly at the ERT. The leave Respondents were the Ministry of the Environment and Lafarge 
Inc. On judicial review the composition of the parties making submissions changed, as explained 
in Part III.  
Simultaneous with the MOE’s approval of Lafarge’s proposal to burn tires and other fuel 
sources at its cement facility in Bath, Ontario, and the issuance of two related Instrument 
Approvals, the MOE posted a press release announcing a proposed two-year moratorium on tire-
burning elsewhere in the province. A lack of experience and knowledge regarding tire-burning 
was cited as the reason for the proposed moratorium. The S 38 Applicants responded by seeking 
leave to appeal the two Instrument Approvals. Several grounds were raised in the leave to appeal 
applications, although, as detailed in Chapter 2, this case study is limited to the precautionary 
debates in Lafarge. 
The findings are divided in three chapters, chiefly for the sake of clarity and additionally 
to highlight the issues that proved most controversial. Chapter 4, the first in this Part, explains 
the competing arguments about the S 41 test that the leave Applicants needed to satisfy. The 
focus of Chapter 4 is directly on administrative constitutionalism and the interweaving of RI and 
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DC elements in the ERT’s reasons. Chapter 5 then builds on the S 41 analysis to focus 
specifically on how the parties understood the problem of environmental risk and uncertainty, 
including the precautionary principle’s interpretation and application. In Chapter 6, the 
understandings of knowledge and expertise revealed in the parties’ written submissions are 
examined. Where Chapter 5 examines the precautionary principle and its constituent elements, 
Chapter 6 investigates how the parties understood the related evidentiary obligations, for both 
proponents and objectors, and the types of knowledge that could satisfy these obligations.  
What unites these three chapters, along with the chapters in Part III regarding the judicial 
proceedings, is a preoccupation with the models of administrative constitutionalism advanced by 
each party. In choosing this fixed analytical lens – administrative constitutionalism – the aim is 
for the chapters to reference and reinforce each other while covering distinct aspects of the 
Lafarge precautionary debates.  
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Chapter 4 
 The S 41 Test: Balancing Public Access with Government Responsibility 
This Chapter examines the competing RI and DC interpretations of section 41, which sets 
out the test for granting a third-party leave to appeal:139 
 Leave to appeal a decision shall not be granted unless it appears to the appellate 
body that, 
 
(a)  there is good reason to believe that no reasonable person, having regard to the 
relevant law and to any government policies developed to guide decisions of that 
kind, could have made the decision; and 
(b)  the decision in respect of which an appeal is sought could result in significant harm 
to the environment. 
 
This provision offers environmental organizations and individual citizens a means of 
promoting the precautionary principle’s application and contesting its interpretation. More than a 
mechanism for holding administrative decision-makers – and their political overseers – 
accountable if they disregard the precautionary principle, it provides a forum for contesting how 
the principle is defined and implemented. The “stringent”140 conditions found in the S 41 test 
restrict access to that forum, and establish a (deliberately) uneven playing field. In keeping with 
the rules of legislative supremacy, and the principle of deference to decision-makers who 
exercise authority delegated by the Legislature, third-party applicants have limited authority to 
challenge the government’s adherence to the precautionary principle. However the EBR is 
expressive of a legislative intent to bolster the public’s ability to understand, participate in, and 
challenge the government’s policymaking decisions, from legislative amendments to Instrument 
Approvals.  
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The EBR was supposed to make the playing field more even, and the question at stake in 
Lafarge was how even. This chapter therefore analyzes the arguments made concerning S 41’s 
interpretation in order to better identify the influence of DC and RI themes of accountability on 
how the precautionary principle is understood. Before the ERT, both LEC-LOW and the MOE 
framed the S 41 test in DC terms. Lafarge, in contrast, advanced a strongly RI understanding of 
the S 41 test. CAB, as well as the Individual Applicants, did not engage with the specifics of 
interpreting S 41.  
 While accepting the “stringency” of the S 41 test, LEC-LOW argued it must nonetheless 
serve the EBR’s broader aim of allowing “the people of Ontario to participate in the making of 
environmentally significant decisions.”141 LEC-LOW contrasted the leave test with the appellate 
scrutiny that follows a grant of leave to Appeal: it is easier to gain leave to Appeal than to 
succeed in reversing a decision in the final Appeal hearing.142 LEC-LOW highlighted the usage 
of “appears” in the test’s preamble and the reduced standard of proof it indicated, and urged the 
Tribunal to understand both branches of the test together and in conjunction with the EBR’s 
objectives. They also sought to link the second branch with the first by characterizing decisions 
that risk significant environmental harm as unreasonable: Permitting environmental risk is 
tantamount to unreasonableness, according to this reasoning.  
This reflexive approach to interpreting S 41 was extended to the connection between both 
prongs of the test. LEC-LOW cited a previous ERT decision, Hannah v Ontario,143 which found 
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that where a decision could lead to significant environmental harm, it is unreasonable. In 
Hannah, the Tribunal held that “any decision which could result in significant harm to the 
environment would be an unreasonable decision.”144 Therefore establishing the second prong of 
the test would be enough to support a grant of leave to appeal. By arguing that the second prong 
of the test is sufficient to justify a grant of leave to appeal, greater strategic significance was 
attached to LOW’s claim that Class I and II Instrument Approvals by definition fall within the 
second prong of the test. If a Class I or II Instrument Approval by definition could result in 
significant harm, and if any decision that could result in significant harm would be unreasonable, 
then the S 41 leave test would be satisfied in the case of every Class I or II Instrument 
Apprval.145 However, this reasoning was rejected by the ERT, which held that Class I and II 
Instrument status are indicative of the potential for significant environmental harm: the 
independent burden of proof under the second prong remained, but Class I and II Instrument 
status helped satisfy that burden.146 The MOE also countered LEC-LOW’s argument here, 
instead emphasizing the word “and” that connected both prongs of the test.147  
This deceptively subtle difference in interpretation would result in radically different 
views of the precautionary principle’s impact. As discussed earlier, the question of whether the 
principle should impose precautionary obligations on environmental regulators is a recurring 
one, and LEC-LOW’s reasoning here is suggestive of such obligations. Combined with LEC-
LOW’s support of a lower prima facie standard of proof for S 41, this would result in greater 
public involvement in the performance – or enforcement – of precautionary duties. Like the 
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general tone of LEC-LOW’s arguments, its submission on S 41’s statutory construction reflect a 
robust understanding of the precautionary principle based on a DC paradigm:148 
[…] MOE acts and omissions have effectively shielded the Lafarge proposals from 
meaningful public scrutiny, and have failed to ensure the achievement of the public 
interest purposes of the EPA and EBR. Because the decisions of the Directors are 
unreasonable and could result in significant environmental harm, the only appropriate 
remedy at this stage is to grant the Applicants full leave to appeal under the EBR so that 
the legal, technical and scientific debate over the “merits” of the Lafarge proposal can 
finally be adjudicated in an independent and procedurally fair forum, viz. an appeal by the 
Tribunal. [emphasis added] 
  
In contrast, the MOE characterized the Tribunal’s power to grant third-party appeal rights 
as an “exceptional remedy” confined to cases where the Ministry has breached the “public 
trust.”149 The MOE further juxtaposed this exacting standard against the false idea that S 41 
bestowed a general right to “second guess” its decisions. This restrictive understanding of S 41’s 
scope is reflected in the MOE’s argument that the standard of proof should be a balance of 
probabilities, not a prima facie standard.150 In outlining the S 41 leave test, the MOE also 
repeatedly returned to the need for Applicants to furnish evidence under both prongs of the test. 
The nature of this evidence was variously qualified by the terms “strong,” “expert,” 
“convincing,” and “scientific.”151 As discussed in Chapter 5, attaching a balance of probabilities 
standard to the second branch of the test – the significant harm requirement – undermines the 
precautionary principle’s importance. The MOE also understood the obligations to provide 
evidence as moving back and forth between the Respondents and the leave Applicants, and 
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shifting in nature depending on how each side meets its burden.152 This notion of fluid and 
mutually constituting burdens of proof recalls Jones and Bronitt’s work.153  
The MOE framed its arguments about S 41’s purpose by noting the imperative of 
preserving the MOE’s role as Ontario’s environmental regulator.154 Inherent in the MOE’s 
reasoning is the assumption that protecting its regulatory power requires defining S 41 narrowly: 
It can only breach the “public trust” by failing to apply relevant law and policy; poorly applying 
relevant law and policy does not amount to unreasonableness. Thus the heightened deference 
built in the MOE’s interpretation of S 41 flows from the MOE’s contention that it has almost 
sole responsibility for regulating the environment. Although this reasoning superficially recalls 
an RI paradigm, when the MOE’s arguments on this point are read together with its account of 
the Directors’ decision-making process, it appears to share more with DC concepts.  
The MOE’s argumentative emphasis on the openness, thoroughness, and general quality 
of its Directors’ deliberative process, together with its claims for the importance of deference in 
appellate reviews, falls within a DC theory of administrative constitutionalism: The MOE’s 
application of the precautionary principle was reviewable to the extent that appellate scrutiny 
focuses on whether the principle was applied. But criticisms that this interpretation effectively 
neutralizes S 41 must be evaluated in light of the accountability introduced through public 
consultation: DC advocates insist that the accountability generated through participatory rights 
and processes is more meaningful than legal forms of accountability, such as the S 38 leave to 
appeal process. Access is more inclusive, costs are lower, and prevention is preferable to ex post 
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facto review. This debate should not be reduced to a conflict between more and less robust 
interpretations of the principle.  
The MOE’s narrow interpretation of S 41’s purpose was therefore grounded in DC 
concepts. Authority over the precautionary principle’s application remains almost completely 
vested in the government, and opportunities for review and contestation are correspondingly 
limited, but the understanding of administrative constitutionalism underpinning this reasoning 
was strikingly different from the RI understanding that emerged in Lafarge’s arguments before 
the ERT, although both reach similar legal conclusions. 
Lafarge drew a parallel between S 41 and the test for setting aside jury verdicts in civil 
cases. Such verdicts are only set aside when they are “so plainly unreasonable and unjust that no 
jury reviewing the evidence as a whole and acting judicially could have reached it.”155 The 
analogy is notable for both its expression of RI principles – civil cases are bipolar disputes 
between private litigants – and the high threshold for granting leave that it implies.  Although 
this interpretation of S 41 may appear more exacting than the MOE’s, it is tempered by Lafarge’s 
acceptance of the Tribunal’s previous decisions on proof, which had recognized a prima facie 
standard of proof that was less than a balance of probabilities.156 Only the MOE supported a 
higher standard of proof before the ERT.157  
As detailed in Chapters 5 and 6, Lafarge and the MOE’s different paths to similar 
destinations mirror the relationship between LEC-LOW and CAB’s arguments: CAB’s 
submissions represent an RI variation of LEC-LOW’s precautionary arguments. Throughout 
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their submissions LEC-LOW returned to the leave to appeal provisions’ status as one 
participatory mechanism in a legislative scheme directed at expanding public involvement in 
environmental decision-making.158 These DC principles exist uneasily with appellate challenges, 
to the extent that challenges focus on substantive legal choices and outcomes rather than 
impugning the deliberative process that generated those choices and outcomes. Arguing that 
broad public consultation is necessary, but that decisions produced by such consultation should 
be subjected to similarly broad appellate rights is difficult: If public consultation is important, 
then the results of that consultation merit respect on appellate review. Yet LOW’s criticisms of 
the public consultation process leading up to the issue of the Lafarge Approvals puts its appellate 
challenge more squarely in the DC tradition: the quality and fairness of the deliberative process 
was at the heart of the precautionary arguments made by the leave Applicants.159  
Lafarge asserted that public participation on the project was “extensive, effective, and 
widespread.”160 Together with the MOE, Lafarge pointed to the amendments and conditions 
added to the proposal as evidence that public participation was meaningful. Lafarge further noted 
that the Approvals’ requirement to form a Community Committee ensured that public 
participation would be ongoing. LEC-LOW maintained that the Committee would be “an 
information forum rather than an advisory body or dispute resolution mechanism.”161 The 
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conflict over public participation primarily sprang from two opposing narratives – Lafarge used 
the word “story”162 – of the public consultation process. Facts, not law, were at the dispute’s 
centre. The S 41 Applicants advanced a DC understanding of public consultation’s importance in 
precautionary decision-making, the MOE based its authority on claims that it had implemented 
DC concepts of public participation, and Lafarge insisted that the public consultation was 
fulsome and impactful. Legally the arguments converge on public participation, even if Lafarge 
specified that the consultation exceeded what the EBR requires and less consultation would have 
still been sufficient. 
The Stratfords’ Applications bypassed these debates about administrative 
constitutionalism and the legal contours of the decision-making process to focus purely on their 
resistance to the project. Jamie Stratford and Mark Stratford submitted separate but identical 
leave Applications that were considered together by the ERT, who referred to them jointly as 
“The Stratfords.”163 Their submissions consisted of two paragraphs focusing exclusively on their 
opposition to the project, without any discussion of the S 41 test or elaboration on why they 
opposed the project. Their opposition was expressed, not justified or explained.  
Sandra Willard, another individual applicant, detailed the political roots of her opposition 
to the project. Her submissions were composed of copies of two letters she wrote to the Minister 
of the Environment, and a concise list of Grounds for Appeal. Her arguments feature a distrust of 
Lafarge and large multinational corporations more generally. She caustically refers to “the 
application by the Lafarge cement industrial giant to begin using its cement kiln as a waste 
incineration device thereby boosting Lafarge’s profits and at the same time (oh aren’t they 
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wonderful) reducing greenhouse case emissions…”164 Addressing Minister of the Environment 
Laurel Broten, Willard sympathetically alludes to the economic constraints on the Ministry’s 
freedom to set stringent limits, before insisting that the consequences of approving Lafarge’s 
proposal are so grave that it must nonetheless be rejected. Willard also maintains that “rejecting 
the Lafarge proposal will not shut them down and it won’t cost jobs.”165 The prioritization of 
economic considerations is critiqued – Willard mentions the central place of “material assets and 
status icons” in contemporary society – but the reconcilability of environmental and economic 
imperatives is insisted on.166   
The ERT’s remarks on the purpose of S 41 mostly consisted of a long excerpt from 
Simpson v Ontario,167 a 2005 ERT decision also written by Member Pardy. While noting that the 
leave test is stringent, in Simpson the ERT also found that the test must be “applied in 
conjunction with the stated intent of the EBR to enable the people of Ontario to participate in the 
making of environmentally significant decisions by the government of Ontario.”168 Quoting this 
excerpt affirmed the continuing influence of DC principles. Simpson also emphasized the 
distinction between the leave test and appellate review: “It is not necessary at this stage for the 
Tribunal to determine whether the Director’s decision was unreasonable, or whether significant 
harm to the environment will materialize.”169 This careful delineation between S 41’s purpose 
and the narrower reach of the appeal test further suggests the DC paradigm’s central place. 
Access to the deliberative forum of an appeal hearing is expanded by a generous interpretation of 
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S 41’s leave to appeal rights, while the more exacting standard for overturning a decision on 
appeal protects exercises of administrative discretion from intrusive scrutiny. Both objectives are 
characteristic of a DC paradigm. 
The ERT distinguished the questions asked in the first and second prong of the test: “The 
issue under the first branch of section 41 is contextual: are the decisions reasonable given 
relevant laws and policies? In contrast, the issues under the second branch are not contextual, but 
absolute: what could the effects of the decisions be, and are those effects significant?”170  
Member Pardy may have drawn this distinction independently; it does not appear in the written 
submissions made by the parties. As envisioned by Member Pardy, an “absolute” inquiry into the 
potential for significant environmental harm does not rest on determining compliance with the 
same applicable laws and policies that form the crux of the first prong’s “contextual” inquiry. 
Legislative choices, and regulations created by the Cabinet, are essentially irrelevant. 
The answer to the accountability and legitimacy questions posed by the ERT’s logic lie in 
the EBR: The Legislature made it law, and the ERT is bound to apply the second branch of the S 
41 test as it was written. Whether that answer is satisfactory is a values-laden question beyond 
the scope of this paper, but the implications for administrative constitutionalism must be 
addressed. The second branch of S 41, according to the ERT’s reasoning, offers the public an 
opportunity to challenge the adequacy of applicable environmental laws to protect the 
environment from significant environmental harm. It is not a limitless, free-standing opportunity 
– the first prong limits the second – but it is a meaningful reflection of DC ideas about 
accountability and participatory deliberation. The opportunity is also widened by the ERT’s 
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finding that different facts may be relied on under each prong of the test: the potential significant 
environmental harm can be unconnected to the unreasonableness alleged under the first prong. 
Pardy’s ideas about systems theory, which he has advanced in several journal articles and 
a monograph, may help explain this distinction between an absolute and contextual inquiry. He 
calls for laws that protect ecosystems from disproportionate anthropogenic impacts with the aim 
of allowing ecosystems to evolve dynamically. Crucially, Pardy rejects an instrumentalist 
approach that seeks to direct ecosystem development towards specific ends with economic or 
social benefits: “The alternative is to establish and enforce general rules and principles that 
protect ecosystems… from undue influence, so that these [ecosystems] may operate according to 
their inherent characteristics and thereby create their own ends.”171 Environmental laws, as 
opposed to administrative discretion, are therefore necessary because ecosystems “need legal 
rules and principles to protect them.”172 
Reasonableness – and the DC paradigm - figures prominently in the ERT’s interpretation 
and application of the first prong of S 41. The heading that precedes the ERT’s application of the 
first prong of the test is evocative: “First Branch of S 41 – Reasonableness.”173 A notoriously 
unwieldy and imprecise concept, reasonableness is traditionally associated with DC principles 
and a reluctance to reverse discretionary decisions. This would appear to contradict the leave 
Applicants’ interests, given that their aim was to overturn the Directors’ discretionary decision to 
issue the Instrument Approvals. Yet the ERT’s findings on the issue of proof undercut this 
potential obstacle for the leave Applicants. Drawing on the ERT’s reasoning in Residents, which 
holds that the Legislature set a different standard of proof in S 41, Pardy rejected the MOE’s 
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arguments for a balance of probabilities standard and instead applied a prima facie standard of 
proof.  
Section 41’s reduced standard of proof operated to subvert reasonableness’s traditional 
role as a support for administrative discretion. Instead of proving unreasonableness, the leave 
Applicants only needed to show that the decisions were prima facie unreasonable, a lower 
standard than a balance of probabilities. Evidence of unreasonableness remained at the centre of 
the Tribunal’s inquiry under the first prong of S 41, yet the lower standard of proof for 
establishing unreasonableness weakened claims of discretionary authority. 
Public participation’s status as a legislative objective, and guide to interpreting the EBR’s 
provisions, explains this apparent contradiction. Reasonableness is at the heart of the first prong 
of the test, but its restrictive impact on opportunities for appellate review is softened by the lower 
standard of proof, an interpretive choice made to promote public participation in environmental 
decision-making. Because public consultation is highly valued under the DC paradigm, along 
with the administrative discretion embodied by the legal concept of reasonableness, the ERT’s 
interpretation of S 41 can be understood as a clear implementation of DC principles.  
Despite the ERT’s affirmation of public participation’s importance within the EBR’s 
legislative framework, the Tribunal found that the deficiencies in public participation did not rise 
to the level of unreasonableness demanded by S 41.174 The leave Applicants arguments here 
centred on the failure to post certain technical documents, submitted by Lafarge and relied on by 
the MOE, on the Environmental Registry website for public notice and comment. After noting 
that the Instrument Applications were open for public comment over 120 days, and the technical 
documents in question did not substantively change the proposal, the ERT found in favour of the 
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leave Respondents on this ground – it “was not such an error as to make it appear that no 
reasonable person could have made the decision in question.”175 Yet the Tribunal’s comments 
fall short of an endorsement of the MOE’s conduct. It held that because the documents were 
important enough to be relied on, they should have been posted, even if the failure to do so could 
not satisfy the S 41 test.176  
In his scholarly writing, Pardy has criticized public consultation’s role in environmental 
decision-making, stating that where traditional environmental assessment “permits public input, 
a systems approach relies on legal rights not subject to the views of onlookers.”177  His scholarly 
comments on the philosophy underlying the EBR are also evocative of RI concepts: “the agency 
best able to protect the environment is government.”178 Although this view is not shared by 
Pardy in his role as a scholar, it is consistent with this interpretation and application of the EBR. 
Returning to this chapter’s opening query about how the S 41 test balances government 
authority with opportunities for public scrutiny and challenge, the ERT’s decision suggests that 
while the balance remains uneven and tilted towards government respondents, it is far more 
welcoming of prospective third-party appellants than the MOE and Lafarge claimed. In the next 
chapter, the analysis moves past the questions of statutory interpretation discussed here to 
investigate the competing understandings of precaution, uncertainty and harm revealed in the 
participants’ submissions.  
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Chapter 5 
Risk and Caution 
The SEV states that where there is uncertainty about environmental risk, “the Ministry 
will exercise caution in favour of the environment.” “Exercising caution” implies a deliberative 
approach or state of mind, more than a specific obligation to ensure particular environmental 
outcomes. The phrase evokes DC values, namely the critical importance of decision-making 
processes. The SEV’s commitment to Ministerial caution relates to the deliberative process it 
will employ in cases of uncertainty; the commitment does not extend to guaranteeing results. It 
should be noted that the SEV’s words on the precautionary approach, and the precautionary 
principle’s significance to the EBR legislative scheme, cannot be reduced to these words. As 
explored later in this chapter, LEC-LOW offered an alternative conception of the precautionary 
principle’s role that made use of this broader statutory context. However, the MOE’s 
submissions on the precautionary principle can be traced to this commitment to “exercise 
caution,” as reflected by the equivalency they drew between a careful and thorough decision-
making process, and compliance with the SEV’s precautionary commitment.179 This emphasis on 
process illustrates the impact of DC perspectives on the precautionary principle’s interpretation. 
Any reliance on the precautionary principle in the Directors’ original decision was 
implicit – the leave Respondents did not claim that the Directors’ made a precautionary decision 
and named it as such. Nor did the leave Applicants argue that the Directors’ failure to clearly cite 
the precautionary principle conclusively proved that they disregarded the principle. Both sides 
looked to the decision itself for support of their respective positions on whether the precautionary 
principle was followed. But the parties diverged in how much weight they assigned the 
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Directors’ decision-making process. Consistent with the LEC-LOW’s DC-flavoured 
submissions, they cast doubt on the transparency and fairness of the original decision-making 
process.180 These same qualities were invoked by the MOE in its submissions. The MOE based 
its claims about the soundness of the original decision on a lengthy narrative of the deliberative 
process that led to the qualified approval of Lafarge’s proposals.181 
The proposed moratorium on tire burning, and its simultaneous announcement on the 
same day the Lafarge Approvals were issued, figured prominently in LEC-LOW’s arguments. 
Besides the impression produced by the MOE’s implicit acknowledgement that it lacked 
experience and knowledge regarding tire burning, LEC-LOW highlighted the inconsistency – 
and alleged unfairness – of exposing Bath residents to a risk while proposing to shield other 
Ontario residents from the same risk. This argument appears in the following passage: “In the 
circumstances, the Directors’ decision-making does not represent exercising caution in favour of 
the environment; instead, it represents exercising caution in favour of Lafarge.”182 
LEC-LOW even framed some of its precautionary concerns as a failure to obtain 
necessary information, in a separate ground in their leave to appeal Application. Noting that 
where required information is missing, uncertainty develops, LEC-LOW alleged there were 
“significant evidentiary gaps” in the information the Directors’ relied on.183 Crucially, this appeal 
ground was independent from the SEV. Like with the second prong of the test, LEC-LOW 
sought to infuse the leave to appeal provisions with precautionary ideas, thereby extending the 
principle’s reach. These attempts recall precautionary theorists who argued that the precautionary 
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principle amounts to a philosophy of risk regulation, rather than a narrowly applicable rule. 
Beyond any consequences for the array of legal and statutory interpretation questions at issue in 
Lafarge, these attempts to inject precautionary ideas into the EBR’s appeal framework had wider 
significance for debates about the principle’s significance in environmental regulation. 
Equity’s connections with the precautionary principle appeared most prominently in 
LEC-LOW’s statements about the proposed moratorium. Permitting tire burning in Bath while 
prohibiting it elsewhere in Ontario was deemed “discrimination.”184 LEC-LOW also stressed the 
MOE’s own statements, made prior to the leave Application, that characterized the fuel plant as a 
“pilot project.”185 Although the MOE rejected this description before the ERT, the phrase was 
used in a Ministry news release announcing the Approvals. Pushing this “pilot project” label 
further, LEC-LOW claimed that it was a “major scientific experiment.”186 Thus the Approvals 
represented official authorization of an experiment with potentially dangerous impacts on the 
health and welfare of Bath residents, making it discriminatory.  
The recurring theme in CAB’s arguments is the importance of fairness as a guiding 
principle, and the unfairness of permitting tire burning in Bath while contemplating its 
prohibition elsewhere in the province. This understanding of fairness is implicit in CAB’s 
commitment (detailed in Chapter 6) to weighing the precautionary concerns on “moral grounds” 
and its support for an “apolitical” decision-making process.187  
Going beyond LEC-LOW’s allegations about the Approvals’ discriminatory affects, 
LEC-LOW also argued that the “experiment” was poorly designed and would therefore fail to 
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produce useful information on the safety of tire burning. It was both discriminatory and 
pointless, an unfair burden on Bath residents that offered little in the way of compensatory 
benefits.188 (This line of argument is explored in Chapter 6.)  
Janelle Tulloch’s submissions centred on the material prepared by Dr. Neil Carman, 
whose work also featured in LOW and LEC’s submissions. Tulloch excerpted around two pages 
of Carman’s 1997 report on tire burning. In addition, Tulloch highlighted Bath’s unique 
character and charms – “Bath is a beautiful, small community…” – and her concern about only 
allowing tire burning there. She also expressed her conviction that the environment would suffer, 
as well as human and animal health.189 The MOE disputed Tulloch’s characterization of the 
central issue at stake in the leave hearing. The issue, according to the MOE, was “whether the 
burning of tires under the current circumstances, including the technology, safeguards and 
restrictions outlined in the Certificates of Approval will result in a significant, negative impact.” 
(emphasis added) Tulloch instead focused on the issue of danger: her arguments did not share the 
expectation of certainty contained in the phrase “will result.”190 
This intersecting vocabulary of experiments, risk, benefits, and discrimination is 
expressive of a DC conception of the precautionary principle. According to this DC perspective, 
the principle is more than a method of responding to environmental risk and scientific 
uncertainty: It promotes environmental justice by fairly distributing environmental costs and 
economic benefits. Of course critics of the precautionary principle note the economic imperative 
of development, even at the price of environmental risk and harm, but this broader understanding 
of the principle rejects the assumptions that underlie those criticisms. For example, DC 
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advocates of the precautionary principle insist that the dangers flowing from economic 
development are unfairly concentrated in certain regions and populations. 
Unlike its fellow Respondent at the ERT, Lafarge, the MOE addressed the linkages 
between the precautionary principle and the second prong of the leave test, a matter the ERT had 
recently considered in Davidson.191 Implicitly accepting the proposition that the precautionary 
principle must inform efforts to interpret the second prong of the test, the MOE then approached 
that interpretive task with negative instead of affirmative language: The precautionary principle 
“does not require the withholding of an approval where the Applicant fails to provide evidence to 
support his/her concerns regarding the potential for significant harm to the environment.”192 
(emphasis in the original) This negative framing, which echoes the language found in the first 
branch of the S 41 test, left unanswered the question of whether the precautionary approach 
allows decision-makers the discretion to withhold such an Approval, for example in 
circumstances where probative evidence of both safety and risk are scarce.  
The implications of this interpretive silence are two-fold: first, the facts in Lafarge 
arguably fall into this category marked by uncertainty, where persuasive evidence of both safety 
and risk is lacking; and second, it fails to address the scope of the Directors’ authority under the 
precautionary principle to withhold Instrument Approvals, a legal question relevant to Lafarge 
and future cases because the obligation to exercise discretionary powers reasonably makes 
questions about how such discretion is used potentially determinative in appeals and judicial 
reviews.193 Establishing that applying the precautionary principle involves the exercise of 
administrative discretion does not remove it from the ambit of the S 41 test, especially since the 
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first prong of the test expressly includes the concept of reasonableness, a concept that also guides 
the review of discretionary decision-making. 
The incompleteness that characterizes the MOE’s statements on the relationship between 
the second prong of the S 41 test and the precautionary principle is evocative of logical tensions 
in the MOE’s interpretation of the test, but the incompleteness also reflects the influence of DC 
principles that shrink the scope of appellate review. According to this perspective, proving that 
the Directors’ were not obliged to reject the proposal on precautionary grounds effectively 
defeats any appellate challenge. The absence of an obligation to reject the Proposal indicates that 
both approval and rejection would fall within the range of responses that could survive a 
reasonableness review. 
What is most notable about these competing views is what they share: a reliance on DC 
principles. Sprinkled throughout LEC-LOW’s arguments about the conditions’ inadequacy are 
references to concerns raised by critics that the MOE allegedly ignored in granting the Approvals 
and drafting the conditions.194 The same emphasis on deliberative quality is also seen in the 
MOE’s replying submissions, which focus on the extent to which the conditions redefined 
Lafarge’s original proposal.195 LEC-LOW measured thoroughness in relation to concerns raised 
by the public and environmental critics, and the MOE measured its Directors’ performance in 
reference to the amendments it forced on Lafarge’s proposal. Both sides built their claims on the 
(lack of) quality in the deliberative process, and both sides emphasized the significance of the 
conditions attached to the Approvals, but they diverged on the reference point they used to 
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evaluate the quality of those conditions: the views of critics, or the wishes of the project’s 
proponent, Lafarge. 
Lafarge countered the leave Applicants’ precautionary claims by repeatedly asserting that 
emissions would fall below applicable MOE limits. Lafarge sought to transform the 
precautionary principle’s focus on risk of environmental harm into a concern about compliance 
with regulatory standards. The Directors’ monitoring and reporting conditions supposedly 
answered this concern about regulatory breaches, meaning that the precautionary principle was 
considered and precautionary measures were imposed.196 A lack of supportive precedent may 
have frustrated Lafarge’s efforts to blur the distinction between risk of environmental harm and 
risk of regulatory non-compliance.  
The same narrow definition of harm is found in Lafarge’s comments on the second prong 
of the S 41 test. Both prongs of the test must be satisfied in order to gain leave to appeal a 
decision, thus a more expansive interpretation of precaution accomplishes little if the second 
prong undermines its purpose. Burden of proof formed the crux of Lafarge’s arguments here: 
Where there is compliance with regulatory numerical limits, the burden of proof shifts to the S 
41 leave applicant and this burden can only be satisfied with scientific evidence.197  
The precautionary principle’s reach was at stake in this dispute over the “significant 
harm” test. If Lafarge’s view prevailed, along with the MOE’s argument that each prong of the 
test must be established on a balance of probabilities, the result would be a drastic reduction in 
the precautionary principle’s force. Evidence of the probability of significant environmental 
harm would be required and the precautionary principle is designed for application in cases 
where uncertainty, not evidence, predominates. The distance between the leave Respondents’ 
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understanding of the significant harm test and even a relatively contained interpretation of the 
principle is expressed by Lafarge’s demand for “hard evidence” of harm under the former.198  
Like the MOE, Lafarge claimed that because the proposed ban was not current law, it 
was therefore irrelevant and properly disregarded by the Directors.199 (LEC characterized the 
MOE’s claims on this point as “disingenuous.”200) Lafarge also left unaddressed the argument 
that the proposal indicated there were concerns within the Ministry about the risks posed by tire 
burning that made the Directors’ Approvals unreasonable. Again following the MOE’s logic, 
Lafarge made the same alternative argument that the tire burning ban exhibited a precautionary 
approach.201 In addition, Lafarge framed its claims about the proposed ban’s irrelevance in RI 
terms, as part of the Directors’ – and the ERT’s – obligation to accept and apply the law as it 
stands. Any pleas to change the law, and usurp the Legislature and Ministry’s authority, by 
making proposed legal reforms de facto law must be resisted.202  
 Yet the proposed moratorium on tire burning frustrated Lafarge and the MOE’s 
arguments about environmental risk. The MOE’s narrative of a thorough and expert deliberative 
process resulting in qualified Approvals of Lafarge’s project could not accommodate the 
proposed moratorium on tire burning. Both CAB and the LEC constructed their precautionary 
arguments around this fact. Simply citing the proposed Regulation and related admission of the 
MOE’s lack of knowledge about tire burning satisfied the threshold for establishing the 
precautionary principle’s relevance – lack of scientific certainty about an activity’s 
environmental consequences. It would follow from the proposed Regulation, and 
                                                
198 Ibid at para 82. 
199 Ibid at paras 44 and 130-1.  
200 LEC-LOW Reply supra note 158 at para 96. 
201 Lafarge Response supra note 155 at para 132. 
202 Ibid at 44. 
79 
acknowledgement of the uncertainties surrounding burning tires, that the Directors were bound 
to consider the precautionary approach. 
 The MOE’s initial answer to this strategic dilemma was Rational-Instrumentalism, 
although it added an “in the alternative” DC-inflected argument. Moving from DC to RI 
arguments, from one page to the next, the MOE submitted that the proposed moratorium could 
not be properly considered by either the Directors who made the original decision, or the 
Tribunal scrutinizing that decision. It was a “proposed” regulation, and therefore irrelevant. 
While elsewhere in its submission the MOE suggests that its staff are both numerous and part of 
a holistic deliberative process, on this point the MOE implied that the consideration of Lafarge’s 
proposal and the drafting of the proposed moratorium occurred in separate and unconnected parts 
of the Ministry.203 The MOE also relied on the different legal characters of a Certificate of 
Approval and a Regulation: unlike with the former, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council retains 
discretion over the approval of a Regulation. According to the MOE, the proposed regulation 
was inapplicable because it was a proposal, and the decision whether to accept the proposal – to 
make it binding or not – was beyond the Directors’ control.204  
Yet this argument left unaddressed the concerns that gave rise to the proposed 
moratorium. Both the LEC-LOW and CAB Applications circumvented doubts about the legal 
status of proposed regulations to focus squarely on the risks and lack of knowledge underlying 
the proposed moratorium.205 The MOE only addressed this point in its alternative arguments, 
summarized in a brisk forty-nine word claim that if the Tribunal were to consider the proposed 
Regulation in its review, it should find that by limiting tire burning to “a small number of 
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facilities” the MOE was following the precautionary principle.206 Banning and conditional 
approval, according to this reasoning, were two precautionary responses to the same underlying 
concern. The precautionary principle did not dictate a singular response to the risks and 
uncertainties surrounding tire burning, but instead offered a range of suitably precautionary 
responses.  
This DC understanding of the precautionary principle resisted the RI notion that the 
principle produces specific and predictable regulatory outcomes. The inconsistency highlighted 
in the leave Applicants’ submissions was not troubling because the MOE did not seek 
uniformity, and the precautionary principle did not demand it. Precaution could inspire a 
proposed moratorium in one set of circumstances and conditional approval in another 
deliberative process. Although speculation about the reasoning behind the ERT’s rejection of the 
MOE’s reasoning is both unproductive and beyond this paper’s reach, the strained coherence in 
this part of the MOE’s submissions illustrates the difficulty faced by advocates seeking to blend 
RI and DC arguments. The line separating flexible and nuanced arguments from incoherent ones 
is sometimes delicate.  
The Individual Applicants especially struggled with the persuasive and evidentiary 
demands of making precautionary arguments. The Dawbers and Jenneys submitted virtually 
identical Applications in which they made the following assertion:207 
There is a good reason to believe that no reasonable person would have gone against their 
own former medical officer, Dr. Alban Goddard-Hill’s warnings about the dangers of 
creating deadly dioxins in cement kilns that burned tires. It is my understanding that one 
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gram of dioxin can kill thousands of people; therefore, it would be very unwise to create 
them.  
 
In October, 2004, Dr. Goddard-Hill outlined his objections to the Lafarge project in a letter to 
Environment Minister Dombrowsky.208  Although the Dawber and Jenney Applications did not 
attach Dr. Goddard-Hill’s letter, it was included by LEC-LOW in their supporting materials. His 
letter features sharp criticism of traditional Risk Assessment: “[It] has been used by industry as a 
licence to make a profit by polluting the environment for three decades now.”  
 Precautionary considerations are the foundation of Willard’s list of Grounds for Appeal. 
Willard argued that the proposal should only be approved “if it could be proven safe up front,” 
and that “the ability to quickly demonstrate the direct correlation between human illnesses and 
air pollutions is not a hard science in a multi-polluted world.”209 This last assertion links the 
ecosystem approach with precautionary ideas in a mutually reinforcing relationship. Willard also 
calls for the exclusion of anyone affiliated with Lafarge from oversight and data collection 
responsibilities, which is consistent with her allusions to the conflict between Lafarge’s 
economic goals and the public interest.  
J. Sulzenko, one of the individual applicants, maintained that the Approvals should be 
reversed in the absence of an environmental assessment or full public consultation: The 
implication is that more scientific or democratic legitimacy was needed. Precautionary concerns 
are also highlighted in Sulzenko’s arguments: “Surely it makes more sense… to find out through 
a full environmental assessment process that involves full public consultations what the 
consequences are of adding such a toxic mix to an old kiln BEFORE anything goes into the 
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air.”210 Sulzenko’s comments recall Dryzek et al’s notion of a precautionary discourse that 
extends beyond the precautionary principle. The idea of tame and robust interpretations of the 
precautionary principle may also shed light on Sulzenko’s objectives: the options of a more 
extensive environmental assessment or a fuller public consultation process may evoke different 
models of administrative constitutionalism, but they would both constitute a robust application of 
the precautionary principle.  
Unlike this fluid understanding of precaution, the ERT’s reasoning on the precautionary 
principle centred on the issue of proof: who must prove what. After finding that the proposed 
moratorium on tire-burning represented an acknowledgement that the MOE lacked experience 
with the practice, Member Pardy concluded that the precautionary approach obliged “the 
Directors to consider the incineration of tires to be as hazardous as it could possibly be, and to 
place the onus of establishing the absence of environmental harm upon the source of risk.”211 
This formulation of the precaution has attracted criticism on the grounds that it demands that 
proponents prove a negative – i.e. the absence of risk – and is thus incoherent and impractical.  
Scott has refuted this criticism of the precautionary principle by pointing to an alternative 
understanding of the proponent’s obligation: “The precautionary principle, in shifting the burden 
of proof, demands… evidence of the absence of harm.”212 Member Pardy’s sweeping 
characterization of the precautionary principle’s standard of proof is not generally shared by 
supporters of the principle; the idea that the precautionary principle requires proof of a negative 
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is usually only expressed by critics of the principle, such as Sunstein. In fact, LEC-LOW 
specifically disavowed this understanding of the precautionary principle:213 
The Response of the Directors suggests that reliance by the Applicants on the 
precautionary approach is misplaced because it would lead to the banning altogether of a 
process or proposed action such as the Lafarge proposal in circumstances of uncertainty. 
[…] The Applicants submit that the Directors’ [sic] and Lafarge have again misconstrued 
and mis-characterized the position of the Applicants. […] [I]f the test burn conditions 
[sic] the approval are deficient to the point of being incapable of providing the correct 
answers, as suggested in the Leave to Appeal Application, then any decision to allow 
permanent burning of alternative fuels based on flawed test burn results will be similarly 
deficient. By any yardstick, such a decision is not precautionary. [emphasis added] 
 
On first impression, Member Pardy’s interpretation of the precautionary approach recalls 
RI concepts in its formalistic understanding of proof and narrow focus on the parties 
immediately involved in the decision: the Directors and the “source of risk,” in this case Lafarge. 
It also constitutes a robust definition of the precautionary principle, one that is far from the 
“tame” interpretation supported by Thornback and Tollefson, and even further from the soft 
regulatory approach to environmental risk urged by Sunstein. Requiring that regulators assume a 
practice is “as hazardous as it could possibly be” invites stringent evaluation of projects with 
uncertain but even potentially serious environmental impacts. However, the practical 
implications of this interpretation rest on the SEV’s legal weight and the precise nature of the 
obligations it imposes, and when Member’s Pardy’s interpretation of the precautionary approach 
is contextualized accordingly, that first impression changes: the DC paradigm is predominant in 
the ERT’s examination of the precautionary approach.  
 Section 11 of the EBR states that Ministers must “consider” their SEV’s when making 
environmentally significant decisions; the obligation is arguably more procedural than 
substantive. Crucially, regulators retain the discretion to approve a proposal even when applying 
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the precautionary approach indicates that it should be rejected. The ERT’s robust definition of 
the precautionary approach is balanced – and arguably attenuated – by its limited significance for 
the ultimate decision.  
The ERT’s findings on the relevance of the proposed moratorium on tire burning in 
regard to the precautionary approach amounted to another victory for the DC paradigm. 
Rejecting the MOE’s and Lafarge’s assertion that the proposal was irrelevant because it had not 
been made law by the Directors’ superiors in the Ministry and Cabinet – a formalistic hierarchy-
based argument that recalls RI concepts – the ERT held that the proposal was a “policy” within 
the meaning of S 41.214 Consequently, the Directors should properly have considered the 
proposal even though it had not been officially approved by the Minister and Cabinet. This 
represents a clear departure from the RI ideas expressed by the Tribunal in its other comments on 
the proposal’s significance. 
The ERT considered the proposed ban on tire burning in two separate grounds: the 
precautionary and the discrimination claim. This divided analysis may appear surprising in light 
of the above discussion in the literature review on the links between the precautionary principle 
and efforts to equitably distribute environmental risk (and accompanying socioeconomic 
benefits). In addition, it is difficult to trace the legal basis of the discrimination argument. The 
Tribunal cited an earlier ERT decision, Safety-Kleen,215 for the proposition that consistency is 
essential to reasonable environmental decision-making: “consistency is one of the characteristics 
of a system of governance based on the rule of law.”216 In the next paragraph of Safety-Kleen, 
this broad statement is qualified by noting the legislative reliance on site-specific Instrument 
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Approvals. Safety-Kleen, in reasoning adopted by Member Pardy, reconciled this apparent 
contradiction by holding that environmental effects – rather than regulatory guidelines and 
emissions limits – are what must be consistent.217  
This recalls Pardy’s comments about the importance of rule of law principles in “The 
Invisible Hand” and other academic works. In addition, Pardy’s emphasis on the superiority of 
effects-based environmental laws fits easily with this understanding of environmental 
discrimination, which should not be confused with DC concepts of equity. Consistency, more 
than fairness, is the value underlying the Tribunal’s concern about discriminatorily permitting 
tire burning in Bath while banning it elsewhere. 
This is an exacting standard that could potentially justify searching and intrusive scrutiny 
of administrative decisions, with implications for public administration frameworks. Even 
precautionary theorists who highlight the importance of equity typically advocate for an open 
public deliberation on the distribution of risks and benefits, in keeping with DC concepts, rather 
than a bright-line rule that adverse environmental impacts must be kept constant over an area as 
large as Ontario. Once consistency of environmental effects, including risks, is accepted as 
intrinsic to reasonable environmental decision-making, the simultaneous issuance of the 
Approvals and the proposed moratorium appears obviously reasonable. Describing the Lafarge 
plant as a “pilot project” further supports this impression of unreasonableness.218   
These comments on the importance of consistency raise questions about the theory of 
administrative constitutionalism underpinning the Tribunal’s reasoning on this point. The 
sharpness – or inflexibility – of the command against inconsistent distributions of environmental 
risk seems to leave little room for discretion, suggesting the influence of RI principles. And 
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unlike the precautionary approach, whose relevance is dependent on its inclusion in the SEV and 
which must only be “considered” when making environmentally significant decisions, the 
requirement to not discriminate appears more far-reaching. Avoiding discrimination is framed as 
an obligation, and not merely as a value or priority that should inform administrative decision-
making. 
In contrast, DC ideas infused the Tribunal’s contemplation of these same facts 
surrounding the proposed ban under its analysis of the precautionary approach. On these two 
separate grounds, Member Pardy found that the proposed ban established the appearance of 
unreasonableness – under both RI and DC theories. 
It should be noted that in Member Pardy’s analysis of the precautionary principle he also 
made the more modest finding that the proposed ban revealed a lack of knowledge about tire-
burning that made the Approvals prima facie unreasonable.219 This reasoning is easily reconciled 
with both RI and DC theories – the proposition that where lack of knowledge is admitted, 
precaution should be taken is not in tension with either paradigm of administrative 
constitutionalism – but it is significant that Member Pardy did not solely rely on this relatively 
uncontroversial finding. Instead he chose to import the DC understanding of a more fluid and 
polycentric administrative decision-making process where “relevant” law and policy is defined 
more expansively and less hierarchically.  
One intriguing aspect of the ERT’s decision is its simultaneous recognition of the 
importance of equitably distributing environmental risk and exclusion of those equitable 
considerations from its analysis of the precautionary principle. The effect of this split approach 
was to better insulate the leave Applicants’ victory from legal challenge. Reviewing courts could 
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potentially uphold the ERT’s decision regardless of their views on the importance of equitably 
distributing risk and the related question of what part consistency plays in exercises of 
administrative discretion. 
In the final paragraph of his comments on precaution, Member Pardy switches between 
“approach” and “principle.” Shortly following his interpretation of the precautionary approach 
and its related obligations surrounding proof, Pardy condemns the Directors’ Approvals by 
noting that “[s]uch an approach is not consistent with the precautionary principle.”220 (emphasis 
added) Whiteside’s emphasis on the significance of the word “principle” is instructive in light of 
the SEV’s use of “precautionary approach.”221 The slippage between “principle” and “approach” 
– which is seen throughout the parties’ submissions – may indicate that in relation with how 
environmental harm, uncertainty and risk are understood, and burdens of proof allocated, there is 
little meaningful difference between the two formulations. (Lafarge even referred to “the 
precautionary principle/approach,” implying that the two are interchangeable.222) What 
difference there is appears in the nature of the regulatory response envisioned: The precautionary 
principle imposes obligations on regulators, while the precautionary approach offers guidance 
that should be considered, but not necessarily followed.  
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Chapter 6 
Expertise: Contesting Science and Providing Proof 
Expertise figures prominently in the debates regarding the second branch of the test, the 
significant harm requirement. The content of expert evidence is summarized together with the 
authors’ qualifications. For example, Member Pardy notes that a report submitted by the S 41 
Applicants was prepared by “Dr. Brian McCarry of the Department of Chemistry at McMaster 
University.” The evidence of two “local Medical Officers of Health” was also highlighted.223 As 
the following discussion demonstrates, fears about the precautionary principle threatening the 
authority of scientific experts in environmental regulation and decision-making were not realized 
in the ERT proceedings. 
LEC-LOW emphasized Lafarge’s environmental violations in other jurisdictions, 
including Quebec, in its arguments.224 Lafarge in its responding submissions arguably placed 
even more emphasis on its reputation, listing a series of environmental accomplishments and 
constructing a corporate image as a paragon of environmental and social responsibility.225 On 
both sides, these competing reputational claims are presented with little comment or explanation 
about their legal significance: their importance to Lafarge’s legal outcomes is apparently self-
evident. But for the purposes of this analysis, the rhetorical and legal ends served by these claims 
are important. LEC-LOW, in reply submissions it made after Lafarge’s and the MOE’s 
responding factums were filed, attempted to clarify the relevance of its reputational claims:226 
[…] [T]he Applicants do not take the position that Lafarge’s history of environmental 
non-compliance was so extensive that the Directors ought not to have issued any 
approvals to Lafarge. However, the Applicants submit that that history of non-
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compliance should have been expressly considered by the Directors, and should have 
resulted in further and better conditions to safeguard the environment and local health 
and safety. 
 
Perhaps the clearest use for these claims was in debates about the proper weight accorded 
to each party’s scientific evidence, including the engineering and modeling reports. All the 
parties attempted to polish their credentials and place their scientific claims in the context of 
their reputational claims. The Facts section of the Applicants’ and Respondents’ factums move 
fluidly between environmental and reputational claims. Lafarge cited awards and recognitions it 
had received for its environmental performance together with summaries of its technical reports 
on the proposed projects.227 The “objective” scientific evidence was bolstered by claims of 
organizational excellence that would easily fit in a corporate or NGO profile – or in a press 
release. Expertise, reputation, and objectivity were mutually constructed. 
The Dawber and Jenney Applications similarly expressed skepticism about the 
trustworthiness of Lafarge’s expertise: “[U]nlike the US Environmental Protection Agency you 
are satisfied with a self regulating system. Recent findings prove that this system is not 
viable.”228 The sentiment expressed here is reminiscent of concerns raised by other leave 
Applicants: that the MOE’s and Lafarge’s claims regarding expertise, namely the reliance on 
Lafarge to monitor and mitigate its own environmental impact, was misguided. Trusting in 
Lafarge’s expertise and good faith was a mistake, according to the Dawbers and Jenneys. 
Before the Directors’ Approvals were issued, CAB was one of several environmental 
groups to urge the MOE to hold a public hearing on the proposed project. Although public 
hearings are more closely associated with DC understandings of administrative constitutionalism 
and the proper regulation of risk, CAB framed its request in distinctly RI terms. While clarifying 
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that it was not casting any doubts on the integrity and objectivity of the technical staff evaluating 
Lafarge’s proposal, CAB raised concerns about “political” influences on the MOE’s ultimate 
decision on Lafarge’s proposal.229 Political and bureaucratic power are threats, while objectivity 
is the antidote. Recalling that the RI paradigm emphasizes clear and exact legislative rules, rather 
than a reliance on discretionary authority, assists in discerning the strong influence of RI ideals. 
The Ministry of the Environment was thus distinguished from its staff. CAB invoked the ideal of 
an “apolitical” deliberative process that is responsive to public concerns.230 According to this 
reasoning, public consultation is the reverse of political influence. This implicitly counters critics 
that highlight the potential for such participatory processes to devolve into irrationality, 
prejudice, and fear-mongering.231 
CAB, in this section of its arguments for a public hearing, also cited the MOE’s 
commitment that “this decision [to approve or reject Lafarge’s proposal] will not only be made 
on technical, but also moral grounds.”232 It is unclear what the phrase “moral grounds” signaled 
here, either when it was used by the MOE’s staff or when CAB repeated it. But the distinction 
between “technical” and “moral”, together with the opposition constructed between public 
participation and political influence, is instructive. Further clues are provided in the sentence 
immediately following the reference to “moral grounds,” which notes the importance of 
evaluating the proposed project “on its merits.”233 Thus “moral grounds,” public consultation, 
and “merits” are aligned on one side, and on the other side “political influence” is grouped with 
exclusive reliance on “technical grounds.”  
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The MOE, unlike its fellow leave Respondent Lafarge, sourced its claims about the 
precautionary nature of the decision not only in the extensive conditions attached to the 
Approvals, but also in the deliberative process that generated those conditions. The MOE’s 
submissions feature lists of Lafarge’s supporting documentation - down to specific emails and 
letters - and the corresponding scrutiny, questioning, and analysis performed by the MOE’s 
“technical staff.”234 According to the MOE, the original decision was the product of careful 
review and analysis by technical and scientific professionals. The MOE located its claims to 
authority, and the deference it sought from the reviewing Tribunal, in this combination of 
expertise and thoroughness.  
Building on their arguments about Lafarge’s responsibility for proving the project’s 
safety, LEC-LOW argued that the evidence relied on by the MOE and Lafarge failed to refute 
the potential for significant harm established by the Approvals’ status as Class I and II 
Instruments. Basing its arguments on commissioned scientific reports that investigated the 
proposed project, LEC-LOW further criticized the adequacy of the conditions attached to the 
Proposals. Key weaknesses cited by LEC-LOW included the limited number of contaminants 
listed in the testing requirements, as well as the technologies used for the monitoring.235 Where 
the leave Respondents described the conditions as exhaustive and refined, LEC-LOW suggested 
they were inadequate and incomplete. The picture that emerges in LEC-LOW’s review of the 
conditions is that of a lengthy, but poorly formulated list. In contrast, the MOE in particular 
suggests that the dozens of conditions are proof of a thorough and expert evaluation process.  
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In regard to precaution, the most significant part of the MOE’s submissions on proof 
concerns the interlocking ideas of expertise and evidence. The MOE argued that where a 
decision is supported by scientific evidence, only “strong expert evidence” contradicting the 
decisions’ reasonableness suffices to grant leave under S 41.236 The MOE claimed that the 
evidence provided by the Applicants failed to meet this threshold, in part because much of its 
evidence centred on questions about the adequacy of the data relied on by the Directors to 
establish the project’s safety.237 Thus the S 41 Applicants’ precautionary arguments depended on 
providing contradictory scientific evidence, not merely casting doubt on the evidence supporting 
the decision. Precautionary arguments could therefore only satisfy the leave test, according to the 
MOE’s reasoning, if they were based on contradictory evidence. Casting doubt on the evidence 
of safety was not enough.  
A demand for “hard” evidence of risk results in a dramatically weaker version of the 
precautionary principle. Evidence of safety can prevail even when its validity is persuasively 
challenged, so long as the challenge falls short of positively establishing risk. The precautionary 
principle’s purpose of removing the need for “full scientific certainty” is thus frustrated, while 
the concerns of Sunstein and other skeptics are largely answered. Scientific evidence of safety 
can only be countered with evidence of actual risk: once evidence of safety is presented, simply 
challenging its veracity is not enough.  
Beyond presenting their own reports and related affidavits – “prepared by five experts” – 
Lafarge also attacked Dr. Carman’s report: “the opinion and allegations of Dr. Carman should be 
afforded little or no weight on the basis that [he] lacks the required independence. Dr. Carman is 
an advocate for environmental groups and individuals seeking to prevent the use of Alternative 
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Fuels and in particular Tire Derived Fuels.”238 Lafarge, citing Dr. Carman’s CV, also noted his 
advocacy work against burning tires for fuel in several U.S. jurisdictions. This advocacy, 
according to Lafarge, proved unsuccessful in these other jurisdictions:239 
The use of AF [alternative fuels] and TDF [tire-derived fuels] use has been consistently 
and increasingly embraced in other jurisdictions in Canada, the United States and around 
the world as an effective and environmentally beneficial measure. Contrary to 
suggestions and allegations, the technology and experience is not novel or experimental. 
  
 LOW-LEC, in their reply submissions, disputed Lafarge’s characterization of Dr. 
Carman’s work:240  
There is no legal or other reason for the Tribunal to disregard the evidence of Dr. 
Carman, just as there is not reason to disregard the evidence of the Lafarge experts 
merely because they have a history of representing proponent interests, or to disregard the 
evidence of the MOE’s experts merely because they are employed by MOE to represent 
its interests. 
 
LEC-LOW’s reasoning here is attractive, but a close reading suggests that one of 
Lafarge’s objects in casting doubt on Dr. Carman’s expertise was to highlight the support for tire 
burning shown by American regulators. The expertise of American regulators was invoked to 
impugn the expertise relied on by the leave Applicants. Lafarge repeatedly made these implicit 
claims regarding the expertise of regulators in other jurisdictions who approved Lafarge’s 
activities, and tire burning in particular. Several reports and discussions regarding these other 
jurisdictions were featured by Lafarge in their materials, including the “Alternative Fuels 
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Report” prepared by Lafarge to answer public concerns about burning tires for fuel, and the 
Affidavit of Mike Lepage, an Engineer who prepared a study of the project for Lafarge.241 
Member Pardy surveyed the evidence submitted by both sides, concluding that they were 
“diametrically opposed.”242 Lafarge and the MOE had argued, in conjunction with their claims 
about the proper standard of proof, that in situations where expert evidence was contradictory, 
leave to appeal should be denied.243 This reasoning was rejected by the Tribunal, which instead 
based its finding that the second branch of the test was satisfied precisely on the existence of 
contradictory – and expert – evidence. Findings that the leave Applicants’ claims about the 
danger posed by the proposed plant were backed by “credible, qualified experts,” the ERT 
granted leave to appeal the Instrument Approvals.244  
Yet this victory did not extend to the Individual Applicants. After a more in-depth 
examination of the individual applicants’ standing under S 38, which is not pertinent to this 
paper’s analysis, the ERT quickly dismissed all the individual Applications for failing to provide 
the technical evidence and legal analysis demanded by S 41.245 This was done in one paragraph. 
Expertise was an immediately present issue in the ERT’s assessment of the individual 
Applications. Member Pardy stated that the individual Applicants’ concerns were “genuine,” and 
their submissions “articulate,” but his finding that “none of these applications are accompanied 
by supporting material of any weight” proved fatal.246  
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This echoes the MOE’s criticism of the Jenneys’ application for lacking adequate 
supporting information, contrasting this lack with the “detailed affidavits from technical staff, 
each of whom is a highly qualified expert in his or her field” that the MOE provided.”247 
Superiority in both legal and scientific expertise was being claimed here. The MOE criticized the 
Jenneys’ choice to simply quote Dr. Goddard-Hill’s work rather than introducing it via 
documents or affidavits, a formal legal procedure and one that the Jenneys may have been 
unfamiliar with. 
The supporting material that the ERT deemed necessary for a S 41 application is costly – 
the services of the legal and scientific professionals who created LOW’s and LEC’s joint 
applications are expensive. A de facto requirement that leave Applicants be lawyers and 
scientific professionals, or retain their services, severely restricts access to appellate 
opportunities. Sulzenko anticipated these barriers in the closing paragraph of his application: “I 
tried to navigate the MOE site but had great difficulty. I hope this letter serves in a formal 
enough way to request the MOE decision be appealed.”248  
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PART III: The Divisional Court of Ontario 
Lafarge waited about six months before filing its application for judicial review, and 
another two months passed before the application was completed.249 LOW argued that the delay 
should disqualify Lafarge’s judicial review application under the doctrine of laches, which 
allows Courts to withhold a remedy in cases where a party had been unduly slow in initiating or 
pursuing proceedings. The Court dismissed LOW’s request but rebuked Lafarge for the delay.250 
On judicial review the Environmental Commissioner of Ontario (ECO) gained intervenor 
status. The ECO confined his submissions to S 41’s purpose and the relevance of the SEV 
without taking a position in the broader dispute. At the Divisional Court Lafarge was termed the 
“Applicant,” while the MOE, despite its support for Lafarge, was considered a “Respondent.” 
This was presumably because the Ministry and the ERT are both part of the Ontario government. 
However, for ease of reference I will continue to refer to Lafarge and the MOE as “leave 
Respondents.” LOW and the other S 38 Applicants will continue to be referred to as such.  
Another change on judicial review was that the S 38 Applicants filed separate materials. 
LOW independently submitted a factum and supporting evidence, as did the LEC and five 
individuals who had previously been associated with LEC’s and LOW’s joint application at the 
ERT. These five individuals – Gordon Downie, Gordon Sinclair, Robert Baker, Paul Langlois 
and John Fay (DSBLF) – were represented by Joseph Castrilli, who also appeared on their behalf 
at the ERT. Thus there were three sets of S 38 applicant materials before the Court. On a number 
of points they referenced and relied on each other’s submissions.  
Because the MOE was formally a Respondent on judicial review, it filed its submissions 
after Lafarge. The MOE submitted its factum approximately six weeks after Lafarge’s, and two 
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weeks after the S 38 Applicants filed their factums. It is not clear why the MOE filed last. The 
result was that the MOE could respond to all the parties’ arguments, while the S 38 Applicants 
were unable to address the MOE’s claims, including change in position on the SEV’s relevance, 
in their written submissions. (This shift is discussed below in Chapter 8.) The ECO, however, 
filed its intervening submissions on the SEV’s significance and the EBR almost three months 
after the MOE. Lafarge and the MOE subsequently replied to the ECO’s submissions, leading to 
an additional debate on the SEV’s relevance. 
Lafarge alleged several errors in the Tribunal’s reasoning, most significantly with respect 
to the proper interpretation of the S 41 test, the SEV’s relevance, and the application of the 
principles – including the precautionary approach - that the SEV contains. But Lafarge’s 
arguments remained largely consistent between the ERT hearing and the judicial review 
proceedings, except on the question of the SEV’s relevance. Precaution – and the relationship 
between expertise and assessments of risk - featured prominently in the debate surrounding the 
SEV and the second branch of the S 41 test.  
Section 43 of the EBR, which denies any right of appeal to the ERT’s acceptance or 
denial of a S 41 leave application, formed the crux of the S 38 Applicants’ arguments on judicial 
review.251 Where environmental concerns and the language of risk had dominated their 
arguments before the ERT, on judicial review the theory and practical concerns of administrative 
constitutionalism reigned. The root legal conflict on judicial review was whether the ERT’s 
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decision was intra vires or ultra vires its jurisdiction. That jurisdiction was of course a statutory 
creation, meaning that the question of who should identify and interpret the law governing the 
Directors’ original decision – the MOE, the ERT, or the Divisional Court – was itself a question 
of statutory interpretation. Answering the questions of law before the Divisional Court depended 
on uncovering legislative intent. However constitutional and rule of law principles are also 
implicated in judicial reviews, and Lafarge, like other complex administrative law cases, 
contained dilemmas that could only be resolved through balancing deference to the legislature 
and exercises of legislative authority with adherence to the foundational principles of 
administrative constitutionalism. The result of that balancing exercise would be shaped by the 
choice to adopt a more DC- or RI-inflected model of administrative constitutionalism. 
Dunsmuir,252 a Supreme Court of Canada case that modified the law that governs 
standard of review analysis, was released shortly after the parties filed their submissions. The 
Divisional Court allowed the parties to submit additional arguments on standard of review in 
light of the Dunsmuir decision.  
On judicial review all the S 38 Applicants stood by the Tribunal’s reasoning, devoting 
their efforts to countering the leave Respondents’ criticisms of the Tribunal’s judgment rather 
than advancing the arguments they had initially made. The Tribunal’s interpretation of the S 41 
test was defended, as were its findings on the precautionary approach. However, the Tribunal’s 
judgment was largely silent on the SEV’s relevance, because it was uncontested there, and 
provided little guidance on the selection of a standard of review. On these two issues the S 38 
Applicants advanced the same DC concepts they had embraced at the ERT leave hearing.   
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The three chapters in this Part address issues that are specific to the judicial review 
context and therefore offer insights that are distinct from the material covered in Part II’s review 
of the ERT arguments. Chapter 7 examines the arguments about choice of a standard of review 
and the related determination of the ERT’s role in a S 38 application. Chapter 8 considers the 
ERT’s interpretation of the S 41 test and the dispute about its reasonableness, as well as the 
newly emergent issue of the SEV’s relevance. Chapter 9 analyzes the competing understandings 
of precaution and environmental uncertainty advanced on judicial review, along with the nature 
of the deference shown to the ERT’s reasons on those points. Each chapter engages with 
foundational questions about different forms of accountability within the EBR framework and 
draws on Chapter 3’s overview of the EBR. These foundational questions gained prominence at 
the judicial review stage following the leave Respondents’ new opposition to the SEV’s 
relevance in the S 41 test and the responding intervention by the ECO. 
Although some of the legal questions raised in Lafarge on judicial review may appear 
removed from controversies about the precautionary principle’s definition, they speak to how the 
principle is applied, and more specifically the measure of authority enjoyed by administrative 
decision-makers applying the principle. It is the Divisional Court’s judicial review of Lafarge 
that most convincingly supports Fisher’s theory about the inextricable links between 
administrative constitutionalism and the precautionary principle. 
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Chapter 7 
Dunsmuir: Internal or External Review 
Where questions of expertise and the persuasiveness of competing scientific claims at the 
ERT were primarily limited to the technical reports commissioned by the parties, the question of 
the ERT’s expertise in deciding questions of law and fact emerged as a critical one at judicial 
review. In particular, expertise is an important consideration in the selection of a standard of 
review. The SCC’s judgment in Dunsmuir - released in March, 2008, shortly after all the parties 
submitted their factums – impacted how Tribunal decisions like the one at issue in Lafarge are 
scrutinized.253 All the parties filed supplementary arguments to address Dunsmuir’s 
modifications to the law on choice of standard of review. Given the SCC’s elimination of the 
most deferential standard of patent unreasonableness, the LEC and the other S 41 applicants 
amended their arguments to request a standard of reasonableness.254 In their original 
submissions, they sought either reasonableness or patent unreasonableness.255 Thus the dispute 
over standard of review remained fundamentally unchanged – the S 41 applicants still wanted a 
deferential standard, while Lafarge and the MOE asked for the most exacting standard.256 But the 
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Court’s judgment in Dunsmuir – and the SCC’s efforts to clarify the principles underlying 
judicial review in the majority and concurring opinions – shaped how the parties made the case 
for their chosen standard of review. The nature of the dispute remained unchanged, but 
Dunsmuir altered the dispute’s legal boundaries. 
Dunsmuir, and prior standard of review jurisprudence, directed reviewing Courts to 
examine the purpose of a Tribunal’s enabling statute in assessing the measure of deference owed 
to a Tribunal’s decision.257 Statutory intent is also relevant later in the substantive review of a 
Tribunal’s decision: it determines the extent of deference and grounds the Court’s assessment of 
whether that degree of deference was exceeded. This inquiry resembles the choice to adopt an 
external or internal review model in merits proceedings, as explored in Chapter 1.  
The case study reveals a striking distinction in how the parties approached the 
interpretation of S 41: Lafarge isolated S 41, while the S 38 Applicants sought to integrate it with 
the EBR’s other provisions.258 Lafarge’s arguments break down the language in S 41 to find its 
“plain meaning,” while the S 38 Applicants’ submissions invoke the purposive approach to 
statutory interpretation that seeks to reconcile a provision’s words with the legislative objectives 
of its statute.259 The MOE, although it eventually reached the same conclusions as Lafarge, took 
a different approach to interpreting S 41 that more closely examined its place in the EBR:260 
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The emphasis… is not on granting leave to third party applicants but in giving the public 
an opportunity to provide comments, through the Registry, before an environmentally 
significant decision is made, and in having the Director take those comments into 
consideration. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1’s literature review, the role of specialized tribunals in the DC 
and RI paradigms depends on the choice to adopt an internal or external review model. But in 
regard to the ERT’s role, the leave Applicants and Respondents were neatly divided. Each side 
expressed radically different perspectives on the ERT’s role in hearing the S 41 leave 
application. Lafarge described the ERT’s adjudicative role in sparse terms:261  
[I]t ‘approximates a conventional judicial paradigm’ seeking to resolve a dispute between 
two parties – those who wish to appeal and those who do not want an appeal to proceed. 
In essence, the role of the Tribunal in making the Decision was to review the submissions 
of two parties, complete with affidavit evidence and legal submissions, much in the same 
way a Court would hear an application or a motion for leave to appeal. 
 
This characterization of the ERT’s role is indicative of the internal review model. The Tribunal is 
tasked with resolving a bipolar dispute and must choose between two outcomes: granting or 
refusing leave to appeal.  
In its responding factum, LOW highlighted this passage to dispute it and the claims that 
Lafarge based on this narrow conception of the ERT’s responsibilities. LOW presented an 
external review understanding of the ERT’s role, one that recognized a more expansive – and DC 
– view of the ERT’s jurisdiction:262 
Contrary to the Applicant’s claim that the ERT is merely ‘seeking to resolve a dispute 
between two parties,’ the jurisdictional reality is that the ERT must determine mixed 
matters of law, fact, policy and the public interest when considering [S 41] applications 
under the EBR. 
 
LOW further described this process as “polycentric,” a revealing word choice that 
illustrates the gap between LOW’s embrace of DC principles and the leave Respondents’ 
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alternative conception of the ERT’s task in RI terms.263 By characterizing the ERT’s task as 
multi-faceted, complex, and polycentric, LOW sought to buttress its argument that the ERT’s 
expertise was distinct from the Court’s expertise, making the Tribunal’s decisions entitled to 
more deference.264 The MOE explicitly rejected the “polycentric” label, arguing that “the [S 41] 
test does not give the Tribunal broad discretionary powers or a range of policy laden choices nor 
does it involve the assessment of scientific, technical or policy based issues.”265 Viewed in 
isolation, this might simply indicate a limited role for the Tribunal in keeping with an external 
review model of merits review that protects regulatory choices from administrative appeals. Yet 
as discussed below in Chapter 8, the MOE defined the role of its own Directors in similarly 
narrow terms, including with respect to the precautionary principle. RI concepts were thus 
consistently invoked by the MOE.  
Like the other S 38 Applicants on judicial review, LEC cast S 41’s purpose in DC terms 
by stating that the ERT’s grant of leave to appeal was “merely a decision that will enable further 
public participation before” making a final decision to uphold or reverse the Approvals.266 This 
reasoning may also imply a bridging role for S 41: it establishes the criteria for re-evaluating the 
soundness of a decision reached within an RI administrative paradigm in a DC process. S 41, 
according to this interpretation of LEC’s arguments, is the trigger for making an RI deliberative 
process into a DC one. 
The immediate legal effect of the S 38 Applicants’ arguments about the ERT’s broad 
jurisdiction, if accepted, would be to bolster the ERT’s claims to deference from the Divisional 
Court. This same broader understanding of the ERT pointed to a DC understanding of the 
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precautionary principle that was alive to the potential for inequitable distribution of risk and 
sensitive to diverse sources and forms of expertise. The ERT’s task was not merely to decide a 
private dispute between two parties based on the preponderance of available scientific evidence, 
but also to consider any gaps and uncertainties in that evidence together with the public’s 
interest.  
 Although the ERT’s expertise was most directly implicated in the choice of standard of 
review, it was also relevant in regard to the ERT’s specific findings of fact. The ERT’s expertise 
in statutory construction, and questions of law more generally, was strongly contested, while its 
authority in scientific and factual areas proved less controversial.267  
The MOE attempted to circumvent the question of the ERT’s expertise in fact-finding by 
alleging that the ERT had failed to make requisite findings of fact on the second branch of the S 
41 test, and that when it had made findings of fact – most notably with respect to whether the 
Approvals reflected a precautionary approach – underlying errors of law made it appropriate to 
reverse those findings.268 Accordingly, there were no findings of fact that should attract the 
Court’s deference. This reasoning speaks to a cautious recognition of the Tribunal’s claims to 
deference in regard to fact-finding: The Tribunal’s conclusions on these points are not attacked 
squarely, but are instead tied to alleged errors of law. 
Returning to Dunsmuir, the practical consequence for Lafarge – and the conflict between 
competing understandings of the precautionary principle at issue in Lafarge – was renewed 
scrutiny of the ERT’s claims to deference from reviewing courts. Yet Dunsmuir, at least in the 
context of S 38 leave applications, did not alter the law regarding the Directors’ claims to 
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deference for its decisions. That reflects the ERT’s origins as a Tribunal created by statute, 
carrying out duties prescribed by statute: its review of the Directors’ decision did not engage the 
common law rules of standard of review that were at issue in Dunsmuir because those rules 
apply to the work of reviewing courts, not tribunals. The ERT’s review was governed by its 
enabling statutory provisions, most significantly S 41 itself, and informed by the common law 
rules of procedural fairness.269 Dunsmuir’s implications for the decisions addressed in Lafarge – 
the Directors’ original approvals and the ERT’s grant of leave to appeal – were therefore uneven. 
LOW maintained that Dunsmuir’s effect on standard of review analysis was minor: the 
new standard of review analysis retained the same essential questions that were asked in the 
“pragmatic and functional analysis.” The significance of deference was maintained despite the 
elimination of the patent unreasonableness standard, and application of the correctness standard 
remained limited to exceptional cases. LOW’s overarching argument was the enduring 
significance of deference post-Dunsmuir, especially when expert Tribunals acted within their 
own statutorily defined jurisdiction.270   
The Court ultimately selected the standard of reasonableness, as requested by the leave 
Applicants. The Court reviewed all aspects of the ERT’s decision on this standard. This followed 
the Court’s findings that the Tribunal has specialized expertise, and familiarity with the questions 
before it on the S 41 leave application. S 43 of the EBR, which prohibits appeals from a grant of 
leave to appeal under S 41, was deemed “a weak form of privative clause.”271 
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S 41 also binds the ERT, at least in part, to a reasonableness standard – the first prong of 
the test asks whether “no reasonable person” could have made the challenged decision. Lafarge 
therefore featured a kind of “double reasonableness” standard: The S 38 Applicants sought leave 
to appeal the Directors’ Approvals on a standard of reasonableness, and needed to satisfy the 
ERT there was a prima facie case for that decision’s unreasonableness, and on judicial review 
the Court reviewed the ERT’s assessment of that same prima facie case on a reasonableness 
standard.  
Unraveling the various legal standards and degrees of proof operating in Lafarge is both 
analytically demanding and a necessary step in understanding how the precautionary principle is 
applied in Ontario law. Lafarge, the MOE, and LEC all made lengthy written arguments on the 
proper interpretation of S 41, focusing on the terms “appear,” “good reason to believe,” and “no 
reasonable person.”272 As noted by the Court in its judgment, this labyrinthine debate on proof 
seen in the submissions is confusing and difficult to decipher.273 Rather than detail the specifics 
of the debate, my aim here is simply to identify the concepts and values underlying the parties’ 
comments on proof. 
Lafarge’s statements on proof illustrate and reinforce its efforts to make the leave test 
more onerous.274 This object – restricting appellate scrutiny of regulatory decisions – is 
potentially consistent with both RI and DC paradigms, but the two paradigms offer different 
legal paths towards reaching that goal. As illustrated by the MOE’s arguments at the ERT, DC 
principles are capable of grounding a narrow interpretation of leave to appeal rights. But 
Lafarge’s submissions to the reviewing Court display the same adherence to RI principles seen in 
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its arguments at the ERT. Lafarge described the S 41 hearing as fundamentally adjudicative – 
“[t]he decision is to be based on the evidence and arguments submitted by two (or more) parties 
in opposition to each other.”275 This adversarial framing is far removed from the leave 
Applicants’ characterizations of the ERT’s task, which centred on its place within the EBR’s 
panoply of procedural rights, mechanisms, and environmental objectives.  
The Divisional Court ultimately concluded that the ERT’s interpretation of the S 41 test 
was more than reasonable: it was correct.276  Following the classic approach to questions of 
statutory interpretation, the Court closely analyzed the provision’s words together with the 
legislative purpose it served. But the opening paragraph of its consideration of S 41 
foreshadowed the Court’s ultimate conclusion: “Part II of the EBR allows the general public to 
participate in and influence decision-making of the Ministry which has environmental 
significance.”277 Statutory intent is the Court’s starting point, and intent is discerned by looking 
at the surrounding provisions. This interpretive choice marked a victory for the leave 
Applicants’, and the ECO’s, arguments that S 41 was part of the EBR fabric, and not an isolated 
legal accountability mechanism divorced from the Act’s overriding objectives. 
The Court outlined the competing rationales for more or less expansive – DC or RI, 
respectively – interpretations of S 41’s appeal rights. Citing Winfield’s 1998 “Political and Legal 
Analysis of Ontario’s Environmental Bill of Rights,”278 the Court outlined several reasons that 
may have motivated the legislative choice to make S 41’s test narrow. The list reads like an RI 
manifesto:279  
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1.  The instrument holder has much more at stake than do members of the public 
who may have no physical or economic connection to the subject matter; 
2.  Appeals are very costly, in terms of legal and transaction costs, administrative 
resources, predictability and delay. There is an important social value in 
minimizing these costs by reserving appeals for cases of real unfairness and 
bungling; and 
3.  It is the mandate and primary role of government decision makers to serve the 
collective public interest and third party appeals should be limited to those 
cases where regulators have betrayed or failed their public trust. 
 
Yet the Court also recognized that contrary to these motivating policy concerns, the EBR 
expressly aims to allow Ontarians “to participate in the making of environmentally significant 
decisions by the Government of Ontario.”280 The language echoes the language in the S 38 
Applicants’ submissions.281 The implicit contrast between Winfield’s summary of possible 
reasons why the test is strict – reasons attributed to the Legislature by “commentators” – and the 
EBR’s “stated intent” to foster public participation further tipped the scales towards the leave 
Applicants, and the DC paradigm.  
The Court’s findings on the question reflected the influence of DC ideas about public 
involvement in deliberative processes. Holding that the requisite standard of proof under S 41 is 
evidentiary – a prima facie standard – the Court framed the leave Applicants’ evidentiary 
obligation as a threshold test. Section 41 Applicants must establish “that there is a serious 
question to be tried.”282 Although the Court characterizes this test as “stringent,” the Tribunal’s 
task on a S 38 Application is clearly distinguished from its task on a full appellate review. 
Lafarge and the MOE’s efforts to blur the difference between the S 41 test and the appellate 
review task failed.283  
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Strategic considerations may also motivate the choice to adopt an internal or external 
review model of a Tribunal’s role. One question raised by the arguments in Lafarge is whether 
the external or internal review model better insulates a Tribunal decision from challenge on 
judicial review. Lafarge’s and the MOE’s efforts to frame the ERT’s role in adjudicative terms, 
as an umpire deciding a private dispute, and the S 38 Applicants rejection of that characterization 
may indicate a shared assumption that framing the ERT’s role as an internal reviewer would 
make its decisions more susceptible to being overturned. Discretion is central to both the external 
review model and Canadian administrative law, where the degree of discretion entrusted to a 
Tribunal proves critical in determining how much deference Courts must show on judicial 
review. In Canada at least, the close relationship between deference and discretion points to the 
external review model’s capacity to make Tribunal decisions more resistant to judicial review. 
 If their places were reversed and the leave Respondents had been successful before the 
ERT, perhaps the parties’ support for the internal and external review models on judicial review 
would have also been reversed. Only mere speculation is possible on this point, but it is 
important to note the potential for what Fisher terms “analytical opportunism” in judicial review 
proceedings where parties may find themselves being a Respondent in one case and an Applicant 
in the next.284 The choice to adopt an internal or external review model may therefore reflect a 
party’s satisfaction with a Tribunal decision rather than deep-rooted views about administrative 
constitutionalism.  
These clashing understandings of the ERT’s role – as a source of law, or a statutory 
interpreter with no special capabilities – are underpinned by DC and RI paradigms, respectively. 
But the Court’s judgment rejected these extremes, despite exhibiting a more DC character. The 
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Court concluded that the ERT’s interpretations of the EBR and SEV were entitled to deference, 
but refrained from recognizing the Tribunal as the creator of law in the form of binding 
precedent constructed from case law.285 In this, as with other aspects of the Court’s decision, RI 
and DC principles were blended, and the exact measure of both paradigms’ acceptance was left 
open for further litigation. Lafarge illuminates the influence of DC and RI concepts in shaping 
disputes about the precautionary principle, while leaving many questions about the outcome of 
such disputes unresolved.  
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Chapter 8 
Accountability: Legal v Political 
Both Lafarge and the MOE accepted the SEV’s relevance before the ERT, but argued the 
opposite on judicial review.286 Although S 41’s relationship to the EBR was a recurring point of 
dispute, the issue emerged most clearly in the submissions exchanged by the ECO, the MOE and 
Lafarge regarding the SEV’s status. The ECO, in his intervening submissions, maintained that 
the SEV fits within the definition of “relevant policy” in the first branch of S 41.287 Lafarge and 
the MOE, in their reply to the ECO, argued that the Instrument Approval decisions subject to S 
41 appeals are far removed from the legislative objectives and concerns expressed in the EBR’s 
SEV provisions.288 The S 38 Applicants highlighted the MOE’s and Lafarge’s change of position 
on the SEV’s relevance:289 
Contrary to the submissions of the Applicant [for judicial review], there is nothing 
improper or jurisdictionally incorrect in the ERT’s consideration of the MOE’s SEV 
promulgated under the EBR. Significantly, neither the [judicial review] Applicant nor the 
Directors took the position at the leave stage that the SEV was an irrelevant 
consideration. Instead, the Applicant and Directors claimed that the issuance of the two 
waste-burning approvals complied with the SEV. However, the ERT properly rejected 
this claim in relation to the SEV provisions regarding the ecosystem approach and 
precautionary principle. [emphasis added] 
 
This reversal expanded the dispute: where the parties had previously agreed on the precautionary 
principle’s relevance but diverged on whether it had been followed, now they disagreed on the 
more foundational question of whether the Directors were free to consider it at all.  
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The word “free” is deliberately used here in relation to the dispute about the SEV’s 
significance. Lafarge and the MOE alike implicitly argued that not only could the SEV, and by 
extension the precautionary principle, be ignored by Directors issuing Approvals, but that it must 
be ignored.290 The following comments appear in the MOE’s factum:291  
The SEV was not intended to guide decisions by Directors when issuing instruments 
under s. 9 or s. 39 of the EPA. […] [T]he statutory scheme was not set up for Directors to 
take [the SEV] into account when making decisions whether or not to issue instruments. 
[The Air Approval was issued under S 9, the Waste Approval was issued under S 39] 
 
Thus the MOE did not seek to expand its own discretionary authority so that it could 
alternatively rely on or disregard the precautionary principle as it wishes: this would be 
consistent with some DC concepts that allow administrative decision-makers great latitude in 
determining precaution’s usefulness in the circumstances of a particular decision, but it was not 
the MOE’s chosen approach in Lafarge. The Directors lacked authority to consider the SEV, and 
furthermore because the SEV is not “relevant” policy the Directors cannot properly rely on it. If 
the Court had fully accepted the MOE’s arguments, Directors would be unable to deny 
Approvals on the basis of precautionary concerns. The effect of the MOE’s argument, if it had 
succeeded, would have been to restrict its own discretion. Lafarge’s support of this argument is 
unremarkable, given the general opposition to the precautionary principle in the business 
community, but the MOE’s willingness to adopt the same narrow understanding is more 
noteworthy. 
In what was likely a concession to the strategic demands of defending a judicial review 
application, the S 38 Applicants’ arguments regarding the S 41 test mostly focused on defending 
the Tribunal’s reasoning, and the same Tribunal jurisprudence that Lafarge and the MOE 
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challenged. LOW denied that “Member Pardy had [gone] on an arbitrary frolic when he granted 
leave” to the S 38 Applicants.292 The Tribunal’s interpretation of the S 41 test was defended on 
two grounds: first, it was consistent with the provision’s language and purpose; and second, it 
was consistent with the Tribunal’s previous jurisprudence in recent years.293  
The MOE, like Lafarge, urged the Court to reject the ERT’s previous jurisprudence on 
the SEV and its relevance under S 41. The MOE made two related arguments about the SEV’s 
reach: first, the EBR allowed the Minister significant discretion in determining how the SEV 
applied to environmentally significant decision; and second, only the ECO, in its Reports to the 
Legislature, could hold the MOE accountable for improperly exercising its discretion in applying 
the SEV.294 The first argument supported the MOE’s claim that the SEV was relevant in drafting 
Acts, Regulations, and policies, but irrelevant in making decisions – including the issuance of 
Instrumental Approvals in Lafarge – pursuant to those same Acts, Regulations, and policies. 
Accordingly, Directors should not consider the SEV when making Instrument Approval 
decisions because the SEV expressly does not provide for that consideration. Yet even if the 
MOE and Lafarge failed to convince the Court that the ERT’s finding about the SEV’s relevance 
was unreasonable, this second argument, if accepted, would put the issue of compliance with the 
SEV beyond the ERT’s jurisdiction.  
The effect of the second claim – that only the ECO can hold the MOE accountable for not 
complying with its SEV – was to shield the broader issue of whether the SEV was complied with 
from the reviewing Court’s scrutiny, as well as excluding the SEV from the ERT’s analysis in 
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any subsequent leave to appeal cases. Because the SEV’s reference to the precautionary principle 
is the only explicit mention of the principle in the EBR legislative scheme, the success of the S 
38 Applicants’ precautionary claims largely depended on this argument’s failure. 
Clarifying the ECO’s role and the nature of the MOE’s accountability in connection with 
the SEV was therefore critical to deciding the legal fate of the precautionary principle. As 
Fisher’s theory predicts, debates about the precautionary principle’s role in approving or 
rejecting proposals like Lafarge’s are inseparable from debates about government accountability, 
a foundational aspect of administrative constitutionalism. The core of the ECO’s submissions 
concerned accountability, and specifically the ECO’s own role in promoting accountability. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the MOE sought to elevate the ECO’s significance in ensuring 
accountability beyond how the ECO himself defined his role. Where the MOE claimed that the 
ECO had sole responsibility for determining its compliance with the SEV, and reporting on any 
non-compliance to the Legislature in his Annual Reports,295 the ECO presented an alternative 
picture of the EBR, one that included intersecting and duplicative accountability mechanisms 
involving the Legislature, specialized Tribunals, and the Courts.296 
 The MOE suggested that accountability was linear and largely toothless, while the ECO 
presented a contrasting image of a textured accountability framework that made the SEV’s 
obligations almost inescapable. Neither framework fits neatly within a solely RI or DC 
paradigm. RI theories prize strong accountability mechanisms, like the ECO called for, but they 
also emphasize a linearity that is much clearer in the MOE’s arguments. 
The extent of the MOE’s embrace of RI concepts on judicial review was more clearly 
shown by the MOE’s assertion that the SEV – and the principles it contains – are too “broad” 
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and “sweeping” to provide any guidance in deciding whether to issue an Instrument Approval.297 
Building on this claim, the MOE argued that the SEV could not be “policy” as defined in the 
EBR because it could not provide such guidance. Guidelines containing specific emission and 
containment limits could provide guidance to Directors reviewing Instrument applications: 
numerical thresholds were applicable, but the precautionary principle (and ecosystem approach) 
were incapable of application in the same context. This echoes the critiques of Sunstein that the 
principle represents a generalized attitude of caution, rather than a functional rule to apply in 
situations of risk and uncertainty.  
Consistent with its emphasis on a hierarchical understanding of administrative decision-
making, the MOE also characterized its Directors’ authority as minimal, and inadequate to apply 
the SEV’s principles. The MOE, in a submission that was ignored by the Court in its judgment, 
insisted that because the EBR refers to the “Minister’s” responsibility to consider the SEV, and 
the Minister of the Environment had not explicitly delegated that task to the MOE’s Directors, 
they therefore lacked the jurisdiction to apply the SEV.298 This formalistic understanding of the 
Directors’ role closely aligns with the RI paradigm. It is also at odds with Canadian views of 
administrative constitutionalism, which recognize that delegated authority and responsibility 
flow together: If an administrative decision-maker exercises delegated authority, then 
corresponding responsibilities – such as the application of a relevant law – must also be 
fulfilled.299 The MOE’s arguments on the Directors’ restricted authority are more illustrative of 
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its own acceptance of RI principles than any fissures in the current state of Canadian law on 
administrative delegation. 
Although parties may abandon positions taken for a Tribunal hearing and adopt new ones 
on judicial review, there is a logical tension inherent in arguing that a Tribunal was unreasonable 
to accept the same legal argument that the same party previously made in the same proceeding. 
LOW, LEC, and the other S 38 applicants highlighted this tension in regard to Lafarge’s changed 
position on the SEV’s – and precautionary approach’s – relevance.300 The S 38 Applicants could 
not directly address the MOE’s changed position in their written submissions because the ERT’s 
factum was filed later, but their comments on Lafarge’s shift applied equally to the MOE. The 
inconsistency, however, may be explained as a strategic choice to not contest the ERT’s previous 
jurisprudence on the issue when arguing before that Tribunal. The judicial review proceeding 
represented an opportunity to challenge the ERT’s jurisprudence before judges who were not 
responsible for its creation. 
 The nature and scope of this opportunity – specifically the degree of deference the 
reviewing Court owes the Tribunal – is a matter of administrative constitutionalism. Lafarge and 
the MOE claimed that only minimal deference was due because the points of statutory 
interpretation at issue were not specific to environmental decision-making.301 In contrast, the S 
38 applicants even argued that “Tribunal case law has made the SEV relevant law and policy.”302  
Consistent with the general tenor of LOW’s submissions on judicial review and at the 
ERT, LOW’s reasoning in regard to the SEV adheres closely to DC principles: Because the ERT 
exercises administrative authority, it benefits from the DC model’s respect for administrative 
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discretion. LOW drew on ideas of accountability in arguing that it was appropriate for the ERT 
to consider the SEV, including the precautionary principle. Citing the EBR’s provisions that 
compel prescribed Ministries to draft an SEV and consult it when making environmentally 
significant decisions, LOW posited the provisions amounted to a “legal duty.” Building on this 
claim, LOW argued that the ERT acted reasonably in determining that the SEV fell within the 
ambit of “relevant law.” LOW further noted that past ERT decisions similarly relied on the 
SEV.303  
Beyond its expansive reading of the EBR’s accountability provisions, LOW also 
emphasized the ERT’s institutional responsibility to promote accountability and compliance. 
Responsibility and authority are closely aligned concepts in administrative law, which made 
LOW’s submissions on this point essential for its broader arguments on Standard of Review and 
the jurisdictional propriety of the ERT’s decision. This foundational character of LOW’s claims 
about the ERT’s accountability powers is apparent in LOW’s submissions on the SEV’s 
relevance: “it is not open to this Honourable Court to effectively re-try the case, or to find facts, 
regarding SEV compliance… As discussed below, the task of determining [leave to appeal] 
applications has been assigned by the Ontario legislature to the ERT, not the courts.”304 Here 
LOW is presenting a kind of “zero sum” view of accountability, where the ERT’s role in 
promoting accountability with the EBR effectively supplants the Court’s jurisdiction.  
Lafarge, in contrast, defined the ERT’s responsibilities in sparse terms, and then 
challenged the ERT’s performance of those responsibilities. Lafarge’s attitude to the ERT’s past 
decisions, including Lafarge, was openly critical. Calling the ERT’s interpretation of the test 
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“overly lenient,” Lafarge urged the Court to overhaul the ERT’s jurisprudence in this area.305 It 
alleged that “the clear language of the test in S 41 has been misapplied to the point where an 
applicant need not even show that a decision was wrong – merely that it appears to have been 
unreasonable.”306 Establishing “good reason” to believe the wrongness of a decision was the 
minimum demanded by S 41, not a task reserved for the appellate review following a successful 
leave application. The standard of proof is a balance of probabilities, and what must be proven to 
that standard is the existence of “good reason to believe that no reasonable person could have 
made the decision.”307   
Compared to the Court’s firm endorsement of the Tribunal’s interpretation of the S 41 
test, its comments on the relevance of the SEV were more measured: “it is arguable, and, 
therefore, reasonable to have regarded the SEV as relevant policy…”308 This still represented a 
victory for the S 41 Applicants, but the Court’s language indicates that the victory may have 
been a product of the earlier standard of review finding: it is unclear if the Tribunal’s finding on 
the SEV’s relevance would have withstood a correctness review. And the Court’s conclusion on 
this issue may have been determinative: “Lafarge argued that at the heart of the case is the 
question whether the Directors unreasonably failed to consider the SEV.”309 Lafarge could have 
prevailed on this question either by showing that the Directors were free to disregard the SEV, or 
by showing that they had adequately considered it. 
Responding to the leave Respondents’ allegation that the Tribunal improperly scrutinized 
the adequacy of laws and regulations instead of simply focusing on their application, the Court 
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quoted from the Tribunal’s judgment on this point: “The Tribunal agrees that the laws and 
policies that apply to the Directors’ decisions are not themselves the subject of the test under the 
first branch of section 41 […].”310 (emphasis added) In contrast, the leave Respondents had 
maintained that the ERT’s own characterization of its approach was inaccurate, in an implicit 
accusation of a lack of transparency.311 The Court’s decision to approvingly quote this passage 
signaled its confidence in the Tribunal’s transparency and acceptance of the distinction the 
Tribunal drew between the first and second branches of the S 41 test. Deference prevailed and 
the SEV’s relevance was accordingly secured. Both the legal foundation for the Court’s ruling on 
this point – deference to a specialized tribunal’s findings – and the resulting recognition of a 
polycentric accountability framework to promote the precautionary approach’s influence are 
characteristic of DC values.  
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Chapter 9 
Proving Harm with Deference  
The correct – or reasonable – interpretation of the second prong of S 41 emerged as a 
particularly contentious issue on judicial review. Lafarge’s preferred construction of the S 41 test 
implicitly excluded precautionary ideas by making no provision for uncertainty. Claiming that a 
proper statutory interpretation would result in the denial of leave to appeal where the Applicants 
and Respondents present contradictory evidence, Lafarge asked that regulatory decisions escape 
appellate scrutiny where uncertainty exists – yet contradictory evidence, where both sides have 
solid empirical foundations, necessarily results in uncertainty.312 DSBLF disputed Lafarge’s 
contention that only novel environmental harm – i.e. harm beyond the status quo – can meet the 
threshold for significant environmental harm under the second prong of the S 41 test. Contrary to 
the idea that only new harm can be significant, DSBLF maintained that all of the proposed 
project’s emissions must be evaluated, not only any increase in emissions.313   
However, the volume of submissions on this point was unmatched by the Court, which 
dealt with the issue briefly. Rejecting Lafarge’s argument that where expert evidence is divided, 
leave must be denied,314 the Court instead based its finding of reasonableness precisely on the 
existence of (expert) disagreement and resulting uncertainty about the potential for significant 
environmental harm. The Court also affirmed the Tribunal’s view that compliance with 
numerical limits is not determinative.315  
Recalling that there is no statutory obligation to include precaution within a ministerial 
SEV also assists with efforts to construe the meaning of “significant harm to the environment” in 
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S 41: The command to avoid redundancy, a tenet of statutory interpretation, is inapplicable here 
because S 41 was not drafted with any guarantees that the precautionary principle would be 
reflected elsewhere in the regulatory framework. 
In finding for the leave Applicants on the second branch of S 41, the Court stated that it 
“should not second guess the Tribunal in this regard.”316 This remark represents a denial of the 
leave Respondents’ arguments that the decisions of the Directors merit deference on judicial 
review. The Court’s deference was reserved for the ERT. As Fisher notes, the role of specialized 
appellate tribunals like the ERT is ambiguous under both the RI and DC paradigms. Yet the 
presence of DC concepts in the Court’s judgment, including in its consideration of the second 
branch of the test, suggests that the deference is grounded in DC principles. 
 The debates surrounding the application of the precautionary approach featured a 
similarly complex reliance on DC and RI concepts. Lafarge’s submissions on the precautionary 
approach centred on distinguishing a lack of experience with tire burning from scientific 
uncertainty about the risks posed by the practice. The Tribunal, according to Lafarge, had 
confused these two concepts. The MOE’s acknowledgement that it lacked experience with tire 
burning was insufficient to trigger the precautionary principle’s application because outside 
Ontario regulators were familiar with burning tires for fuel, and scientific evidence established 
the practice’s safety.317 Lafarge also claimed that the Tribunal erred by not examining whether 
the conditions attached to the Approvals reflected a precautionary approach. Following an 
admission that the precautionary principle imposes a burden of proof on a source of 
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environmental risk, Lafarge criticized the Tribunal for not inquiring into whether Lafarge 
satisfied that burden.318 
 Although Lafarge attempted to exclude the SEV and the precautionary principle from S 
41’s ambit, its claims about the Tribunal’s interpretation of the principle were more modest. 
Lafarge aimed at marginalizing the precautionary principle and reducing its legal significance, 
but Lafarge did not seek to transform the content of the principle from how the Tribunal had 
understood it. A narrower understanding of scientific uncertainty that looks to the decisions of 
scientists and regulators in other jurisdictions at the expense of local experience may be 
suggestive of RI concepts, but DC theories can also accommodate an understanding of scientific 
uncertainty that is grounded in global scientific knowledge. Thus Lafarge’s arguments here 
sought to refine rather than transform the Tribunal’s interpretation of the precautionary approach. 
The MOE arguments on this point were more radical. In a shift from its stance at the 
ERT, the MOE supported a narrower understanding of the precautionary principle:319   
[Precaution] is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not Certificates of Approval should be 
issued in respect of a facility that has emissions to the environment, except to the extent 
that terms and conditions in the approval might prevent adverse effects to the 
environment. (emphasis added) 
 
Crucially, this was an alternative argument: it was only applicable if the Court rejected the 
MOE’s arguments about the relevance of the SEV and the precautionary approach. Thus the 
“irrelevance” cited by the MOE did not refer to the issue of whether the Directors must consider 
the precautionary approach. 
According to the reasoning outlined in the above passage, precaution only serves to 
minimize environmental harm; it cannot direct – or empower - regulators to prohibit a practice 
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with harmful emissions. The MOE acknowledged the gulf separating this interpretation from the 
Tribunal’s interpretation, and claimed that the Tribunal had “misinterpreted the Precautionary 
Principle and consequently has erred in its application to the facts of this case.”320 The MOE’s 
arguments on judicial review were consistently RI, but the MOE’s definition of the precautionary 
principle is so tame here that it is unclear whether it even qualifies as precaution. Lafarge in its 
submissions argued that the conditions attached to the Approvals reflected a precautionary 
approach, but unlike the MOE it did not claim that precaution was “irrelevant” to the question of 
permitting or rejecting a proposal with environmental effects.321 
The S 38 Applicants emphasized that the Tribunal made findings of fact in regard to the 
precautionary approach that the Court should not “retry,” but they did not adopt Member Pardy’s 
“as hazardous as it could possibly be” formulation of the principle.322 LEC maintained that the 
precautionary approach consisted of three elements: “(1) a threat of environmental harm; (2) 
uncertainty; and (3) action.”323 It further stated that “insight and the awareness of the 
vulnerability of ecosystems combined form the basic rationale of the precautionary approach.”324 
On both the precautionary approach and environmental discrimination grounds, the S 38 
Applicants emphasized that the Tribunal found that the Directors had failed to consider either 
issue at all; it was not a question of whether the Directors had unreasonably applied the 
precautionary approach or erred in concluding that there was no discrimination. LEC defined the 
question before the Court on the discrimination claim as follows: “[Was the ERT] reasonable in 
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finding that the Director should have considered the possibility of discrimination…”?325 
(emphasis in the original)  
Like its arguments on the precautionary approach, Lafarge’s criticisms of the Tribunal’s 
discrimination finding were measured. Lafarge concentrated on the Safety-Kleen decision, which 
it alleged that the Tribunal had misinterpreted. Consistency of environmental effects was the 
critical factor, not the activities in question. Because permitting tire burning in Bath would not 
expose its residents to adverse environmental effects, according to Lafarge, no discrimination 
would follow from approving Lafarge’s project while banning the practice elsewhere in the 
province.326 The DSBLF Applications, in addition to emphasizing that the Tribunal made 
findings of fact on this point, noted that Member Pardy wrote the Safety-Kleen decision and was 
thus unlikely to have misinterpreted it.327 
The MOE, in contrast to Lafarge, challenged the legal foundations of the Tribunal’s 
reasoning on the discrimination ground. No legal requirement to keep adverse environmental 
effects constant throughout the province was admitted by the MOE:328  
[The Tribunal] did not indicate what law or policy required the Director to ensure 
consistent environmental effects throughout Ontario. It did not as there is none. In fact 
the legal regime in which the Director must operate specifically provides for the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council to make regulations that by their nature discriminate. 
 
This sharply diverges from the ERT’s reasoning, as well as the arguments made by both Lafarge 
and the S 38 Applicants. However, the Court’s opinion on this issue is unclear. Like the ERT, the 
Court grounded its consideration of the precautionary approach around the practice of tire 
burning. But despite concluding that the Tribunal’s findings in regard to discrimination were 
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reasonable, it did not determine if the discrimination ground “standing alone, would be sufficient 
to support the granting of leave.”329 (The same statement also applied to the common law rights 
ground.) 
The Court held that because the Approvals were issued “in the face of uncertainty about 
environmental risks from the adverse effects of tire burning…,” the Tribunal reasonably found 
that the Directors' unreasonably ignored the precautionary approach.330 Reasonableness is 
operating at two levels here: in the ERT’s assessment of the leave Application, and the Court’s 
review of the ERT’s performance. This complexity is reflected in the Court’s concluding 
sentence on the Tribunal’s SEV findings: “it was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that it 
appeared that there is good reason to believe that no reasonable person could have made the 
decisions to issue the CofAs without applying an ecosystem approach and a precautionary 
approach to its decisions.”331 
After making these finding in favour of the leave Applicants on the interpretation of the S 
41 test, the SEV’s relevance, and the Directors’ failure to consider the ecosystem and 
precautionary approaches, the Court declined to make a definitive finding on the discrimination 
ground.332 While accepting that the Tribunal’s findings were reasonable,333 the Court also 
refrained from stipulating whether the discrimination finding was enough to satisfy the S 41 test. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter 5, Member Pardy’s reasoning on the discrimination claim 
featured RI ideas and rested on the same facts that were considered through a DC lens in the 
context of the precautionary approach. Both grounds involved questions about environmental 
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risk. It is unclear how the Court would have decided on the discrimination issue, but it is worth 
noting that the Court had the opportunity to uphold the Tribunal’s findings about environmental 
risk on both DC and RI grounds, and chose the DC ground. The result of the Court’s choice in 
Lafarge was that DC understandings of precaution had a firmer place in Ontario law than their 
RI counterparts.  
The DC-infected arguments made by LEC, LOW and the DSBLF applicants throughout 
the Lafarge case therefore gained favour with the Court. CAB’s strongly RI and precautionary 
arguments – advanced before the ERT, but not pursued on judicial review – and Lafarge’s RI but 
anti-precautionary arguments were both comparatively unsuccessful. The MOE, however, 
adopted inconsistent arguments before the ERT and Divisional Court and found little success 
with either approach. This offers a useful reminder that the choice to rely on DC- or RI- 
principles may have no impact on the ultimate result. But the dismissal of the Individual 
Applications illustrates that the choice to embrace neither model, and instead advance a purely 
precautionary claim that disregards questions of administrative constitutionalism, virtually 
guarantees failure. These conclusions are further explored in the following Chapter. 
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PART IV: Reflections and Discussion 
Chapter 10 
Discussion  
The literature review examined three broad, and overlapping, areas of scholarship that 
share a preoccupation with understanding environmental risk and the (non-)responses it 
provokes: science/democracy theory; the study of precautionary and promethean ideas, including 
the potency of different conceptions of the precautionary principle; and administrative 
constitutionalism theory. The methodology applied to investigate the Lafarge debates owes most 
to the third category, administrative constitutionalism and specifically Fisher’s idea of RI and 
DC framings. The study’s findings, however, speak to the relationship among all three areas of 
scholarship. In this chapter, I will make three concise and inter-related arguments, each of which 
is grounded in the study’s findings: first, the science/democracy framing is inadequate and 
marked by logical contradictions; second, neither the DC nor the RI paradigm is more 
precautionary than the other, and consequently the question of which paradigm prevails in a 
given jurisdiction or context has little significance for how environmental risk is regulated; and 
third, the discourse of administrative constitutionalism has an acute exclusionary impact. Hajer’s 
discussion of credibility and the role it plays in securing the dominance of a particular 
environmental discourse further explains these empirical findings and informs the analysis found 
in this chapter.334  
Discourses depend on their exclusionary capacities for their ongoing existence, and this 
aspect of the empirical findings perfectly accords with the theoretical work of Hajer and others. 
There is nothing remarkable or surprising in the mere fact that administrative constitutionalism 
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functions to exclude certain voices and perspectives from environmental decision-making: 
discourses exclude. But exploring what – and who – is excluded is a prerequisite for 
contemplating alternative approaches to constructing and contesting environmental risk, and 
their relative merits. 
 
Abandoning the science/democracy dichotomy:   
The findings confirm that environmental risk is constructed and contested in Ontario 
through the discourse of administrative constitutionalism. They also confirm criticisms of the 
science/democracy framing: as discussed in the literature review, the RI and DC models can both 
claim to be more democratic and more inclusive of scientific expertise. The results accordingly 
vindicate Fisher’s search for an alternative prism to explain the construction and contestation of 
environmental risk, namely administrative constitutionalism.  
However, an important caveat limits the scope of this conclusion: In other contexts, 
including ones involving environmental decision-making, science and democracy may exist in a 
dichotomous relationship. Because the precautionary principle is invoked where there is 
scientific uncertainty, it may be that scientific and democratic values conflict less because the 
former cannot claim to offer a clear direction to either favour or oppose a project. Precautionary 
concerns are strongest when science is least capable of providing a certain answer. This is not 
necessarily true in every environmental decision-making context, and the analysis here does not 
support universalizing the criticisms of adopting a science/democracy framing in precautionary 
debates to all environmental debates. 
Both science and democracy were significant in the Lafarge precautionary debates, but 
they did not neatly fit into an oppositional relationship. Participants frequently invoked both 
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concepts to support their positions. And the core disagreement underlying precautionary debates 
– whether safety should be presumed or subject to a rigorous standard of proof335 – cannot be 
divided along a science/democracy framing because both sides accommodate precautionary 
principle supporters and critics. This core disagreement was most immediately apparent in the 
arguments about what expert evidence is needed to satisfy the second branch of the S 41 test, 
which concerns the risk of significant environmental harm. The MOE maintained that if “strong 
expert evidence” points to the project’s safety, the second branch cannot be satisfied.336 The S 41 
applicants countered, in a submission that was ultimately accepted by the ERT, that when expert 
evidence is contradictory, a sufficient possibility of environmental harm is established to satisfy 
the second branch of the test.337 The two arguments therefore diverged on this core issue of 
whether safety or danger is presumed when the scientific evidence does not point to a single 
answer.338 
The genesis of the science/democracy framing’s enduring popularity and influence may 
lie in debates like the one discussed here regarding contradictory evidence, which are more aptly 
described as being concerned with expertise. Where Sunstein, Whiteside and others attribute 
disagreements between citizen advocates of precaution and scientists who support technological 
innovation to a deeper tension between science and democracy, the results here support Jasanoff, 
Fisher and others who see such disagreements as being about expertise.339 More practically, it is 
impossible to draw a line between “supporters” and “opponents” of science in the Lafarge 
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debates: all participants, including the individual applicants, argued that the scientific evidence – 
including any lack of evidence – supported their position.  
 Crucially, disagreements about whether there is a scientific consensus on a specific 
environmental risk issue, and what that scientific consensus supports, should not be confused 
with disagreements about the relative value of science and democracy. The Lafarge debates 
illustrate that the proposed project’s critics and supporters alike looked to scientific evidence, 
while disagreeing about what that evidence revealed.  
Member Pardy’s discussion of environmental discrimination further illustrates how the 
dichotomy fails to adequately explain precautionary debates. Equity – namely the objective of 
ensuring that environmental impacts and risks are kept constant across Ontario – drives Pardy’s 
reasoning on this point. However, the normative assumptions underlying his reasoning are at 
odds with both the importance of choice and the resulting accommodation of difference in most 
democratic theories, as well as the scientific reality that environmental conditions across an area 
the size of Ontario cannot be measured according to a single standard or kept uniform.340  
The broad brush strokes of Member Pardy’s reasoning on the environmental 
discrimination claim, with its reliance on rule of law considerations, recalls administrative 
constitutionalism as the concept is defined by Fisher. Both are concerned with the nature and 
extent of state authority, including the accountability standards to which government actors are 
held. Yet it cannot be said to fit comfortably within either an RI or DC framework. The 
inflexibility is anathema to the DC paradigm, while the lack of any clear legislative authority 
distinguishes it from Rational-Instrumentalism. Ultimately, Member Pardy’s rule of law 
reasoning appears to share more with the RI than the DC model, but it also speaks to the 
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potential for precautionary arguments to exist in tension with both scientific and democratic 
values. Like the LEC-LOW and CAB arguments that pursued robustly precautionary arguments 
through reliance on different paradigms of administrative constitutionalism, precautionary 
arguments can integrate one, both, or neither side of the democracy and science pairing.  
Exploring the concept of deference further confirms the inadequacy of a 
science/democracy finding. Deference underpins the law of judicial review and determining the 
measure of deference that is owed to an administrative decision-maker can prove decisive in a 
judicial review challenge. One question specifically raised by the findings is the intersection of 
democracy with judicial review, and in particular the choice of a standard of review. The 
deference embodied in the standard of reasonableness is not free-standing, but instead deference 
to officials appointed (directly or indirectly) by elected officials.341 The nexus between deference 
and a concern for respecting democratic choices is therefore readily apparent. But before too 
quickly jumping from recognition of this nexus to a return to the traditional science/democracy 
framing epitomized by Sunstein and Whiteside, Fisher’s remarks about the “analytical 
opportunism” that characterizes precautionary debates within the discourse of administrative 
constitutionalism must be considered.342 The S 38 Applicants all spoke of the ERT’s statutorily-
designated expertise and responsibility, and resulting claims to deference, but based on the 
research conducted here there is no indication that the S 38 applicants’ views on standard of 
review amounted to more than a strategic choice to limit the court’s review of its victory at the 
ERT. There is simply no indication as to the origins and foundations of the S 38 Applicants’ 
arguments on standard of review, beyond their stated interest in opposing the proposed facility’s 
construction.  
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The lack of a solid boundary separating the two sides of the dichotomy is perhaps best 
captured by the “experiment” terminology embraced by LEC-LOW in its submissions regarding 
the MOE’s “pilot project” announcement. The claim of unfairness supported the 
inappropriateness of subjecting Bath residents to an “experiment”, and the allegations of 
methodological frailties supported the claim of unfairness and discrimination. Consistent with 
the submissions by all parties, LEC-LOW sought to blend democratic and scientific values.  
Moreover, efforts to extend the science/democracy framing to the deference analysis on 
judicial review must fail because the ERT’s authority is rooted in viable claims to both 
democratic legitimacy and scientific expertise.343 Opposition to showing deference to the ERT’s 
decisions is most obviously based on a desire to ensure that the best possible decisions are made 
and skepticism about the ERT’s ability to accomplish that goal relative to a Court’s ability. This 
concern cannot be linked to any underlying views about the relative value of science and 
democracy.  
What emerges from the findings on the nexus between deference and democracy is that 
while democracy remains both critically important and contested in conflicts between RI and DC 
advocates, a science/democracy dichotomy cannot be mapped onto those conflicts. Science, as 
opposed to scientific expertise, does not even feature significantly in arguments about standard 
of review. And even if “scientific expertise” might be capable in some contexts of standing in for 
“science” in a dichotomous relationship with democracy, that possibility does not extend to 
judicial review: Both democracy and scientific expertise belong on the same side of the leger in 
choosing a standard of review; both militate in favour of deference.344 Exploring the place of 
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science, or scientific expertise, in the context of standard of review therefore further reveals the 
inadequacy and logical tensions inherent in a science/democracy framing.   
Pointing out the problems with a science/democracy framing does not say anything 
affirmative about how environmental uncertainty is constructed. But here the case study’s 
findings provide insight and support for Fisher’s theories about administrative constitutionalism 
and environmental uncertainty. While DC and RI arguments are often mixed together in a single 
participant’s submissions, one paradigm would be dominant. With the arguable exception of the 
Individual Applicants, each party’s ultimate position – to either favour or oppose the MOE’s 
approval of the proposed facility – was advanced in distinctly RI or DC terms. More specifically, 
the constructions of environmental risk they advanced were expressed in predominantly RI or 
DC terms. In interpreting the S 41 test for granting leave to appeal, defining the applicable 
standards and burdens of proof, discussing competing expert reports and evidence, and 
constructing environmental risk and harm, the participants relied on their understandings of 
administrative constitutionalism. Thus the results here confirm the findings of the previous 
empirical studies and theoretical works on the inadequacy of a science/democracy framing and 
the significance of administrative constitutionalism. 
 
The agnosticism of conflicts between the RI and DC paradigms:  
In light of the case study’s findings, it is difficult to identify any connection between 
tangible environmental outcomes and whether the RI or DC paradigm is ascendant. The question 
of which paradigm prevails in debates regarding administrative constitutionalism appears to have 
little or no significance for how environmental risk is constructed and regulated. In regard to the 
relative strength of the various interpretations of the precautionary principle advanced in the 
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Lafarge debates, LOW and CAB closely resemble each other despite their support for different 
models of administrative constitutionalism. Similarly, Lafarge and the MOE supported different 
models of administrative constitutionalism at the ERT but shared the same preference for weaker 
interpretations of the precautionary principle.  
Both the RI and DC paradigms accommodate strongly precautionary and promethean 
arguments. Each paradigm served as the vehicle for arguments favouring and opposing the 
proposed facility, and each served to present both precautionary and promethean arguments on 
environmental risk. The Lafarge debates therefore demonstrate that neither paradigm of 
administrative constitutionalism is inherently more or less precautionary. LOW and CAB both 
advanced strongly precautionary views through, respectively, DC and RI concepts. The MOE 
switched from DC to RI arguments on judicial review, but consistently supported a weak 
interpretation of precaution that imposed no substantive obligations.  
On first impression, the differences in regard to burdens and standards of proof may 
appear to produce a substantive difference between two paradigms that makes one more 
precautionary than the other. Some observers maintain that the precautionary principle simply 
reverses the burden of proof. But neither the DC nor RI paradigms support a more or less 
stringent standard of proof: They differ in the emphasis placed on questions of proof, and how 
rigidly they characterize the applicable standards and burdens of proof.345 Thus the MOE’s DC-
inflected submissions on proof at the ERT – submissions that envisioned burdens of proof 
shifting between the S 38 applicants and respondents in a variable and contextualized manner – 
ultimately dovetailed with Lafarge’s RI-inflected submissions on proof.346 Both Lafarge and the 
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MOE argued for the recognition of stringent obligations on the part of S 38 applicants with 
respect to proof.  
A better understanding of the close links that bind constructions of environmental risk 
with constituent discourses of administrative constitutionalism paves the way to understanding 
what is lost and gained by framing debates about where our environmental knowledge ends - and 
what to do when it does - in the language of DC and RI concepts. As the case study details, 
administrative constitutionalism encompasses significant diversity in its constituent RI and DC 
discourses. Administrative constitutionalism includes a panoply of precautionary and 
promethean ideas, even if they all share the same belief that environmental uncertainty is a 
problem of a public administration. This is vividly demonstrated in CAB’s submissions, which 
call for Ministry scientists and civil servants to lead the decision-making process instead of 
politicians and political appointees.347 The question therefore becomes which part of government 
should be making environmental risk decisions, and choosing this starting assumption excludes 
other possible ways of approaching environmental risk.  
There is a striking contrast between the centrality of conflicts between the two paradigms 
and the ultimate environmental insignificance of which one prevails. Consistent with Fisher’s 
theories, environmental risk in the Lafarge debates was contested through the discourse of 
administrative constitutionalism, and specifically the conflict between RI and DC paradigms. 
Arguments about institutional roles and scope for discretion occupied the bulk of each party’s 
written submissions. Yet these two different visions of public accountability and institutional 
organization offered by paradigms appear to say almost nothing about environmental risk and the 
                                                
347 CAB Application supra note 187. 
136 
(lack of a) need for a precautionary response. Instead the two paradigms serve as platforms for 
either precautionary or promethean arguments, as the case may be.  
The strongest thread running through the MOE’s judicial review arguments is not an RI 
or DC paradigm, but a commitment to whichever argument most narrowly defines its 
precautionary powers and responsibilities. This approach, including the abrupt shifts between 
DC and RI concepts it entailed, arguably sacrificed coherence. Although the Court’s unvarnished 
opinion of the shifts is unknown, the opposing parties attempted to exploit the resulting 
inconsistencies in the MOE’s arguments. This response from the MOE’s legal adversaries 
indicates that relying principally either on RI or DC principles in disputes about the 
precautionary principle may be strategically advantageous. Thus the coalescing around DC or RI 
principles that Fisher witnessed in her case studies of debates about the precautionary principle 
may reflect legal tactics in addition to deeply held beliefs about administrative constitutionalism.  
This case study cannot establish a link between the strategic demands of litigation and the 
tendency for parties in a dispute about the precautionary principle to adopt a distinctly RI- or 
DC-paradigm. The evidence is insufficient. But a close reading of arguments made in Lafarge 
reveals that a strategic price was paid when DC and RI principles were blended in a mutually 
contradictory fashion. While Fisher suggests that this coalescing is explained by participants’ 
views about the proper state of public administration, this potential strategic aspect offers an 
alternative explanation for why individual participants in precautionary debates tend to coalesce 
around RI or DC models. It also speaks to why the discourse of administrative constitutionalism 
divides into these two camps: they are storylines, to use Hajer’s term, and coherency is rewarded 
when crafting storylines to use before Tribunals and courts.348 
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This is not to say that the two paradigms are entirely neutral platforms for the arguments 
regarding environmental risk that they convey. As Fisher suggests, even equally strong 
interpretations of the precautionary principle take different forms depending on which paradigm 
it is expressed and applied in. LOW and CAB, for example, both made strongly precautionary 
arguments but the former emphasized inclusive deliberative processes, while the latter 
emphasized unbiased scientific evidence. Both are hallmarks of the DC and RI paradigms, 
respectively. Thus administrative constitutionalism is not entirely irrelevant to how the 
precautionary principle is constructed, even if the primacy of RI or DC ideas has little 
significance for the specific question of how robustly the principle is defined.   
In general, the environmental risk scholars who have engaged with theories of 
administrative constitutionalism have not extended their analysis to the question of whether one 
paradigm is more precautionary than the other. One modest exception is Tollefson and 
Thornback’s work, which endorses the RI paradigm on the grounds that it is more appropriate for 
judicial application and promotes a more contained interpretation of the precautionary 
principle.349 Implicitly, Tollefson and Thornback’s preference follows from a distrust of the more 
potent, and potentially unwieldy, definitions of the precautionary principle. Besides Tollefson 
and Thornback, the question of which model is more strongly precautionary has attracted 
minimal study. This paper’s argument that neither model is more precautionary than the other 
accordingly strikes out new ground that remains largely unexplored. 
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The failed promise of the Deliberative-Constitutive paradigm:  
The DC paradigm of course claims to provide for a more inclusive decision-making 
process that welcomes diverse voices and community-specific understandings of environmental 
risk. Inclusivity is one of its underlying aims and the goal that DC supporters strive to reach. But 
the case study findings, viewed in conjunction with Hajer’s examination of environmental 
discourses, complicate this aspirational picture of the DC model. In practice the DC model 
functions in symbiosis with the RI model. They are defined in opposition to each other and 
through debates about the proper direction of administrative constitutionalism. In an imagined 
decision-making forum where the DC model enjoyed a complete victory over its RI competitor 
and debates about administrative constitutionalism became obsolete, less exclusionary processes 
can be envisioned. Both DC supporters and critics of precaution could contest and thereby co-
produce understandings of environmental risk in a shared process that would be open to broad-
based public involvement. This speculation, however, is hypothetical, utopian and arguably odds 
with the mutually constituting nature of the two paradigms. The plausibility of the DC paradigm 
existing independently of rational instrumentalism is highly doubtful. 
Since the DC model exists within a constantly renewing discourse of administrative 
constitutionalism, all participants are expected to engage with that discourse.350 Meaningful 
access to decision-making processes – where “meaningful” includes having credibility – is 
conditional on understanding and participating in debates regarding administrative 
constitutionalism. The same condition applies regardless of whether DC or RI concepts are 
adopted because in either case participants must establish their credibility within the umbrella 
discourse of administrative constitutionalism. 
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The MOE’s submissions before the ERT, where it emphasized deliberative quality and 
vociferously contested the Individual Applications, exemplifies this internal limit on the DC 
paradigm’s ability to promote inclusion. Crucially, there was no internal contradiction or tension 
between the MOE’s positions on the legal significance of deliberative quality and its insistence 
that the individual applications must be rejected for failing to adequately address the legal and 
evidentiary issues. Both positions are consistent with the DC principles it emphasized at the 
ERT. While the DC model emphasizes deliberative quality, including openness, it exists within 
the discourse of administrative constitutionalism. Credibility within that discourse of course 
demands expert usage of its terminology and careful invocation of its storylines, as Hajer 
explains.351 
The DC paradigm’s inability to remedy the exclusionary impacts of administrative 
constitutionalism’s dominance is a new observation that suggests the need for refining current 
theory in this area. Yet the scope of such refinements would be confined. The findings and 
analysis here support nuanced modifications, not revolutionary changes. That is because the 
findings confirm the DC model’s support for inclusivity and increased public consultation, 
despite its limited success in that endeavour. Thus this analysis does not collapse the core 
distinction between the DC and RI models on the proper role of public consultation, nor does it 
cast doubt on the sincerity of DC advocates who stress the value of public consultation. Instead it 
merely establishes the limited utility of DC support for publicly accessible deliberative 
processes.  
 That limited utility must also not be overstated. Without the influence of DC ideas, the 
discourse of administrative constitutionalism might become more exclusionary. The EBR 
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process studied in this paper – a process that resulted in the overturning of a government decision 
opposed by many community members – itself reflects the influence of DC ideas, as Chapter 3’s 
history of the EBR outlines. It should also be recalled that the definition of the precautionary 
approach found in the SEV evokes DC concepts, including in its reference to exercising caution 
and integration within a broader framework of considerations. Despite being embedded within 
the exclusionary discourse of administrative constitutionalism, and thus incapable of fully 
realizing its promise to open up environmental decision-making processes, the DC paradigm 
nonetheless makes those processes more accessible and transparent.     
Moreover, the DC model may very well reinforce the role and influence of comparatively 
well-resourced groups like LOW that do not draw on the formal legal authority prized in the RI 
model. But LOW’s credibility was a product of its familiarity with administrative 
constitutionalism or, more precisely, the familiarity of the legal professionals representing LOW. 
The DC paradigm may therefore provide more opportunities for dissident and non-governmental 
voices to play a central role in precautionary debates, even while familiarity with the discourse of 
administrative constitutionalism remains a prerequisite for securing that role. 
 
Exclusion: 
The fundamental lack of connection between the two competing paradigms, and any 
identifiable tendency for a more or less precautionary understanding of environmental 
uncertainty, prompts a question: what is the significance of these debates about administrative 
constitutionalism for the problem of environmental uncertainty and its regulation? And how does 
illuminating these debates about administrative constitutionalism further our understanding of 
how environmental uncertainty is constructed given that both paradigms accommodate wholly 
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different understandings of environmental uncertainty? The answer lies in the consequences that 
flow from constructing and contesting environmental uncertainty in the discourse of 
administrative constitutionalism. Although whether the DC or RI model prevails may not have 
much significance for environmental outcomes, the dominance of administrative 
constitutionalism in constructing environmental uncertainty has far-reaching consequences. The 
full extent and nature of the consequences, however, remains unknown because this dominance 
functions to silence alternative voices. We cannot be sure of what such voices would say if they 
were confident of being heard.  
Beyond the rich material provided by the Lafarge submissions, two methodological 
choices proved essential for discovering and engaging with these consequences. First, this paper 
rejects the assumption that environmental risk is inevitably constructed through the discourse of 
administrative constitutionalism. Because inevitability is not assumed, there is room for 
imagining alternatives, and consequently more importance is attached to fully understanding the 
implications of the status quo of dominant RI and DC paradigms. Second, Hajer’s work 
spotlights and problematizes the exclusionary aspects of discourses. As the fate of the Individual 
Applications indicates, administrative constitutionalism demands a high level of familiarity with 
complex terminology and access to professional expertise, which combine to make it literally 
exclusionary for many citizen participants who lack the requisite financial and other resources. It 
is also exclusionary in another sense because the very construction of environmental risk through 
administrative constitutionalism precludes alternative constructions. 
A glimpse of the alternative paths foreclosed by reliance on administrative 
constitutionalism is found in Sandra Willard’s submissions. Willard extensively quoted and 
relied on the Minister’s public statements about the importance of protecting the environment, 
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and suggested that approving Lafarge’s proposal would represent a violation of those statements: 
“Please use your discretion to reject Lafarge’s application or require a full Environmental 
Assessment. I prefer the rejection and would consider that in keeping with your own words from 
your own mouth.”352 Willard’s arguments departed from the general focus on S 41, its place 
within the EBR, and the rules that guide Instrument Approval decisions: she directly confronted 
the economic objectives and restrictions that shape environmental decision-making.353  
However, the EBR’s accountability framework, including S 41, excludes any mechanism 
to promote scrutiny or discussion regarding the broader political, economic and budgetary 
choices made by government. (Budgets are excluded from the EBR’s public consultation 
provisions.354) Choices about the economy, trade policy, and labour relations – among other 
issues – may limit the government’s environmental performance, but those choices are excluded 
from the legal debates that occur in S 41 proceedings.355 Sandra Willard’s submissions radically 
transcend the limits of administrative constitutionalism, making her arguments unique in the 
Lafarge debates: the resulting dismissal of her application shows that the hegemony of 
administrative constitutionalism is capable of excluding both people and ideas from 
environmental decision-making in Ontario. 
The result of administrative constitutionalism’s dominance is that precautionary 
advocates cannot make effective arguments that directly express their concerns about 
environmental threats and the inequities in how they are distributed. Instead they must argue 
                                                
352 Willard Application supra note 164. 
353 Mark Winfield, “The Ultimate Horizontal Issue: The Environmental Policy Experiences of 
Alberta and Ontario, 1971-1993” (1994) 27(1) Canadian Journal of Political Science 129 at 129-
30; Dryzek et al supra note 10. 
354 Eva Ligeti, “Ontario Regulation 482/95 and the Environmental Bill of Rights: A Special 
Report” (January 17, 1996).   
355 McKay, supra note 136 at 62-3. 
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about public administration and how it should function. Precautionary, or anti-precautionary, 
objectives must be pursued indirectly by linking the desired regulatory outcome with an RI or 
DC argument about public administration. At their core, all the parties in the Lafarge debates – 
with the important exception of the individual applicants – relied on essentially the same logic to 
advance their (anti-)precautionary objectives: If administrative constitutionalism is understood 
properly, then the S 41 test is (or is not) met in regard to the precautionary approach. 
Administrative constitutionalism, not environmental objectives, animated this logic.  
Revisiting at this juncture the Divisional Court’s central finding underscores how 
inaccessible and removed from the realities faced by Bath residents the Lafarge debates became: 
[I]t was reasonable for the Tribunal to have concluded that without assessing the specific 
potential cumulative ecological consequences of approving the Lafarge applications, and 
given the concern that the CofAs were made in the face of uncertainty about 
environmental risk from the adverse affects of tire burning, the Directors' decision was 
unreasonable because of the failure to take into account SEV principles. Thus, it was 
reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that it appeared that there is good reason to 
believe that no reasonable person could have made the decisions to issue the CofAs 
without applying an ecosystem approach and a precautionary approach to its decisions.356 
  
It is an open question how many of the people interested in the Lafarge debates from the initial 
public comment stage onwards could even find sense in this passage. Lafarge’s culmination in 
this central finding by the Divisional Court encapsulates both how instrumental administrative 
constitutionalism is in regulating environmental risk and the rhetorical concealment it engenders. 
This lack of clarity recalls Rob Nixon’s arguments in his book Slow Violence and the 
Environmentalism of the Poor about the barriers that combine to conceal the full reality of 
                                                
356 Lafarge, supra note 3 at para 60. 
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environmental harms.357 Scott, in a review of Nixon’s book, noted the culpability of 
administrative law in this regard.358 
 Consequently, people like the Individual Applicants in Lafarge who are unwilling or 
unable to indirectly advance their precautionary objectives through RI or DC arguments are 
excluded, in this case by the dismissal of their applications in one paragraph. The Stratfords’ 
submissions, for example, are entirely outside the discourse of administrative constitutionalism. 
Like their fellow individual applicants the Dawbers, the Jenneys, and Sulzenko, it is clear that 
the Stratfords participated in the ERT process because they did not want a tire-burning facility in 
their hometown. There is no evidence of engagement or interest in broader questions about 
public administration, which are precisely the type of questions that must be addressed to gain 
credibility within the discourse of administrative constitutionalism. This is of course entirely 
consistent with the work of Hajer on how environmental discourses establish boundaries for who 
and what are included.359  
 Sulzenko’s call for a full environmental assessment and public consultation on the 
grounds that it “makes more sense” also reflects the alternative logic of focusing directly on 
environmental risk, not administrative constitutionalism.360 Because administrative 
constitutionalism is enshrined in the S 41 test, and dominates the construction and contestation of 
environmental risk, arguments that are outside the discourse of administrative constitutionalism, 
like Sulzenko’s, are largely ignored.   
                                                
357 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard 
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Another contextual detail further illuminates the barriers faced by participants in debates 
where full participation is contingent on making sophisticated arguments through the discourse 
of administrative constitutionalism: The S 41 Applicants in Lafarge were successful in terms of 
the legal outcome of the proceedings – leave to appeal was granted, upheld on judicial review, 
and, as explained in the introduction, the project was later abandoned – but their application for a 
costs award was denied. The sum they sought totaled $284,655.19.361 As the ERT explained:362  
The amounts claimed by each of the Costs Applicants include all Counsel fees, expert 
witness fees, and miscellaneous disbursements (including photocopying and 
telecommunication charges, as well as travel and accommodation costs), incurred during 
the course of the entire proceeding. 
 
Under the Tribunal’s Rules of Practice, costs can only be awarded “if the conduct or a 
course of conduct of a Party has been unreasonable, frivolous, vexatious, or if the Party has acted 
in bad faith.”363 The S 41 Applicants sought costs from Lafarge, not the MOE, and argued that 
Lafarge’s conduct was unreasonable and therefore met the Rules of Practice standard. This 
argument was rejected by the ERT in lengthy written reasons that detailed the procedural history 
of the case and scrutinized the parties’ conduct. That ruling was later upheld in a reconsideration 
decision.364 Although this paper cannot address the many competing objectives and concerns 
underlying costs rules,365 recalling the financial cost of participating in the Lafarge case enriches 
our understanding of administrative constitutionalism’s discursive dominance and the 
implications of that dominance. 
                                                
361 Baker v Directors, Ministry of the Environment, Case Nos 07-009-07-016 (June 16, 2009) at 
4. The costs application was heard by the ERT following the Divisional Court’s judicial review 
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146 
The above analysis traces the significance of administrative constitutionalism’s 
dominance in constructing environmental risk, and the relative insignificance of whether the DC 
or RI model prevails. Specifically, the outcome of conflicts between the DC and RI paradigms – 
and the question of which paradigm is ascendant – has little impact on the response to 
environmental uncertainty. In contrast, the discourse of administrative constitutionalism 
functions to exclude voices and ideas that cannot fit within its boundaries and adopt its 
terminology: this raises questions about who and what is excluded by this dominance. Because 
this paper does not accept that administrative constitutionalism’s discursive dominance is 
inevitable, the question that calls for further contemplation and research is whether its dominance 
is desirable. Although conflicts between the DC and RI paradigms may have minimal 
environmental significance, does administrative constitutionalism’s dominance change how 
governments respond to environmental uncertainty? The concern driving this curiosity is 
whether environmental uncertainty is regulated differently because it is constructed and 
contested through the discourse of administrative constitutionalism. If so, efforts to remake how 
environmental uncertainty is addressed must engage with and challenge the dominance of 
administrative constitutionalism.  
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